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ABSTRACT 
 
 
On the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of Black Power and amidst a resurgence of national 
interest in African American grassroots political mobilizations under the Black Lives Matter 
umbrella, this dissertation argues for a reformulation of how we understand the history of the 
civil rights movement, Black Power, and their respective, though interrelated, relationships to 
Black-defined liberation, mainstream liberalism, and radical politics. By analyzing and reframing 
familiar debates this project pursues a more usable history for ongoing liberation struggles. It 
first argues that though it was politically valuable to the civil rights establishment to align itself 
with mainstream white liberals in the national politics, in media, and in the public sphere, this 
civil rights liberal alliance ultimately de-centered Black-defined interests, visions, and goals 
from the Black freedom struggle. While grassroots, Black-centered direct action was a key part 
of the civil rights liberal framework, maintaining strategic alliance with white liberals in 
positions of power continued to be a movement priority. 
From this basis this dissertation re-interprets the liberal framework of the mainstream 
civil rights movement by examining the uneasy relationship between the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the civil rights liberal alliance. SNCC’s political trajectory 
illustrates these tensions well. They were an organization of young people who were both 
independent from but highly influenced by existing civil rights organizations. Yet, over the 
course of SNCC’s organizational life, they eventually eschewed the liberal framework out of 
which they came. This project examines this trajectory, highlighting their call for Black Power in 
1966 to demonstrate the ways in which Black Power represented a reassertion of Black-centered 
struggle and simultaneously, how that re-assertion was unacceptable within the framework of the 
civil rights liberal alliance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In spite of compounding evidence to the contrary, most popular historical narratives 
(liberal and conservative) continue to celebrate the classical civil rights movement period (1954-
1965) as a hallmark of American progress. In these narratives, the passage of the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act on the heels of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ensured that African Americans were no 
longer second-class citizens in the United States. Though racist white outliers still existed in 
backwards and parochial pockets, particularly in the South, the predominant narrative tells us 
that the lion’s share of what was needed to overcome racial inequality in the United States had 
been accomplished. Such celebrations ignore the advances in systemic white supremacy and 
anti-Blackness that have developed in the last half-century, in the wake of, and often in direct 
response to, the gains of the civil rights movement. The rise of mass incarceration and mass 
criminalization, for example, which continue to disproportionately impact people of color and 
Black communities in particular, emerged after the supposed achievement of a post-civil rights 
racial equality.  
Mainstream explanations of these trends have relied on narratives of Black pathology, 
immorality, and individual responsibility. In fact, the legal achievements of the civil rights 
movement have been mobilized as justification for these narratives: African Americans caught 
up in the system had no one to blame but themselves. While pathologizing narratives and 
dehumanizing characterizations of Black people have had a continual presence in American 
history, they took new form in the post-civil rights era. The angry Black criminal and the 
undeserving welfare queen shared an inappropriate sense of entitlement and ungratefulness.1 
                                                
1For more on framing entitlement see: Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, “‘The Crime of Survival’: 
Fraud Prosecutions, Community Surveillance, and the Original ‘Welfare Queen’,” Journal of 
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These tropes arose in juxtaposition to the image of Black humility, morality, and respectability 
embodied by the mythic civil rights movement figure. It is not circumstantial that the heroic civil 
rights leaders we often memorialize were, like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., educated men, from 
middle class professional backgrounds, with claims to Christian morality and a steadfast 
dedication to nonviolence. This mold was strategic and effective. It helped to define the strict 
bounds of civil rights legitimacy that facilitated the civil rights movement. 
This dissertation re-examines the traditional civil rights movement period and explores 
the bounds of civil rights legitimacy in order to reframe how we think of the civil rights 
movement in the ongoing Black freedom struggle. It is no longer sufficient for our everyday 
histories to view the civil rights movement so simply, as a celebratory marker of success for 
Black freedom. Instead, I contend that the most useful way to understand the civil rights 
movement is as a limited alliance between mainstream civil rights leaders and organizations, on 
the one hand, and white liberals on the other. While this formulation is less dramatic, I believe it 
is both more accurate and also more effective at making sense of what has happened in the 
ongoing Black freedom struggle over the past half century. This civil rights liberal alliance 
helped to facilitate a great expansion of liberal power in the postwar period in the United States. 
Yet how this alliance developed and functioned significantly circumscribed the Black freedom 
struggle by carving out a narrow band of legitimacy in terms of movement goals, strategies, 
tactics, participants, leaders, practices, and values. As a result, the Black freedom struggle had 
unprecedented mainstream visibility and support during the era of the civil rights movement. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Social History (Winter 2007): 329-354; Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, “Guns and Butter: The 
Welfare State, the Carceral State, and the Politics of Exclusion in the Postwar United States,” 
Journal of American History 102, no. 1 (2015): 87-99; Marisa Chappell, The War on Welfare: 
Family, Poverty, and Politics in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2009). 
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However, the implicit rules of the civil rights liberal alliance prioritized the interests of 
movement allies over the self-defined interests and concerns of Black people. In this way, while 
grassroots direct action mobilizations and on-the-ground organizing efforts led by African 
Americans made the civil rights movement possible, the civil rights liberal alliance established a 
context in which Black humanity and Black lives could still be easily de-centered. For scholars 
and activists interested in ongoing liberation struggles, this is the story of the civil rights 
movement that needs to be emphasized. 
 
Terminology: Black Humanity, Liberalism, and the Civil Rights Liberal Alliance 
Starting from the assumption that liberation is inextricable from a conscious sense of 
one’s own personal power and human agency, this project uses the term “Black humanity” in the 
context of the Black freedom struggle to refer to the configurations of internal liberation, 
including themes of consciousness, agency, pride, and self-determination at the level of the 
individual as well as the community.  
The merger of interests between leaders of mainstream civil rights organizations, white 
liberal politicians, mainstream liberal power holders in media, industry, and U.S. institutions 
outside of politics, including labor, and mainstream liberal popular sentiment, has been called 
various things: liberal civil rights alliance, liberal civil rights coalition, labor-liberal-civil rights 
coalition, etc. In this dissertation I primarily use the term “civil rights liberal alliance” to refer to 
this set of merged interests, though the others work, and do emerge occasionally in this writing 
as well. 
Among the most challenging terms to grapple with in this project are “liberal” and 
“liberalism.” Those who self-identified as liberals in mainstream politics, media, and mass 
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culture and claimed allegiance to a liberal ideology are certainly included. But my use of 
“liberal” in this project is also as a descriptor for a variety of behaviors, assumptions, and goals 
among mainstream figures and everyday people who, though they may come from a variety of 
political affiliations, functioned as liberals in relation to the Black freedom struggle. 
A critique of liberalism is a central part of this project and yet the definition of liberalism 
that it uses is admittedly fluid. Though I am sympathetic to critiques that in this formulation 
“liberalism” and “liberal” can become catchall terms, I also believe that it is a necessary fluidity 
to attend to the mutability and multifaceted nature of how liberalism has functioned in its 
interactions with the Black freedom struggle during and since the civil rights movement.  
Common definitions of classical liberalism have included a commitment to themes like 
individual freedom, natural rights, and constitutional government. However, this formulation 
offers very little to distinguish between liberal and conservative politics in recent U.S. history, 
for example, as both derive from what we call classical or constitutional liberalism. Instead, this 
dissertation is concerned with the particular manifestation of liberalism that emerged in the 
United States after World War II and solidified against the backdrop of the cold war. According 
to historian Doug Rossinow, while many of the liberals of the 1930s had joined with those to 
their left in Popular Front politics, postwar liberalism embraced a new uncritical commitment to 
capitalism, an explicit rejection of left allies, and a seemingly deep aversion to anything 
resembling revolutionary or radical alternatives. “The memory of liberalism’s anti-capitalist 
heritage,” he explains, “of the fierce critique of American capitalism that long had animated one 
large wing of American liberalism, quickly faded, a memory that liberals had reason to wish 
gone during the era of McCarthyism. The earlier compatibility of liberalism with a supportive 
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view of social transformation was erased from the nation’s political rule book.”2 As Rossinow 
suggests, postwar liberals became increasingly invested in celebrating, rather than challenging, 
the “progress” of postwar American politics and global capitalism.  According to Sociologist 
Paul Starr, “…in the years after World War II many historians and social scientists regarded the 
liberal project and American civic creed as more or less identical.”3  
In this sense, postwar liberals became the primary defenders of the status quo. Yet, 
simultaneously, and most significantly for this project, they were also committed to expanding 
civil rights and liberties to those who had been excluded in the past, particularly African 
Americans. This combination manifested in a very particular set of interests, particularly among 
white liberals in the postwar United States. “Liberals gradually embraced the cause of civil rights 
and racial inclusion,” Rossinow explains, “but they did not welcome insurgencies against the 
American social and political system, either domestically or internationally, as cold war radicals 
did—and as some earlier liberals had.”4 Thus, while the postwar liberal was committed to racial 
equality, she was even more committed to the prevailing economic, social, and political systems 
of the United States. 
Situating postwar liberals in a particular historical context provides a partial explanation 
for the way that “liberal” and “liberalism” appear in this text. However, as historian Matthew 
Countryman explains, postwar liberalism was still a “slippery ideological phenomenon” and 
liberals had an “ideological fluidity.” Part of this fluidity was due to the way that liberalism 
functioned. Liberal “political commitments,” Countryman suggests, “…were tied more to 
                                                
2 Doug Rossinow, Visions of Progress: The Left-Liberal Tradition in America (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 8. 
3 Paul Starr, Freedom’s Power: The True Force of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 
1. 
4 Doug Rossinow, Visions of Progress, 9. 
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process than they were to ideology.” Rather than “a coherent and consistent political ideology” 
liberalism could be “a marker of a particular social and class location.”5 According to journalist 
Edmund Fawcett, liberalism was as much a practice as it was an ideology.6 In the context of the 
postwar Black freedom struggle, liberals engaged in a variety of practices and processes from a 
variety of societal roles and locations. 
 Indeed, scholars who have studied the history and political philosophy of liberalism are 
often most closely agreed on one thing: it is difficult to define. As political theorist Michael 
Freeden explains, “There is no single, unambiguous thing called liberalism…. It may therefore 
be more accurate to talk about liberalisms in the plural, all part of a broad family exhibiting both 
similarities and differences.”7 Though Freeden is referring to various manifestations of liberalism 
that have existed across the globe over the past few centuries, his proposal of multiple 
liberalisms is also meaningful in the particular context of postwar liberalism in the United States.  
Admittedly, this dissertation is critical of liberalism in all of its forms in the postwar 
context for the ways in which it de-centered Black humanity from the Black freedom struggle. 
However, at least one way in which the concept of multiple liberalisms is useful here is for 
distinguishing between the roles, practices, and values of white liberals and those of African 
American liberals. Though all liberals generally shared a commitment to American values, and a 
belief in the gradual process of reform as the most desirable means of achieving racial equality 
and societal change more broadly, African American liberals had a relationship to the Black 
                                                
5 Matthew Countryman, “Questions of Gender, Class, and Politics in Philadelphia’s Black Power 
Movement,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography Vol. 130, No. 4 (Oct 2006), 
409, 410. 
6 Edmund Fawcett, Liberalism: The Life of An Idea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2014), xviii, xxi. 
7 Michael Freeden, Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 1, 3. 
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freedom struggle that was necessarily distinct from that of whites. Most obviously, white liberals 
were allies while Black liberals were not: the struggle was theirs. The primary critique of 
liberalism in this project is a critique of white liberalism, and, in particular, the ways that white 
liberals wielded power toward their own ends through their alliance with the Black freedom 
struggle. 
Countryman’s discussion of how liberalism functioned in postwar Philadelphia is useful 
for articulating this interpretation. According to Countryman, Philadelphia liberals often 
“convey[ed] the belief that they and only they possessed the necessary combination of technical 
know-how and moral clarity to govern the city well.” This sense of paternalism was a common 
theme among white liberals who interacted with the Black freedom struggle. He continues: 
Philadelphia liberals valorized public service over the pursuit of private interests and 
shared an instinct for a particular mix of technocratic government, gradual top-down 
reform, and managed negotiation of competing interests within the city. Thus, 
Philadelphia’s liberals—white liberals, in particular—could and did see themselves as 
simultaneously allied with, but never fully of, the city’s Democratic machine, local labor 
leaders, and the black freedom movement.8  
 
As Countryman suggests, liberalism is often most easily recognized in practices and approaches, 
in particular those that were invested in top-down solutions to racial inequality, putting decision-
making in the hands of “experts”, and an overarching commitment to the existing social, cultural, 
and political structures of the United States, opting for versions of reform and incremental 
adjustment to expand the rights and liberties of more people, rather than working towards radical 
or revolutionary change. In addition, liberalism often reflected an inattentiveness to the invisible 
privileges and hierarchies of white supremacy that existed in mainstream discourse, national 
politics, as well as more immediate, localized, and interpersonal interactions.  
                                                
8  Countryman, “Questions of Gender, Class, and Politics in Philadelphia’s Black Power 
Movement,” 410. 
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The term “liberal civil rights framework” describes the set of values, assumptions, and 
agreements that undergirded the civil rights liberal alliance. Because part of the power of the 
liberal civil rights framework is its mutability, this dissertation tries to define the framework in 
rather broad terms. Specifically, it starts from the assumption that the civil rights movement 
operated within a liberal civil rights framework, which meant that the vision of Black freedom 
within the civil rights movement put primacy on Black alliance with external power holders, 
particularly in the federal government and among other white liberal political and financial allies. 
A distinguishing characteristic of the civil rights movement and its larger liberal civil 
rights frame was the confluence of nonviolent direct action and reliance on liberal allies. This 
created a framework where nonviolent direct action became directed towards eliciting 
sympathetic and moral support from power holders as a primary strategy of liberation. The civil 
rights liberal alliance created the specific and necessary conditions for this strategy. It depended 
equally on nonviolent direct action and white liberal allied support. Furthermore, it created the 
conditions for an essential politics of respectability within the movement. In this way, the liberal 
civil rights framework defined the bounds of legitimate Black protest and Black freedom. They 
were circumscribed by claims to morality, mainstream visibility, strategic commitment to 
nonviolence, and (like in all alliances) approaches and actions that did not threaten the power of 
their white liberal allies. 
Like other scholars who have critiqued aspects of the civil rights movement, my intent is 
not to diminish the accomplishments, courage, or strength of the Black struggles that fall within 
the liberal civil rights framework as I have proposed it. It is rather to recognize the limits 
engendered in the civil rights liberal alliance. Though efforts to assert Black humanity at the 
center of struggle were circumscribed by the interests of liberal allies during the civil rights 
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movement, Black freedom activists never stopped asserting themselves and their visions of 
freedom. Through their labor and passion, the liberation struggle continues. 
 
SNCC and the Civil Rights Liberal Alliance 
This dissertation examines the emergence of the civil rights liberal alliance and looks at 
examples from the political trajectory of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) to illustrate the ways in which Black humanity became de-centered in the civil rights 
movement. The political trajectory of SNCC illustrates the tensions between Black humanity and 
the civil rights liberal alliance well. Formed in April 1960 out of a wave of student sit-ins that 
spread across the South over the course of just a few months, SNCC quickly became the student 
wing of the civil rights movement. Unlike other mainstream civil rights organizations, SNCC 
was formed already deep within the framework of the civil rights liberal alliance. They were an 
organization of young people who were both independent from but highly influenced by existing 
civil rights organizations. Over the course of SNCC’s organizational life, SNCC eventually 
eschewed the liberal framework out of which they came. In public discourse, SNCC Chairman 
Stokely Carmichael’s call for “Black Power” in June 1966 became the flashpoint for this shift. 
The liberal reaction was titanic, with serious implications for the civil rights liberal alliance and 
for SNCC.  
However, unlike liberal declension narratives of the civil rights movement and SNCC, 
this story is not about SNCC’s demise in the face of impatience, disillusionment, and burgeoning 
radicalism (or even in the face of liberal foot-dragging, internalized white racism, and liberal 
political opportunism). Nor is this a project that seeks to romanticize Black Power as an 
unrealized path toward liberation. Instead, this dissertation examines the contours of the civil 
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rights liberal alliance, the struggle between human and liberal interests through the framework of 
nonviolence, the function of liberalism within SNCC, and the public spectacle around SNCC that 
emerged in 1966. I do this in the service of a single primary assertion: that liberalism is 
incompatible with liberation.  
Three interrelated arguments run throughout this dissertation to undergird this assertion. 
First, as I have prefaced here, I argue that we should think of the civil rights liberal alliance as a 
central defining factor of the civil rights movement and, more controversially, that this alliance 
did not advance but in fact limited the pursuit of Black freedom. Second, I posit that this line of 
analysis allows us to see SNCC’s embrace of Black Power in 1966 not as an expression of 
radicalism but instead as an attempt to re-insert Black humanity at the center of struggle. Finally, 
I consider the ways in which the predominance of the civil rights liberal alliance has impacted 
historical work on the civil rights movement. I argue that the limiting effect of this civil rights 
liberal framework has been perpetuated in our historical analysis of grassroots organizing in the 
Black freedom struggle. Our histories often celebrate local, grassroots organizing but fail to 
critically engage it. As a result, Black freedom movement scholarship from a variety of political 
perspectives fails to create robust usable histories for continued liberation struggles. 
The first two chapters of this project explore the origins of the civil rights liberal alliance 
and liberal civil rights framework. Chapter one rehearses historical arguments about the civil 
rights movement to frame the emergence of the civil rights liberal alliance. In chapter two I 
examine the origins of nonviolence as it functioned within the civil rights movement, arguing 
that the particular interpretation of Gandhian nonviolence from Christian pacifists in the 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) had a direct 
impact on the strategic framework of nonviolent direct action in the civil rights movement. This 
 11	
framework of nonviolence became essential to the civil rights liberal alliance because it 
contained within it a primarily external orientation, often emphasizing how nonviolent direct 
action would impact potential allies over how it would affect the participants themselves. This 
chapter argues that the strategic framework of nonviolence fueled the emerging civil rights 
liberal alliance.  
The remaining chapters examine the role of civil rights liberalism in the political 
development of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). In these chapters I 
argue that the trajectory of SNCC’s changing and tenuous relationship to the civil rights liberal 
alliance provide a strong example for how postwar liberalism not only severely circumscribed 
the Black freedom struggle but in fact forestalled the possibility of Black-centered visions of 
freedom within the civil rights liberal alliance. Chapter three turns attention to SNCC, examining 
the ways in which SNCC functioned in tension with the liberal civil rights framework in their on-
the-ground organizing efforts after 1961. I challenge historical declension narratives that have 
claimed that SNCC declined in national prominence when they began to retreat from their 
organizing tradition and initial values after 1964. Instead, I demonstrate that elements of SNCC’s 
organizational decline were already in process in the midst of what scholars have framed as 
SNCC’s pre-1964 “golden era” of community organizing. I argue that the roots of SNCC’s 
organizational decline are more accurately connected to the “internalized liberalism” that 
functioned within the organization from its beginnings. Chapter four turns to the moment of 
rupture in dominant narratives of SNCC: Stokely Carmichael’s call for “Black Power” during a 
speech in Greenwood, Mississippi during the “March Against Fear” in June 1966. Examining the 
context of the “March Against Fear” and the liberal response to Black Power, this chapter makes 
two arguments. First, that the March itself represented an expression of Black Power: a Black-
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led, Black-defined, and Black-centered organizing campaign. Second, I argue that mainstream 
responses to the March and the “Black Power” slogan were less about what the march and the 
phrase actually meant and more about what they represented: SNCC’s emerging disinterest in the 
civil rights liberal alliance. The final chapter examines the historical narratives about SNCC and 
Black Power that began to develop in mainstream media and public discourse during 1966 and 
1967, and ultimately took root in the historiography of SNCC, Black Power, and the civil rights 
movement over the past few decades. This chapter suggests that more robust engagement with 
categories like liberalism and radicalism, as well as analyses of on-the-ground grassroots 
organizing, are needed to combat historiographical trends that have perpetuated rather than 
challenged the predominance of the civil rights liberal alliance in our histories. This chapter 
contends that longstanding trends in the scholarship have perpetuated historical narratives that 
detract from building usable histories in the ongoing Black freedom struggle. 
 
Periodizing the Civil Rights Movement 
In the past few decades, scholars of the Black freedom struggle have re-examined and 
challenged many of the prevailing assumptions about the civil rights movement, Black Power, 
and the legacy of African American activism in the twentieth century. This has involved not only 
revisiting movement content (e.g. goals, strategies, tactics, ideologies, leaders, participants, and 
associations), but it has also included attempts to rework the naming and periodization of the 
dominant waves of Black political activity, particularly in the post-World War II period. Chief 
among these trends in the scholarship is the now prominent framework of a “long” civil rights 
movement. Long movement proponents question the “classical” timeline of the postwar Black 
freedom struggle, where the era of “Civil Rights” was the decade between 1954 and 1965, and 
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advent of “Black Power” from 1966 to 1975. Instead, they extend the timeline in both directions, 
back to the 1930s and 1940s and forward into the 1980s and after.9  
Proponents of this periodization have contributed to Black freedom struggle scholarship 
in a variety of ways. They encourage us to recognize that historical periodization does not 
produce clean chronological or ideological distinctions. Further, they retrieve less visible 
iterations and configurations of Black activism and seek to recognize the diversity and 
complexity of recent and ongoing mobilizations. Indeed, the strongest contribution from long 
movement thesis proponents has been made by those who insist on expanding our conceptions of 
leadership and movement power so that we recognize the necessary contributions of a diversity 
of actors, including Black women and members of poor and working class communities. These 
scholars suggest that the traditional periodization of the movement necessarily privileges the 
work and interests of certain relatively elite leaders: ministers, formal educators, and other 
middle-class professional men. In this regard, locating power in the hands of many and 
                                                
9 For an original articulation of the long movement thesis see: Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long 
Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of American History 91:4 
(March 2005), 1233-63. See also: Jeanne F. Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, eds. Freedom 
North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940-1980 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003); Jeanne Theoharis, “Black Freedom Studies: Re-imagining and Redefining the 
Fundamentals,” History Compass 4 (2006): 348-367; Timothy B. Tyson, Radio Free Dixie: 
Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1999); Matthew Countryman, Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race 
and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Nikhil 
Pal Singh, Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Defying Dixie: The Radical 
Roots of Civil Rights, 1919-1950 (New York: 2008). 
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recognizing that it has been yielded in a variety of more and less visible ways is deeply important 
work for our historical narratives.10  
But is loosening the periodization of the twentieth-century Black freedom struggle 
necessary to expand our understanding of Black agency and transformative power? Is the only 
value of the traditional periodization of the civil rights movement the way it privileged certain 
voices and experiences? If we do let go of the traditional periodization, will our historical 
narratives no longer make meaningful distinctions between the civil rights movement and the era 
of Black Power? This project begins by thinking about these questions of power, agency, and 
periodization. It revisits our historical narratives in order to ask a relatively simple question: 
what do we lose by loosening the “classical” historical periodization of the civil rights 
movement?  
While a number of scholars have challenged the “long movement” thesis, they have not 
always considered this question directly. Historian Hasan Kwame Jeffries, for example, argues 
against the long movement thesis in two ways. First, he suggests that the call for a “long” civil 
rights movement limits our understanding of Black activism by making it solely about the pursuit 
of civil rights and ignoring the diversity of goals and interests that have made up the Black 
freedom movement.11 This critique is important, thought it brings Jeffries to a second, shakier 
                                                
10 See for example: Dayo F. Gore, Jeanne Theoharis, and Komozi Woodard, eds., Want to Start a 
Revolution? Radical Women in the Black Freedom Struggle (New York: New York University 
Press, 2009). 
11 It should be noted that other scholars have made similar gestures. Peniel Joseph, for example, 
has argued for Black Power, rather than civil rights, as the all-encompassing Black freedom 
struggle framework. See: Peniel Joseph, “Black Liberation Without Apology: Reconceptualizing 
the Black Power Movement,” Black Scholar 31 (Fall-Winter 2001): 3-19; Waiting ‘Til the 
Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black power in America (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 2006); ed., The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era 
(New York: Routledge, 2006);Dark Days, Bright Nights: From Black Power to Barack Obama 
(New York, Basic Civitas Books, 2010). 
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conclusion: the main problem with the long civil rights movement is that it is not long enough. 
Instead, Jeffries posits that we should view the entire post-emancipation period as an 
encompassing struggle for what he calls “freedom rights”: “the assortment of civil and human 
rights that emancipated African Americans identified as the crux of freedom.” Though his 
concept of freedom rights is a valuable contribution to our lexicon for the complex and varied 
goals within the Black freedom struggle, Jeffries extends, rather than resolves, a key limit of the 
“long movement” thesis. As historians Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua and Clarence Lang have noted, 
such sweeping periodizations flatten historical specificity and ignore important themes of both 
continuity and change that are essential characteristics of the Black freedom struggle.12 
Cha-Jua and Lang’s critique points to a key limit of the long movement thesis. Though its 
proponents have argued that abandoning traditional periodization makes a diversity of political 
actors, strategies, and approaches more visible, the smoothed-over effect of the long civil rights 
movement narrative actually reduces our ability to recognize difference. The specificity of 
historical context gets erased. In this sense, long movement proponents undermine their own 
pursuit of diversifying our understanding of Black freedom struggles. Allowing the long civil 
rights movement to envelop the variety of ways that African Americans respond to and engage 
the circumstances that impact their lives reduces their meaning, significance, and value in the 
ongoing freedom struggle. As Cha-Jua and Lang explain, “if ‘everything is everything,’ and the 
social landscape of oppression and resistance is undifferentiated, historians oriented toward 
                                                
12 Hasan Kwame Jeffries, Bloody Lowndes: Civil Rights and Black Power in Alabama’s Black 
Belt (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 257-58 n15; Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua and 
Clarence Lang, “The ‘Long Movement’ as Vampire: Temporal and Spatial Fallacies in Recent 
Black Freedom Studies,” Journal of African American History 92:2 (Spring 2007), 265-288. See 
also: Robbie Lieberman and Clarence Lang, “Introduction,” in Robbie Lieberman and Clarence 
Lang, eds.  Anticommunism and the African American Freedom Movement: “Another Side of the 
Story (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
 16	
movement politics inadvertently absolve themselves of the necessity of critically assessing the 
unique political, social, and ideological climate of their own time, and the limits and possibilities 
it poses.”13  
In the same vein, when scholars seek to uncover histories of resistance but erase the 
specificity of the historical context, they risk invisibilizing key distinctions in form. Critique, acts 
of individual resistance, and mass social movements are not the same thing just as rebellion is 
different from reform, and both are distinct from revolution.14 Further, erasing specificity also 
invisibilizes the structures and systems of oppression that are at work in a particular context. This 
is the primary concern of this project. When we collapse the periodization of the civil rights 
movement and Black Power as suggested by proponents of the long movement thesis and others, 
we lose a key mechanism of accountability.  For these reasons, this dissertation re-asserts the 
significance of the traditional periodization of the civil rights movement. 
To be clear, upholding this classical periodization is not to resurrect the traditionally elite, 
male-centered, and nationally legible biases in movement scholarship of the past. Nor is it to 
claim the superiority of the leaders, struggles, values and goals that its traditional narratives 
uphold. Apt critiques of their limits abound and have effectively demonstrated their silences on 
local struggles in and outside the South; in urban areas; and led by rank-and-file activists, 
including women, working class and poor people, who had varied goals and employed a variety 
of strategies and tactics, all of which can and did exist outside of the traditional civil rights 
movement framework. Rather, because of these critiques it is valuable to maintain a traditional 
periodization. Instead of uncritically celebrating the heroic civil rights movement, a primary 
                                                
13 Cha-Jua and Lang, “The ‘Long Movement’ as Vampire,” 284. 
14 See: Manning Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction and Beyond 
in Black America, 1945-2006, 3rd ed., (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2007). 
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reason to acknowledge the specificity and particularity of the traditional civil rights movement 
period is in order to recognize its limits. This dissertation is about those limits. This emphasis is 
in pursuit of accountability. 
 
The Civil Rights Liberal Alliance 
The civil rights movement was historically distinct because it represented the 
convergence of two phenomena: the emergence of sustained, grassroots nonviolent direct action 
protest by African Americans and an unprecedented interest in Black civil and political rights 
among outside elites, most notably among white liberals. Though Black freedom-oriented protest 
mobilizations and the use of direct action have been present throughout U.S. history, the specific 
postwar frame of nonviolent, mass direct action used in the pursuit of African American civil 
rights had not. This particular framework emerged in relation, not opposition, to an expansion of 
mainstream legibility and visibility for the pursuit of African American freedom. This 
convergence with mainstream legibility helps to explain the predominance of nationally 
prominent, typically male, church-based, and middle class leadership that has been privileged in 
traditional civil rights movement narratives.  
The strategic framework of the civil rights movement depended on the peculiar 
confluence of Black protest activity and mainstream American legitimacy. Cha-Jua and Lang 
have described this uneasy combination as a “counterhegemonic patriotism,” that “celebrat[es] 
American values, while simultaneously struggling to transform them.”15 As I develop in chapter 
one, the counter hegemonic patriotism of Black activists in the civil rights movement developed 
in relation to the postwar rise of white liberal interest in African American civil rights and 
                                                
15 Cha-Jua and Lang, “The ‘Long Movement’ as Vampire,” 280. 
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political activity. The relationship between Black civil rights activists and white liberal allies 
created the postwar civil rights liberal alliance. Their shared commitment to American values 
and narratives of respectability was part of what made this alliance work, at least for a time. In 
this formulation, the traditionally recognized civil rights movement is inextricable from the 
broader framework of this alliance. Because of this, this dissertation contends that we need to 
maintain a traditional periodization of the civil rights movement in order to see its embeddedness 
in the broader framework of the civil rights liberal alliance.  
This project zeroes in on the limiting effect of the civil rights liberal alliance and attempts 
to recast our historical understanding of the civil rights movement as the civil rights liberal 
alliance. This dissertation maintains that in spite of the efforts and achievements associated with 
the civil rights movement, the emergence of the civil rights liberal alliance actually limited, 
rather than expanded, the postwar movement for Black freedom. In this way, the strength of the 
civil rights movement was also its weakness: unprecedented mainstream legibility required a 
particular framing of leaders, participants, goals, strategies, tactics, and values that appealed to 
mainstream allies. The civil rights liberal alliance gained unprecedented mainstream interest by 
putting the interests and concerns of outside elites at the center of struggle. Yet if we believe that 
self-determined agency is a necessary component of liberation, then the centering of outside 
interests in the civil rights liberal alliance stood in the way of achieving liberation. 
Pointing out the limits of liberalism in relation to the Black freedom struggle is nothing 
new. Black movement scholars from a variety of political perspectives have demonstrated the 
frustrating, challenging, and derailing influence that liberal allies had on the movement. 
Conversely, mainstream narratives of twentieth century U.S. history have often used the civil 
rights movement/Black power in order to expose the limits of liberalism since the 1960s. This 
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has not only been true in conservative impulses to use its association with Black power as way to 
discredit liberalism, but in fact, the same narratives have been used by liberals to lick wounds 
from the post-civil rights, rise of the Right, neoconservative, silent majority era, in order to 
explain the phenomenon they see as the failure of liberalism. In both purposes they share a 
similar logic: liberals gave Black activists too much room, ushering in their own demise.16 
In this way, this dissertation is a project of shading in and reframing familiar narratives in 
order to show how the limits of liberalism are not a matter of being “too liberal”: letting Black 
radicals derail the otherwise good progress of the nation. But the limits are also not just a matter 
of pace, gradualism, or reform (as if they had only moved faster or more effectively things could 
have been different). Instead, this project seeks to underscore the fundamental incompatibility 
between liberalism and liberation. Recognizing this incompatibility is crucial for building 
meaningful liberation struggles in the future. 
 
Cold War Liberalism and Black Freedom 
Scholars on the Left have launched similar critiques of civil rights liberalism from a 
variety of positions, including Black Nationalist, radical, feminist, and Marxist perspectives.17 
Indeed, Marxist critiques of civil rights liberalism often buttress the long movement thesis. Long 
movement proponents have located the origins of the long civil rights movement with the 1930s 
Left. They are certainly correct that the Black Left played an important role in the twentieth 
                                                
16 For examples see: Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in 
the 1960s (New York: 1984); Gareth Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement: The 
Transformation and Decline of Great Society Liberalism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
1996). 
17 There is arguably similar critique among scholars and conservatives on the far right as well, 
who at least in part blame civil rights liberalism for the problems they see in postwar America, 
though their concern is likely less focused on the direct impact of civil rights liberalism on Black 
lives and the pursuit of Black freedom.  
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century Black freedom struggle. However, the prominent role of the Black Left during the 1930s 
and 1940s offers more compelling evidence for why the classical civil rights movement period 
was unique: a defining factor of the traditional civil rights movement period was the 
unprecedented silence of the Left in mainstream Black political activity.  
Many scholars on the Left have recognized that in the cold war context, the Black 
freedom struggle lost some of its most important leaders and organizers to anticommunist red 
baiting, political persecution, and organizational purges within Black, labor, and other political 
organizations. Because of this, within the construction of the civil rights liberal alliance, the left 
was conspicuously absent. In the social and political culture of cold war anticommunism after 
World War II, “red scare” politics had effectively ejected the left from any hope of continued 
participation in such an alliance. The costs of limiting the left were much greater than any 
benefits the cold war context offered to the Black freedom struggle by exposing the hypocrisy of 
U.S. racism to the world and encouraging mainstream efforts to redeem itself.18 The human and 
organizational costs of U.S. anticommunism and “red baiting” on Black activists and 
organizations with ties or perceived ties to the left were dire. Whatever opportunities the cold 
war context provided for the Black freedom struggle in the United States were in direct 
relationship to the severe limits with which the postwar civil rights liberal alliance circumscribed 
the Black freedom struggle.  
The explicit emphasis on morality, respectability, and patriotism that defined the politics 
of the civil rights mainstream during the civil rights movement (which I expand in the first 
chapter) was an outgrowth of this cold war dynamic. Historians Clarence Lang and Robbie 
Lieberman have argued: 
                                                
18 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights; Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line; Woods, 
Black Struggle Red Scare. 
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[T]he Cold War and the accompanying Red Scare caused a rupture that profoundly affected the shape of 
the struggle that is popularly known as the civil rights movement. It was precisely the broader notion of 
black freedom—a global struggle for human rights encompassing anticolonialism and economic justice—
that had to be downplayed in order to achieve ‘civil rights.’ More specifically, leftist individuals, 
organizations, and analyses had to be stifled.”19  
 
Drawing on this argument, this dissertation examines other ways that broader visions of Black 
freedom became stifled within the civil rights movement, outside of the direct suppression of the 
Left. In particular, this dissertation claims that the liberal framework of the civil rights movement 
circumscribed the Black freedom struggle internally. It was not only by cutting off the 
intellectual, organizational, and analytical resources from the Black left but also by foreclosing 
the development of Black-centered and Black-determined visions of freedom. The framework of 
the civil rights liberal alliance insisted on externally oriented strategies and goals, which stifled 
the complexity and depth of Black freedom visions within that framework. Further, it positioned 
liberal allies, rather than African Americans, at the center of struggle. 
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation focuses on SNCC’s relationship to the civil rights liberal alliance in 
order to illustrate the incompatibility between liberalism and liberation. SNCC’s political 
trajectory maps well the tensions between liberalism and Black freedom, and more specifically, 
demonstrates the limits of liberalism for the pursuit of liberation. I argue that the call for Black 
power in SNCC was not incompatible with liberalism (something that white liberals and 
conservatives soon realized as well), but instead, reflected a new phase in SNCC’s growing 
political education about liberalism’s limits. Not a realized revolutionary ideology, SNCC’s turn 
to Black Power in 1966 has been called a version of ethnic pluralism. While I do not suggest an 
                                                
19 Lieberman and Lang, Anticommunism and the African American Freedom Movement, 5-6. 
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alternative to this characterization, I do offer an amendment. SNCC’s Black Power in 1966 also 
represented an explicit rejection of the civil rights liberal alliance within the organization.  
SNCC’s political transformation, including but not ending with their embrace of Black 
Power in 1966, represented a significant ideological and strategic break from the main tenets of 
the liberal civil rights framework. This break was distinct from embracing a radical ideology. 
Rather than subsume that break into a framework in which it does not fit, I suggest we recognize 
it for its “in-betweenness”. As Cha-Jua and Lang have paraphrased historian David Hackett 
Fischer, “the thing becoming should not be confused with the thing itself.”20 In this sense, 
however, “the thing becoming” should also not be overlooked. The past half-century has surely 
demonstrated the transformative limits of liberalism, including Democratic-controlled liberal 
coalitions as well as alliances with and within other institutions of hegemonic power. It has also 
demonstrated the immense difficulty of extracting our liberation struggles from the existing 
hierarchies of power that structure our lives. This challenge, rather than lull us into complacency, 
should demand more explicit and critical engagement with our political, cultural, interpersonal, 
and ideological moment as well as its history. The framework of civil rights liberalism haunts 
and feeds our ongoing and prospective liberation struggles, particularly within the United States. 
More often than not, the limits of this become invisibilized. Rather than challenge the ways our 
historical narratives fuel this invisibilizing tendency, our uncritical and unspecific engagement 
with ideology, program, and rhetoric perpetuate it. While this dissertation is a work in progress 
in that regard, it is also an attempt to take seriously the complexity of changing ideologies, 
strategies, discourses, and relationships that SNCC’s turn toward Black Power entailed. In so 
doing, I contend that SNCC’s struggle with and within the civil rights liberal alliance leading up 
                                                
20 Cha-Jua and Lang, “’Long Movement’ as Vampire,” 279. See David Hackett Fischer, 
Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: 1970), 21. 
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to, during, and after its turn towards Black Power contain key moments of usable history for how 
to contend with the specter of civil rights liberalism as we construct strategies of liberation in the 
current moment. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
THE CIVIL RIGHTS LIBERAL ALLIANCE 
 
This chapter revisits the postwar relationship between civil rights and mainstream liberal 
politics. I argue that a particular civil rights liberal alliance emerged during this period, which 
had significant, though underacknowledged, implications for the trajectory of the Black freedom 
struggle and the political climate of the United States more broadly. Through participation in the 
civil rights liberal alliance, the Black freedom struggle developed unprecedented mainstream 
legitimacy. But the civil rights liberal alliance operated with a set of implied rules that 
circumscribed legitimate Black protest, vision, and goals. In this context, Black movement 
leaders within the alliance adhered to an orientation that emphasized Black respectability and an 
investment in mainstream American institutions and values. In effect, this precarious alliance put 
white liberal interests at the center of struggle rather than the lives, needs, and desires of Black 
people. In what follows I rehearse familiar historical narratives in order to frame the emergence 
of the postwar civil rights liberal alliance.  
The civil rights movement developed in the mid-1950s through an odd convergence of 
Black protest activity in the form of mass nonviolent grassroots mobilization and an 
unprecedented alliance between the civil rights establishment and white liberals in politics and 
mainstream institutions. This precarious alliance between certain actors and organizations within 
the Black freedom struggle and mainstream power holders was mediated through claims to 
legitimacy through morality, patriotism, and respectability.  
In his seminal study, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, Sociologist Aldon D. 
Morris recognizes the unique form of Black protest activity that emerged during the traditional 
civil rights movement period. He explains: 
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The modern civil rights movement broke from the protest tradition of the past in at least two crucial ways. 
One, it was the first time that large masses of blacks directly confronted and effectively disrupted the 
normal functioning of groups and institutions thought to be responsible for their oppression. The hallmark 
of the modern civil rights movement is that these mass confrontations were widespread and sustained over 
a long period of time in the face of heavy repression. Two, this was the first time in American history that 
blacks adopted nonviolent tactics as a mass technique for bringing about social change.1 
 
Morris’s understanding of the ways in which the civil rights movement was distinct from 
previous iterations of Black protest activity is significant: it was sustained and widespread, mass 
direct-action protest in the face of substantial repression and it was also the first time that 
nonviolence was employed as a mass strategic framework in the Black freedom struggle. 
In addition to these elements, the period of the civil rights movement was also distinct 
because of the confluence of this nonviolent mass direct-action with a new relationship to 
postwar liberalism within the Black freedom struggle. The civil rights movement was 
characterized by an unprecedented alliance between mainstream civil rights organizations and 
outside elite allies, primarily white liberals in the federal government and mainstream 
institutions. 
Black grassroots mobilization and other forms of protest activity have existed for 
centuries; however, the civil rights movement involved a strategic framework of nonviolent 
direct action that emphasized themes of morality and respectability in relationship to grassroots 
mobilization. That is, within the civil rights framework organizers and participants in sustained 
campaigns of mass direct action protest activity simultaneously had access to perceptions of 
legitimacy, respectability, and morality in the mainstream. Whereas participation in protest 
activity had generally excluded people from mainstream respectability and legitimacy in the past, 
this was often not the case within the particular framework of the civil rights liberal alliance. 
                                                
1 Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing 
for Change (New York: MacMillan, 1984), xi. 
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Instead, a framework of direct action protest became established through the civil rights 
liberal alliance which defined the boundaries of legitimate Black protest: nonviolent, moral, 
respectable, patriotic, in opposition to southern segregationist, and in alliance with the federal 
government and liberal allies, who were typically northern and white. This framework, however 
limited and problematic, opened a narrow space in which collective Black protest activity 
became legitimate and simultaneously allied with, not in opposition to, ruling party political 
interests. This odd alliance characterized the traditional civil rights movement period. 
 
Black Mobilization  
As countless scholars have demonstrated, the Black freedom struggle in the United States 
is long and vast, spanning over four centuries with myriad iterations. In this time, there have 
always been incidents of grassroots mobilization and a long legacy of collective action. Local 
people have challenged the structures of racism and exploitation that circumscribed their lives in 
a variety of ways. Just as in the civil rights movement, they have formed organizations, used 
nonviolent tactics, called out their oppression, and demanded justice. In some instances they 
were successful; in others, not, sometimes with dire consequences. What sets the civil rights 
movement apart from this longer trajectory is not the fact of their mobilization, as some 
narratives have suggested; instead it is the particular combination of three significant factors: 1) 
the widespread and sustained nature of the civil rights movement such that it became recognized 
as a movement; 2) the explicit use of nonviolence as a strategic movement framework; and 3) the 
perception of mainstream legibility, respectability, and morality among movement leaders and 
participants. Importantly, these respectable figures were participating in on the ground direct-
action. 
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These three factors demonstrate that while there has always been Black collective action, 
it took on a new character through the sustained, widespread, and often self-consciously 
interconnected local mobilizations that were often mediated through efforts of national civil 
rights organizations. In this sense the self-fulfilling prophecy of the movement was meaningful: 
the fact that the civil rights movement conceived itself as a movement is part of what sustained 
and built the movement. For example, in May 1956, Martin Luther King, Jr. claimed there had 
been a rise of a “New Negro in the South,” who was a result of the “revolutionary change in the 
Negro’s evaluation of himself.” However, Morris argues that, contrary to King’s claims, most 
African Americans in the South had not actually developed this “New Negro” consciousness by 
the end of the 1950s. Instead, the term had become “an ideological byword and a self-fulfilling 
prophecy” used by activists “to challenge blacks to take on the responsibilities of fighting for 
their rights.”2  
The use of direct action within the Black community that was connected to broader 
conceptions of a national and even international mass movement was significant. Prior to 1950, 
the NAACP had spearheaded most nationally recognized Black protest activity such that the 
legal method was the dominant approach to challenging racial inequality in the United States. 
According to Morris, this approach “depended on the actions of elites external to the Black 
community whereby Blacks had to hope that white judges and Supreme Court justices would 
issue favorable rulings in response to well-reasoned and well-argued court cases.” As Morris 
explains, one of the most important things that happened in the wake of the 1955 Montgomery 
                                                
2 Martin Luther King, Jr., address delivered at the 2nd Anniversary of the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, May 17, 1956, quoted in Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the 
Civil Rights Movement, 106. 
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bus boycott was that it “thrust the power capable of overthrowing Jim Crow into the hands of the 
Black community.”3 
In addition, while there was a history of Black mobilizations using tactics associated with 
nonviolent direct action prior to the civil rights movement, those activists were not connecting 
such tactics to a larger conception of nonviolence as a specific strategy of mass resistance. The 
Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and its offshoot, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), 
introduced the concept of nonviolent direct action as a strategic movement framework in the 
Black freedom struggle during the 1940s. However, it was not until the mid-1950s that such a 
framework was articulated as part of a mass mobilization. Gandhi’s nonviolent direct action 
campaigns for Indian independence had much appeal for Black leaders, who translated Gandhian 
nonviolence to the Black freedom struggle in a way that aligned with the framework of civil 
rights liberal alliance. I elaborate this point more fully in the next chapter.4 
Finally, while the church was always a site for unity and political activity in the African 
American community, there was not the same explicit dedication to the concerted and sustained 
use of nonviolent direct action in previous eras as during the civil rights movement. As historian 
Manning Marable explains, “At every level of organization, and in almost every small town 
where sit-ins or jail-ins occurred, black ministers were at the very center of struggle.”5 Thus, the 
confluence of mass mobilization, using nonviolent direct action as a strategic movement concept, 
and direct action leadership from within the church and other sites of mainstream legitimacy 
                                                
3 Aldon D. Morris, “A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual 
Landmarks,” Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999), 524. 
4 August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
5 Manning Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction and Beyond in 
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within the Black community, created a unique moment of Black mobilization in the larger Black 
freedom struggle.  
 
Opportunity and Alliance in National Politics 
In addition to the specific character of Black mobilization that emerged in the 1950s, the 
civil rights movement was distinguished by the ways it became politically meaningful in the 
mainstream United States. The particularities of the historical context were driven by and at the 
same time also facilitated the expansion of the wave of mobilizations in the Black community 
into the civil rights movement. By the mid twentieth century, the Black freedom struggle was 
becoming politically and socially meaningful for mainstream politicians, media, and white 
people generally.  
In part a result of earlier efforts in the Black freedom struggle, most recently the Double-
V campaign during WWII, the March on Washington Movement (MOWM) led by A. Philip 
Randolph in the 1940s, and the concerted gains of the legal battles waged by the NAACP, white 
people were paying new attention to Black freedom and white attitudes were slowly changing. 
For example, according to National Opinion Research Center polls between 1942 and 1956, rates 
of white approval for school integration increased from 30% to 48% and rates of white approval 
for desegregated housing increased from 35% to 51%. Similar trends were observed in terms of 
segregated transportation facilities and employment opportunity.6  
Indeed, by the 1950s civil rights organizations began to recognize the significance of 
white support for their causes. According to Historians August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, the 
                                                
6 National Opinion Research Center data cited in Jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest: A 
Report Submitted by Jerome H. Skolnick, Director, Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and 
Confrontation of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New 
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Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) made strategic choices about campaign goals based on their 
perceptions of white support. By 1953-54, they explained, “equal employment opportunity did 
not enjoy the same legitimacy that the white public was increasingly according to the idea of 
equal treatment in places of public accommodation.” As such, CORE chapters turned away from 
tackling employment discrimination and moved increasingly toward the soon-to-be dominant 
civil rights pursuit of desegregating public accommodations.7 
White interest in Black civil rights had developed in relation to Black mobilizations 
against second-class citizen status that were linked to the larger context of World War II. As the 
United States justified its entrance into the “Good War,” U.S. American morality was put into 
relief against the genocidal racism of Hitler Nazi’s Germany. According to historian Manning 
Marable, “…popular ideology which inspired public opposition to Hitler was rooted in an anti-
racist and democratic context. The blatant contradiction between the country’s opposition to 
fascism and the herrevolk state and the continued existence of Jim Crow in the States after 1945 
was made perfectly clear to all.” In such a context, white people in the U.S. and particularly 
politicians were compelled to acknowledge the hypocrisy of Black discrimination in the U.S. 
South due to the agitation and mobilization against racism from within the Black community. 
“Blacks and an increasing sector of liberal white America came out of the war with a fresh 
determination to uproot racist ideologies and institutions at home,” Marable explains. “But few 
at the time were precisely clear as to what measures were required to turn this egalitarian 
commitment into public policy.”8 
The increase in wartime Black political involvement was clear: NAACP membership 
grew from 250,000 in 1943 to 420,000 in 1946. Black veterans returned from war bent on 
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8 Manning Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion, 13. 
 31	
change. A 1946 voter registration drive resulted in eighteen thousand new African American 
voters in Atlanta. There were similar results in Winston-Salem, as well as the election of the first 
Black alderman in the South during the twentieth century. Between 1940 and 1947, the total 
percentage of voting age African Americans who were registered to vote in the South increased 
from 2 percent to 12 percent.9  
Simultaneously, wartime economic demands helped facilitate the second Great Migration 
of African Americans such that the U.S. North and West gained over 2 million new African 
American residents during the war. Over a short period of time, African Americans who had 
faced discriminatory barriers to political participation in the South were suddenly a viable 
political constituency in the North.  By the election of 1948, the political significance of these 
demographic shifts was becoming clear to mainstream politicians. The presidential election of 
1948 has been recognized as the moment when national politicians began to consider African 
American votes in their political strategy. Recognizing the importance of support from a newly 
significant “biracial liberal coalition” of union members and urban minorities, Democratic-party 
liberals forced a reluctant Truman to emphasize civil rights in his campaign message. Truman’s 
top political advisor Clark Clifford outlined a civil-rights centered “campaign blue print” and 
Minneapolis Mayor Hubert Humphrey advanced a platform revolt at the Democratic convention. 
The results were successful: Truman won the presidency with significant Black electoral support. 
As NAACP Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins later recalled, “The message was plain: white 
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power in the South could be balanced by black power at the Northern polls. Civil Rights were 
squarely at the heart of national politics.’”10 
While liberal politicians had recognized that African Americans could be valuable 
political allies by 1948, and though mainstream political support for civil rights was in many 
ways stronger than ever, the political approach to Black civil rights during the 1950s was 
primarily characterized by neutrality. Though many hailed the Brown v. Board of Education 
decision as a symbol of federal support for civil rights efforts, they also ignored the implications 
of the Supreme Court’s 1955 implementation ruling, which was to desegregate with “a prompt 
and reasonable start” and proceed with “all deliberate speed.” This ruling gave many southern 
white supremacists the foothold they needed to interpret “as soon as practicable” to mean “never 
at all”. President Eisenhower demonstrated federal reluctance to support Black Freedom efforts 
in his repeated unwillingness to use federal authority to enforce desegregation, preferring instead 
to leave it to local officials and arguing that he would not presume “the judicial branch of the 
Government is incapable of implementing the Supreme Court’s decision.” Though Eisenhower 
never made a public statement in support of Brown, he was willing to publicly question the value 
of laws that were intended to “change men’s hearts” and felt compelled to remind the nation that 
segregationists had for three generations been “acting in compliance with the law as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court of the United States under the decision of 1896.”11 Not until the election 
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of 1960 did mainstream political support for civil rights take on a new, more supportive 
character, which signaled a new phase in the civil rights liberal alliance.  
While it was significant that the mainstream exhibited unprecedented favorable responses 
to issues of racial inequality during the civil rights movement period, it is important to state that 
they were not ultimately responsible for the emergence of a national movement. Resource 
mobilization theorists in the field of sociology might claim that the emergence of national civil 
rights movement was primarily dependent on the political context, these alliances, and their 
concomitant resources and supporters. But in fact it was Black community mobilization that was 
the primary catalyst. In line with the perspective of sociologists who promote a political process 
model of social movements, it is more accurate to recognize that the unique character of the civil 
rights movement was due in part to its mainstream national prominence, but the broader political 
context of the time does not tell the whole story. Instead, the agency within the Black community 
was key. Liberal allies were certainly a key ingredient for expanding the scope and standing of 
the civil rights movement in national discourse and consciousness, and at the same time they 
were also a source of limits that ultimately worked to undermine the liberating intent at the heart 
of the movement.12 
Though the nature of this alliance ensured that outside elites, including sympathetic 
whites, the legal system, and Federal Government more broadly, would play a key role in 
defining the bounds of the civil rights movement, the advent of mass direct action campaigns 
from within the Black community meant that the balance of power had shifted. As Morris 
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explains, now “massive Black protest dictated that those roles would be in response to Black 
collective action rather than as catalysts for change in the racial order.”13 Though outside elites 
would quickly learn to adapt their responses to Black protest activity in ways that expanded their 
own power, this shift nonetheless put Black people and their actions at the center of struggle. 
 
Cold War Civil Rights 
 Just as mass mobilization in Black communities served as the catalyst for the emerging 
civil rights movement, the nature of national Black protest was also formed in relation to the 
broader political context. Historians such as Mary Dudziak and Thomas Borstelmann have 
argued that the emergence of the cold war in the wake of World War II had further impact on the 
development of the civil rights movement. U.S. claims to morality, democracy, and freedom 
became even more important as the U.S. faced off against the Soviet Union. The context of the 
cold war and global decolonization opened U.S. racism to further scrutiny on an international 
scale. Racism and discrimination throughout the United States, but particularly in the South, 
made the U.S. vulnerable to foreign critique. New critics were attuned to the hypocrisies that 
African Americans had recognized for centuries. This new global gaze was not lost on U.S. 
politicians, whose interest in Black rights expanded at this very moment.14 
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The same factors also increased the value of morality more generally, such that any 
claims to morality became particularly valuable in the cold war context. This contributed to 
increased mainstream investment in Black interests, as the Black struggle against the immorality 
of racism, segregation, and discrimination would increase the moral stock of those allied with it. 
The moral value of allying with the Black struggle became particularly pronounced by the mid-
1960s, when Historian Otis L. Graham, Jr. argues, the “intellectual and moral supremacy of 
liberalism in American politics seems to have reached a crest.” As he explains, “The central 
feature of the liberal program, hesitantly begun by Kennedy and boldly pursued by Lyndon 
Johnson, was their sponsorship of the drive for black equality and an end to Jim Crow. The 
central fact of liberal political life from the sixties forward was a deeply felt moral (and 
intellectual) superiority.”15 
The historical context of the cold war era not only encouraged a new kind of attention to 
Black interests by facilitating access to morality claims; it also had a role in directing the 
particular values associated with Black protest activity that would come to characterize the civil 
rights movement. One of the most significant impacts of the cold war within the United States 
was the repression of the Left. Union purges accompanied the narrowing scope of labor 
demands. The growing anti-communist sentiment meant that political organizations were under 
greater scrutiny and as a result, often succumbed to heightened self-policing. Left organizations 
were targeted through anticommunist legislation such as the Smith Act, the McCarran Act, and 
the McCarran Walter Act. Collectively this legislation increased the deportation and persecution 
of anyone determined to be part of a subversive group and such groups were required to register 
with the government under threat of penalty. Cold war anticommunism hindered the Left 
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substantially. Left organizations experienced a massive decline in political power and 
membership. Black leftists were particularly impacted.16  
There had been a close relationship between the Left and the Black freedom struggle, 
particularly during the 1930s and 1940s. Radical labor organizers were drawing links between 
economic oppression and the Black experience. As historian William H. Chafe explains, they 
“promoted the idea of using interracial solidarity as a vehicle for creating major economic 
changes, both in social welfare programs such as national health insurance, and in the sharing of 
decision-making power between unions and industry.”17 Black leftists, as well as many of the 
white radicals who had been the primary allies of African American freedom during the 1930s, 
helped foster the Popular Front merger of civil rights and labor interests that would become so 
important for liberal politicians such as President Truman in the election of 1948.18  
Yet the new cold war context had a direct impact on the development of Black left 
politics. Historians Robbie Lieberman and Clarence Lang argue, “Just at the moment when 
African Americans’ expectations were raised for achieving genuine equality—inspired by 
independence movements in Africa and Asia, thrilled by the creation of the United Nations, 
which gave them a wider forum in which to air their concerns, and cognizant of how World War 
II rhetoric further justified their claims—the Cold War and Red Scare destroyed many of the 
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organizations and activists most able to articulate these claims and mobilize people to press for 
them.”19 McCarthy-style red baiting had a huge impact on agitators not only in labor, and various 
political and social organizations throughout the United States, but also specifically in the Black 
struggle. Black and white radicals who had been active in community organizations and civil 
rights groups faced new challenges. Fear of perceived communist infiltration often led to internal 
strife within organizations, purges of suspected communists or communist sympathizers, and 
collaboration with government forces to weed out possible threats. 
The results of this impacted the direction of the Black freedom struggle as well as the 
relationship between civil rights and the Left. Cold war policing of the early civil rights 
movement was effective enough that civil rights organizations carefully steered clear of any 
association with the Left. Both CORE and the NAACP had policies explicitly banning 
Communist membership in their organizations, but even in groups with less official exclusions, 
Communists or suspected Communists were purged from the movement in large numbers. 
Historian Manning Marable suggests that because of these purges the Black freedom struggle 
lost many of “the most principled anti-racist organizers and activists,” and moved closer toward 
“accept[ing] the prevailing xenophobia of the times.’”20 Chafe argues that this significantly 
influenced the direction of the civil rights movement such that, “the focus on economic and 
systemic change as a solution to racial inequality faded into oblivion, and more and more of the 
energies of civil rights groups went into legal challenges, within the constitutional structure, to 
patterns of segregation.”21 
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While anticommunist repression encouraged Black organizations to actively separate 
themselves from Left critiques of U.S. racism, other historical factors contributed to the 
development of the new kind of civil rights movement context. American civil rights issues grew 
in national significance throughout the 1950s in relation to the swath of NAACP legal victories, 
most prominently the Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision. Not only did 
this exacerbate tensions between southern and northern white politicians over segregation, it also 
elicited increased white anxiety about the maintenance of white supremacy in the South.22 In the 
wake of Brown, white fears stimulated the formation of White Citizens Councils in various 
locations throughout the South, who were partially responsible for a widespread crackdown on 
African American civil rights organizations, and targeted the NAACP almost exclusively. 
However, one unintended result of this political shut down was that Black organizers who had 
been working through the NAACP began to shift their organizational ties. In the absence of the 
NAACP, black church-based mobilizations began to emerge in new ways throughout the South. 
This had a direct impact on the church-centered character of the burgeoning civil rights 
movement.23  
The decline in NAACP leadership throughout the South as well as the growing 
significance of anticommunist sentiment both contributed to the emergence of mass 
mobilizations out of the Black church. As southern white repression was limiting the power of 
local NAACP branches and national cold war politics limited the functionality of leaders and 
organizations suspected of being connected to the Left, a new emphasis on nonviolent direct 
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action was developing among Black leaders and organizations often being mobilized through the 
church. 
In many ways cold war anticommunism underlined the already liberal-oriented direction 
of the movement. However, in spite of evidence to the contrary, heightened cold war policing of 
communist sympathizers continued. As historian Jeff Woods explained, “Southern red and black 
investigators simply ignored the mountains of evidence proving that the movement was 
fundamentally liberal and committed to working within the limits of capitalism and the 
American democratic system.”24 Purges and tacit compliance with cold war anticommunism 
within the civil rights mainstream ensured this was the case. 
Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons, a student activist and SNCC leader, remembered 
something similar. After being brought into the Deans office at Spelman College for 
participating in some of the early Atlanta student sit-ins in the 1960s, she recalled being asked by 
Spelman president, Dr. Albert E. Manley “…if I were a Communist and if I had been sent to 
foment dissent and chaos on the campus.” Her response was confusion. “A Communist? I hardly 
knew what they was. A paid instigator? Boy, I was as poor as Job’s turkey with hardly a penny 
to my name. I wished somebody were paying me to catch the hell I was catching.”25 
The fact that many mainstream civil rights organizations had effectively cut ties with the 
Left by the 1960s reflected their growing awareness that mainstream support depended on it. 
Lieberman and Lang explain that the message was clear: “challenging cold war priorities by 
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fighting racial injustice and criticizing U.S. foreign policy were out of bounds if one wanted a 
comfortable place in the postwar world.”26 
  Woods explains this further: “Americans of the 1950s and 1960s regarded Communism 
as an even greater evil than southern racism. They found it hypocritical and untenable for 
movement advocates to defend civil liberties of American blacks while accepting aid from 
Communists whom they inevitably identified with totalitarian restraints on the same liberties.” In 
such a context, some civil rights organizations were forced to choose. They recognized clearly 
that in spite of the long history of Left involvement in the Black struggle, liberals, rather that 
radicals, “were far more powerful, numerous, and helpful” at meeting their “immediate 
movement goals” and distancing themselves from “overt Marxists” would garner necessary 
“general public support.”27 
In this way, civil rights leaders became increasingly aware that infusing the Black 
freedom struggle with patriotism, anticommunism, and a general air of respectability was central. 
The movement shifted concertedly. This, combined with the developing church-centered nature 
of Black protest struggles, created a civil rights movement that valued respectability, morality, 
and patriotism to an unprecedented degree. As the larger political context changed to reflect cold 
war politics, white alliance with the Black freedom struggle became increasingly contingent on 
African American patriotism, respectability, and anticommunism. 
 
Respectability 
Many scholars of African American history recognize how conceptions of African 
American respectability have been used to both justify and challenge systemic white supremacy 
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in the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Historians document 
how white anxieties about Black people stepping out of their perceived societal roles have been a 
primary justification for the systemic racialized violence enacted against African Americans in 
the Jim Crow South. In the same way, organized efforts in the Black community to combat 
systemic white supremacy have often relied on rhetoric that emphasizes Black respectability, 
morality, and worthiness. 
Scholars like historian Danielle McGuire argue that against the backdrop of the cold war, 
the confluence of anticommunism, white supremacy, and sexualized paranoia/propaganda in 
white responses to the Brown v. Board of Education decision had a significant impact on the 
development of the Black freedom struggle. White Citizens Councils expanded such that by 
1956 membership numbers topped 20,000 in Louisiana, 40,000 in South Carolina, 60,000 in 
Georgia, and 75,000 in Mississippi.28 Rather than targeted racialized violence, White Citizens 
Councils drew on their political and economic power to police the bounds of white supremacy. 
They published the names of Black people who attempted to register to vote in local papers, 
pressured employers and landlords to fire or evict “undesirable” African Americans, and even 
used their influence to have their bank loans and mortgages withdrawn. Their primary concerns, 
they argue, centered on Black sexuality.29  
McGuire contends that responses to Brown v. Board of Education drew on longstanding 
fears about Black sexual access to white women. Black and white children attending the same 
school opened the door to the possibility of developing future relationships, marriage, and worst 
of all, sex. White opponents of Brown believed school integration had less to do with quality 
education than it did with sexual access to white women. This fear had fueled white commitment 
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to segregation for decades and continued in their opposition to Brown. This had a significant 
impact on the Black freedom struggle. Prior to 1954, McGuire claims, Black middle class 
organizations more willingly rallied around working class figures, particularly women who had 
been the victims of sexual violence at the hands of whites. After Brown, an emphasis on 
respectability resurged. The most recognized example of this was the reluctance of Black leaders 
in Montgomery to launch their boycott of segregated busses around young, working class women 
such as Claudette Colvin, who was one of a few women who had refused to give up her seat 
months prior to Rosa Parks. Colvin, a pregnant teenager from one of the poorest areas of town, 
was an unacceptable symbol of their mobilization. Instead, they waited for Rosa Parks, who 
McGuire contends, was chosen more for her solid image of Black middle class respectability 
than her long and impressive history of Black organizing. Though Parks was a seamstress, her 
age as well as her church and political connections afforded her the image of respectability. 
Black activists recognized that amidst growing white anxiety about Black sexuality and its 
perceived threat to white power, a significant part of the struggle would rest on whether African 
Americans could be seen as deserving of legal protection. This is one of the reasons that 
respectability emerged at the center of Black freedom efforts in the civil rights movement.30  
The significance of respectability drew on the efforts of Black activists during World 
War II to link Black civil rights with expressions of patriotism and legality. For example, in 
1944, one of the earliest student civil rights groups, the Civil Rights Committee of Washington 
D.C., which was sponsored by the Howard University Student Chapter of the NAACP, 
developed a pamphlet that outlined a pledge of commitment for students who wanted to 
participate in the Committee’s campaign in “the art of persuasion and good will” and 
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“developing…public opinion to extend the privilege of service to all members of the 
population.” The pamphlet demonstrated the importance of coupling calls for protest activity 
with clear expressions of respectability, patriotism, and respect for the law. In the pledge, the 
student agreed to abide the rules of the Committee as well as to “do nothing to antagonize 
members of public or the management of public places.” In addition, they also pledged to “look 
my best whenever I act as a representative of the Committee, to use dignity and restraint at all 
times; to refrain from any boisterous or offensive language or conduct no matter what the 
provocation, and to do or say nothing which will embarrass the Committee or the University.”31 
Such calls for respectable behavior drew heavily on themes of nationalism and patriotism 
in justification for equal access to public accommodations. The pamphlet framed discrimination 
as “undemocratic,” and “contrary to the principles for which the present World War is being 
fought.” Further, drawing on larger themes in WWII Black protest, the pamphlet explained the 
fight against racial discrimination as a “patriotic duty and an act of faith in the American boys 
who are fighting for the Four Freedoms in foreign lands, and who have every right to expect a 
fuller share of these freedoms when they return home.”32  
It is also noteworthy that the Civil Rights Committee was deeply invested in acting in 
accordance with the law. Because they were challenging discrimination in public 
accommodations in Washington D.C., the Civil Rights Committee was not breaking any local, 
state, or national laws. The fact that there no law enforcing segregation in Washington D.C. was 
significant. Their sit-ins and other demonstrations were contingent on the fact that they were not 
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pushing to violate the law and the pamphlet asked students to pledge that they would enter and 
remain in a public place only “as long as I conduct myself in a lawful and proper manner.” 
Further, while the pamphlet claimed the “right of equal privileges in all places of public 
accommodation” was “one of the most precious of all human rights,” they were also clear to note 
that the group was most opposed to discrimination or exclusion based on race or color that was 
“not sanctioned by laws.” In effect, the pamphlet emphasized the legality of discrimination more 
than the morality of it.33  
The tension between abiding laws and challenging injustice continued to be a central 
concern within the civil rights movement, which depended on claims to morality, respectability, 
and mainstream validity. Coretta Scott King remembers the feeling of anxiety when during the 
1962 SCLC campaign in Albany, Georgia the city attorney got a federal court order to prevent 
demonstrations. This was the first time that King remembered being in opposition to the federal 
government. “When the federal court started ruling against us,” King explained, “that created a 
whole different thing in terms of strategy.” Before that, she said, they “had been willing to break 
state laws that were unjust laws, and our ally was the federal judiciary.” But now “if we would 
take our case to the federal court, and the federal court ruled against us, what recourse did we 
have?”34 Being in accord with federal laws allowed civil rights activists to maintain a kind of 
public legitimacy while violating local or state laws that enforced segregation in the South. For 
King and others in the civil rights movement, the absence of federal backing was not only a 
logistical challenge; it also threatened their claims to morality and legitimacy. 
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Yet the preoccupation among early civil rights leaders with legitimacy and respectability 
was not always shared, particularly among younger civil rights activists. SNCC’s James Forman 
recalled a divide that was apparent among some student activists and those they called “adults” 
around the time of the Freedom Rides in Nashville 1961. Outside of a few exceptions, such as 
CORE’s national director James Farmer, who had gone to and remained in jail with the Freedom 
Riders in Jackson, MS, the students were very critical of “the so-called big name leaders who 
seemed to spend so much time in the Statler Hilton.”35 SNCC’s Diane Nash, who thought very 
highly of Martin Luther King, Jr. in general, pointed to the fact that he had “been affected by a 
lot of middle-class standards,” and because of that, she argued, despite the fact that he was “a 
good man,” he left “a lot to be desired” as the “symbol of the movement.”36 Perceptions among 
young SNCC activists like Forman and Nash presaged the growing critique of liberal values and 
alliances that would emerge explicitly within SNCC over the next few years. 
Yet in spite of these critiques, many student activists were not so far removed from King. 
As historian Manning Marable explains, “racial reform in the South was not an aberration of 
bourgeois democracy; it was its fulfillment. Sit-ins were no rejection of the American Dream; 
they were the necessary although ambiguous steps taken towards it culmination.”37 SNCC 
Freedom Rider Elizabeth Hirshfield recalled flying over Washington D.C. on her way to 
Nashville in 1961: “…we went right over the national monuments. I looked out of the window, 
at all the key places, and I thought, ‘this is really what being an American is all about,’ going on 
the Freedom Rides. Making America the way Lincoln and Washington meant it to be. That may 
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have been kind of naïve, but it was really a fundamental part of what made me go down there. To 
do what I did was to be an American.”38 
Student activists’ understanding of how their challenges to segregation and racial 
discrimination related to U.S. American values, institutions, and practices fluctuated, diverged, 
and certainly changed over time. Among other things, this reflected the palpable instability that 
was just under the surface of the emerging civil rights liberal alliance.  
 
The Dialectic of Civil Rights Liberal Alliance 
Mid-twentieth century developments such as the growing significance of African 
American voters in national politics, the wave of legal victories from the NAACP, and the 
backdrop of the cold war were all part of an historical context that contributed to both a new kind 
of political opportunity for African Americans and also continued racial oppression. The 
combination had a significant impact on Black mobilization. The precarious mix of new 
mainstream legibility for the Black freedom struggle was counterbalanced by continual 
reminders of entrenched white supremacy. This duality encouraged African Americans to have 
faith in the potential for mainstream channels to be a conduit for political change and at the same 
time reinforced the idea that agitation was necessary for any real change to occur. These twin 
realities helped to shape the mid-century civil rights movement.  
It resulted in a movement with a new intensity of Black protest that was simultaneously 
deeply committed to U.S. American values and politics. As Historian William H. Chafe explains, 
“…they wished to join, not destroy or subvert, the existing structures of society,” and “believed 
that making their case fairly, showing their good faith as citizens, they could prove the merits of 
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being accorded equal opportunity.”39 This faith in the idea of proving to white U.S. America that 
Black people deserved rights was not only present in the rhetoric of moderate civil rights leaders. 
James Forman, one of SNCC’s most influential activists whose politics often challenged the 
liberal civil rights framework, recalled his awakening to the potential power of the civil rights 
movement in the late 1950s. Though he expressed his sentiments quite differently than moderate 
civil rights leaders, he nonetheless reflected a faith in the capacity to persuade a change of heart: 
“We got to take the man’s education, his contradictions, and throw that shit back into his face 
hard and furious,” Forman explained: 
Every time we can, hit him with some of his own shit. We got to know his history and we certainly got to 
know ours. Tell him about his revolution ‘cause he was being mistreated. We got a right to ours too. Tell 
him about his speeches for liberty and death. We can make ours too. Tell him about his documents talking 
about liberty and equality for all. Hell, we in the all, too; so shape up, baby.40 
 
Though Forman was primarily drawn to the civil rights movement as a way to mobilize the 
consciousness of the Black community, he also expressed a desire to “embarrass the American 
image by playing on the contradictions inherent in this society.”41   
Though activists often had different emphases, their general faith in the system was 
reinforced when President Eisenhower ordered the National Guard to Little Rock, Arkansas in 
1957 to enforce the desegregation of public schools. “The symbolic importance of Little Rock 
was lost on no one,” SNCC volunteer Mary Aickin Rothschild recalled. “For the first time since 
Reconstruction federal troops were in the South to protect of the rights of blacks.” This display 
of federal intervention terrified many white southerners and, combined with the “nascent 
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nonviolent movement of blacks throughout the region,” signaled a “new level of action” in the 
civil rights movement by the end of the decade.42 
However, in spite of the hope Eisenhower’s actions in Little Rock may have signaled to 
some, his actions were still at the expense of his own deep reluctance to get involved. Historians 
have argued that the real reason Eisenhower sent troops to Little Rock had nothing to do with his 
support for integration but instead was because he had felt his authority had been challenged by 
Governor Orval Faubus. 43  In fact, Eisenhower’s general response to the issue of school 
desegregation following the Brown decision reflected what Historian William E. Leuchtenburg 
called his “empty pulpit” presidency. Indeed, Eisenhower made a point to avoid involving the 
federal government in what were deemed “local racial situations,” calling it “just plain nuts” to 
use force in opposition to “racial customs.” As Leuchtenburg explains further, “It is not too 
much to say that a great deal of the violence, as well as the fearfully slow rate of compliance 
after 1954, may be laid at Eisenhower’s door.”44  
Thus, the symbolic importance of Eisenhower’s actions in Little Rock occurred amidst a 
larger context of what historians have called an era of neutrality on civil rights issues during the 
1950s. Such a context reinforced the simultaneous notion that change was possible and also that 
much more was needed. We can see an early example of this dynamic in the 1940s in which 
President Truman’s response to increased Black agitation after WWII was to appoint a 
Committee on Civil Rights, and to back the recommendations of their report, “To Secure These 
Rights,” which called for such things as the desegregation of the armed forces and abolishing 
poll taxes. In addition, Truman became the first U.S. president to address a national meeting of 
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the NAACP. Such efforts offered hope to African Americans that their pursuit of justice and 
rights would find support in mainstream politics.45 Yet at the same time, white racism persisted 
in a variety of explicit forms from lynching and rampant segregation. “Precisely because of this 
chemistry—small but important breakthroughs existing side by side with pervasive reminders of 
second-class citizenship,” Chafe explained, “black Americans intensified their protest.”46 In this 
way, the precarious balance of support and limits, the interface between opportunity and action, 
the potential for success combined with the repeated reminder that racial barriers existed and 
needed to be challenged, created a civil rights movement with Black freedom dreams 
circumscribed by the possibilities and limits of liberal alliance.  
 
Conclusion 
The civil rights-liberal alliance that emerged during the postwar, cold war period 
depended on direct action but was led by respectable leaders. It employed protest but enacted it 
toward patriotism. Black visions of freedom were part of a larger oppositional logic, but they 
were for the time being deeply aligned with liberal interests. In this way, they became less 
opposition, more “American,” and importantly, more invested in the power of perception: how 
the Black struggle would be seen by its potential allies and supporters.  
This power of perception was critical. Geographer Bruce D’Arcus argues that in the 
context of the civil rights movement, “dismantling the system” required “undo[ing] its very 
logic.” This meant in part, “creatively transform[ing] everyday spaces—lunch counters, bus 
seats, jail cells—into contested political spaces,” but also gaining “access to the larger spatial 
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spheres of mediated symbols.”47 Media, and particularly television, D’Arcus argues, were central 
to this project. Civil rights protests in the South, he claims, “were distinguished by their visibility 
far beyond the specific sites of protest,” something “made particularly clear in 1963 in 
Birmingham, AL, where confrontations between protest marchers and an aggressive police force 
directed by ‘Bull’ Connor became big news.” However, as D’Arcus explains, “such political 
spectacles only mattered in the context of a potentially sympathetic audience.” Thus, the 
strategic and tactical choices made in the civil rights movement meant that undoing the logic of 
white supremacy required some kind of mass appeal.48 
Unlike the legal battles waged by the NAACP, the mass mobilization of protest activity 
in the direct-action phase of civil rights movement operated outside of what Journalist Edward P. 
Morgan calls the “normal political processes of representative democracy.” As Morgan explains, 
“People resort to protest when their claims and grievances are not being addressed by the 
legitimate political authorities—when they are effectively voiceless within the polity.” In this 
way, Morgan suggests, protest is necessarily outside of the bounds of legitimacy and “from the 
vantage point of political officials and mainstream media, all protest is a form of outsider 
activity.” As such, while U.S. Americans value the right to protest in theory, and while 
historically protest shaped important aspects of U.S. society, usually, Morgan contends, “the 
majority of Americans are predisposed to disapprove of specific protests.”49  
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Yet the protest activity of the civil rights movement had both mass appeal and national 
significance. Further, it was led by leaders who could claim a semblance of respectability and 
were deeply invested in the normal processes of society. As a result, in the civil rights movement 
acting outside the normal bounds of the U.S. democratic process was framed alongside rhetoric 
of inclusion and celebration of “American democracy.” In this way, civil rights movement 
leaders worked hard to undo the logic of white supremacy through the power of perception while 
maintaining claims to legitimacy. In this regard, influencing people’s ideas was essential. As 
D’Arcus explains, “The discursive and performative orders that distinguish a protest from both a 
riot and casual gatherings on a street are not matters of fact, but expressions of often complex 
ideas about the relationship between dissent, order, and democratic practice.”50 In this same way, 
civil rights activists relied on their own claims to legitimacy and drew a careful and strategic line 
that connected themes of dissent, order, and democratic practice in a way that was palatable to 
mainstream white Americans. 
This is how the civil rights-liberal alliance emerged from and depended on the precarious 
confluence of mainstream legibility, political opportunity, and mass nonviolent direct action 
protest. The movement was growing, but only as long as it maintained its political allegiances 
and cultural commitments to respectability and legitimacy. Respectability and legitimacy were 
maintained primarily through appealing to national values and assuaging white liberal anxiety. 
Black demands for equality gained traction as long as they did not threaten white political and 
social power, at least outside of the South. A key part of this was remaining steadfast in their 
dedication to nonviolence. The use of direct action in the civil rights movement was more easily 
understood to be legitimate if it was respectable, patriotic, moral, and nonviolent. The following 
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chapter explores the important role of nonviolence as a strategic framework of the civil rights 
movement that facilitated the civil rights liberal alliance and solidified the movement’s cultural 
and social allegiances to respectability, morality, and legitimacy.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE ORIGINS OF NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 
 
Nonviolence has become one of the defining characteristics of the civil rights movement; 
furthermore it is the primary theme that has allowed us to celebrate the civil rights movement in 
our historical narratives. While Martin Luther King, Jr. is the predominant figure to symbolize 
the use of nonviolence in the U.S. civil rights movement, Mahatma Mohandas Gandhi 
symbolizes the ideological/philosophical origins of that nonviolence. The ways in which 
Gandhian nonviolence has been understood and implemented in the U.S. civil rights movement 
has had a significant impact on the trajectory of the movement and on our contemporary 
understandings of the function of nonviolent protest in the present day.  
This chapter explores the origins of Gandhian nonviolence in the civil rights movement. I 
argue that a particular version of Gandhian nonviolence was translated into the U.S. civil rights 
movement primarily through the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and its parent 
organization, the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR). This translation was heavily influenced by 
their commitment to interracialism and Christian-pacifism. Though these early followers of 
Gandhi did not misinterpret Gandhian philosophy, their own positionality and ideological 
underpinnings encouraged specific interpretations of Gandhian philosophy that emphasized some 
aspects over others. In particular, this chapter argues that early translations from CORE and the 
FOR contributed to a framework of Gandhian nonviolence in the civil rights movement that 
functioned strategically, primarily as a means of influencing the oppressor through efforts of 
negotiation and moral suasion. In this process, their interpretations underemphasized one of the 
most important aspects of Gandhian philosophy: a primary concern with the internal 
transformation of oppressed people.  
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Internal Transformation in Gandhi’s Satyagraha  
Gandhi wrote and spoke prolifically on the concept of nonviolence as a philosophy of life 
and method of social change. He articulated a vision of nonviolence that was highly complex, 
rooted in a combination of spirituality and politics. Though Gandhi was a complicated and often 
contradictory political figure, his framework of nonviolent direct action influenced mass 
mobilizations across the world. Throughout all of Gandhi’s articulations of nonviolence, he put a 
primary emphasis on the ways in which nonviolence could facilitate the internal transformation 
of individuals and communities. 
This was clear in his concept of nonviolent direct action, satyahgraha, which he first put 
into practice while living in Johannesburg in 1906. The South African government had just 
passed new legislation, known as the “Black Act,” which increased the surveillance and 
criminalization of Indians in South Africa. Gandhi and a group of 3000 Transvaal Indians 
engaged in mass civil disobedience as a response, which he later said is what catalyzed his belief 
in the power of satyagraha. The essence of satyagraha was to Gandhi “holding on to 
Truth…soul or spirit,” he called this, “Truth-force,” or “pure soul-force.” Political Scientist 
Dennis Dalton describes satyagraha as a method of nonviolent action based on the idea that  “a 
community’s overcoming fear and recovery of self-respect could come through collective 
nonviolence.” In Gandhi’s view, the purpose of nonviolent direct action, or satyagraha, was 
primarily in the service of personal and community growth, of transformation that was 
internally-focused rather than directed outward. In this understanding, satyagraha was about 
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one’s own sense of self, or one’s community’s self-image, more so than it was about the impact 
on the forces external.1 
For Gandhi, the blending of political action with a sense of internal transformation and 
self-consciousness through satyagraha was deeply connected to his conception of freedom, what 
he called swaraj. Like satyagraha, Gandhi’s swaraj was a multifaceted concept that mixed the 
personal and political and reflected the importance of the internal. Swaraj blended a political 
notion of freedom with a more personal and spiritual conceptualization, which drew on 
longstanding Indian notions from Sanskrit and Hindu texts. A Sanskrit word, Swaraj originally 
has two distinct meanings. One use of swaraj connoted political sovereignty, or freedom from 
external political control while the other referred to a personal sense of freedom, freedom from 
illusion or ignorance, freedom to develop greater self-knowledge and mastery. Gandhi combined 
this understanding of swaraj with another notion of freedom from the Bhagavad-Gita, the holiest 
book of Hinduism. In the Bhagavad-Gita freedom meant spiritual liberation and freedom from 
delusion. It also understood the path to such freedom to be self-discipline, a control of focus that 
would allow one to see more clearly. Gandhi incorporated these understandings of freedom into 
his concept of swaraj, which was at once an expression of political and spiritual liberation: 
freedom from external control, freedom to develop self-knowledge and avoid delusion, and 
freedom to be in control of your own life. For Gandhi, the relationship between swaraj and 
satyagraha was essential. He developed the connection between them in his first major writing, 
Hind Swaraj, or “Indian Independence,” written in 1909. In it, Gandhi argued that true swaraj 
required “self-rule or self-control,” and, he explained, “the way to it is satyagraha: the power of 
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truth and love.” Indeed, in Gandhi’s understanding, achieving freedom from British rule meant 
achieving swaraj, which, he said, had nothing to do with war, battles, violence, or arms. As he 
explained, “the sword is entirely useless for holding India.” The first step was to “cultivate 
fearlessness.”2 
Themes such as “self-rule,” “cultivat[ing] fearlessness,” and “recover[ing] self respect,” 
were at the heart of Gandhi’s satyagraha and swaraj, and reflected an understanding of 
nonviolent direct action whose primary purpose was internal transformation: focusing on the 
impact of direct action on the hearts and minds of the individual actor and their community, 
rather than their adversary. To be sure, Gandhi’s philosophy of nonviolent direct action was not 
exclusively internally focused. It also included elements of strategy, politics, and outside-
oriented action. However, Gandhi spent a good deal of time thinking through the differences 
between these sets of goals. One way that Gandhi made sense of this is through his own 
distinctions between the concepts of satyagraha and duragraha.  
Gandhi’s distinction between satyagraha and duragraha illustrates clearly the differences 
between nonviolence for the purpose of internal transformation and nonviolence as a form of 
persuasion, influence, or bias. Initially, after satyagraha came into use following the civil 
disobedience campaigns in South Africa, Gandhi and others described the term as “passive 
resistance.” However, Gandhi quickly came to reject that explanation, believing it failed to 
“convey the active power of nonviolence.” Instead, he saw passive resistance as a better 
descriptor for duragraha, which Gandhi called “the force of bias.” The duragrahi, Gandhi 
suggested, could employ the tactics of nonviolent direct action, but solely as a strategic measure 
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aimed at influencing or persuading the adversary. As Dalton explains, “The passive resistor or 
duragrahi may avoid physical violence yet still harbor enmity and anger within, using 
nonviolence as a tactic but lacking commitment to its core values of understanding, openness, 
and respect for the adversary.”3 Thus for Gandhi, “passive resistance,” a term that also came to 
lose favor among the most dedicated Gandhian followers in the civil rights movement, reflected 
a more strategic approach to nonviolent direct action, which he described as duragraha. And 
importantly, Gandhi’s distinction between satyagraha and duragraha returned to the question of 
inward rather than outward focus. If duragraha was the “force of bias,” it suggested the primary 
use of passive resistance was to persuade and influence others, while the primary purpose of 
satyagraha was in how it impacted the individual actor herself. 
While Gandhi’s nonviolent philosophy put primacy on internal transformation, the 
predominant emphasis of nonviolence that emerged in the U.S. civil rights movement was 
external. Early followers of Gandhi in the United States introduced versions of Gandhian 
nonviolence that minimized its inward focus in favor of a kind of nonviolent direct action that 
was primarily strategic. 
 
Gandhian Nonviolence in CORE and FOR 
Some of the first interpretations of Gandhi’s nonviolent philosophy used in the Black 
freedom struggle came through activists from the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and its 
parent organization, the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR). Though African Americans had 
been using nonviolent tactics, particularly boycotts, since at the least the 19th century, historians 
August Meier and Elliott Rudwick have argued that such early mobilizations lacked “a self-
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conscious strategy or ideology of nonviolent direct action,” which, they claim, “was a creation of 
the twentieth century.” Indeed, even well into the twentieth century, Black organizations were 
using nonviolent tactics to fight for the expansion of civil rights without linking them explicitly 
to the concept of nonviolence or nonviolent direct-action. However, by the 1940s, more than a 
decade prior to the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott, a self-conscious strategy of nonviolence 
emerged in the Black freedom struggle, inspired by Gandhi, and  “pioneered” through the 
activity of the CORE and FOR.4 
CORE was formed in 1942 by a small group of young activists in Chicago with ties to the 
FOR, a Christian-pacifist organization. The FOR’s longstanding pacifist tradition in the United 
States dated back to World War I and gained particular prominence among students during the 
1930s. According to CORE’s founders, this decade was known as the “pacifist era,” in which 
“the trend in pacifist-Christian circles was on nonviolence as an alternative to violence.” In such 
a context, they explained, “[i]t was natural that this was combined with Gandhism.”5 
Yet while the young activists’ burgeoning interest in Gandhian nonviolence drew on the 
pacifist traditions of the FOR, it also reflected a new context for political activism. A growing 
“pro-war” sentiment had developed among many former Christian-pacifists after U.S. entry into 
World War II, which significantly slowed the growth of pacifism in the United States after the 
1930s. However, the “Good War” had also contributed to increased awareness of racial 
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inequality in the United States, particularly in the context of the military. Most of the young 
activists who formed CORE were part of the now-smaller group of young pacifists, connected to 
the FOR, who had continued their ideological commitments and “social idealism” into the 1940s. 
Building off of the growing concern over racism in the United States developing against the 
backdrop of World War II, these dedicated young pacifists began to connect these themes more 
directly with what had previously been a primarily “philosophical opposition to war” within the 
FOR. Though the FOR had long been concerned with questions of race, their primary investment 
had always been pacifism.  
The FOR’s national leader, A.J. Muste, recruited a young African American pacifist, 
Bayard Rustin, to work as a youth secretary for the FOR in summer 1941. Muste sought to make 
the FOR the central site for peace and human rights oriented nonviolent direct action campaigns 
in the nation. Rustin was particularly interested in mobilizing African Americans to use 
nonviolent direct action as a way take on racial discrimination and segregation. Reporting on the 
mindset of African Americans at the time, Rustin told the FOR leadership, “No situation in 
America has created so much interest among Negroes as the Gandhian proposals for India’s 
freedom.” He believed Black people were ready: “The suffering which the Negro has already 
endured fits him well for the disciplines necessary for nonviolent direct action.” In such a 
context, Rustin pushed the FOR to take on racial discrimination more directly, explaining: “In 
the face of this tension and conflict, our responsibility is to put the technique of nonviolent direct 
action into the hands of the black masses….”6 
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It was not only Rustin who helped put racial justice on the agenda of the FOR, a small 
group of young FOR activists formed a “race relations cell” near the University of Chicago in 
October 1941, and sought to more fully integrate their commitment to pacifism and social 
change with their goals of racial equality. They were particularly interested in “applying 
Gandhian principles to racial problems.” A few months later, in spring 1942, four members of 
the race relations cell and two FOR staff members who had been actively working with them 
formed the first chapter of CORE, the Chicago Committee of Racial Equality. They began to 
apply methods of nonviolent direct action in their pursuit of interracial equality.7 
Because early CORE activists were, in CORE founder Bernice Fisher’s words, “afire 
with the ideas of Gandhian nonviolence,” they sought to follow Gandhi’s teachings as faithfully 
as possible. CORE took this commitment very seriously, creating an “Action Discipline,” which 
set out their modified approach to Gandhian nonviolence. CORE members were required to 
accept the “Action Discipline” and “be well versed in the principles of nonviolent philosophy.” 
The primary text that early CORE activists relied on was Krishnalal Shridharini’s War without 
Violence, which Fisher recalls they “studied and debated, chapter by chapter.” Shridharini, who 
CORE founder, James Farmer, called “a disciple of Gandhi,” had participated with Gandhi in the 
famous Salt March in April 1930. CORE was deeply influenced by Shridharini and they invited 
him to speak at CORE’s first conference in June 1943. War without Violence was a description 
of Gandhi’s philosophy and “an analysis and outline of Gandhi’s method of nonviolent direct 
action.” The methods and concepts in Shridharini’s interpretation were very influential on the 
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young CORE activists. As Fisher explained, “Reading War without Violence was a prerequisite 
in the early days.”8 
In CORE’s interpretation of Shridharini, Gandhi’s approach contained “three basic and 
essential steps: …investigation (to get the facts), negotiation (to try and solve the problem in 
face-to-face discussions), and direct action.”9 As Meier and Rudwick interpreted it, “Gandhi’s 
method was to start with an attempt to convert the opponent through negotiations and then 
successively move on to more militant actions.”10 One of CORE’s first attempts at Gandhian 
direct action was a sit-in they staged in 1941-42 at Jack Spratt, a south-side Chicago coffee shop 
that had been refusing service to African Americans. Farmer recalled how closely the young 
activists tried to follow Shridharini’s teaching on Gandhian methods early on, which he 
attributed in part to them “still being neophytes.” As a first step, the group “reviewed Shridharini 
to discover what our procedure might be” and made a plan based on Gandhi’s methods. 
Accordingly, the group set out to first gather all the facts, then attempt negotiation. If that failed, 
they planned to issue an ultimatum and finally, as a last step, they would initiate nonviolent 
direct action. The young activists followed this outline to the letter.11 
Yet, while early members of CORE worked hard to accurately translate and implement 
Gandhi’s teachings in the U.S., their translation was necessarily incomplete. As Meier and 
Rudwick explain, “In borrowing this procedure, the Chicago Committee of Racial Equality 
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omitted certain actions in the series.” These omissions demonstrated the modifying impact that 
CORE had on the interpretation of Gandhian nonviolence in the U.S. Some of these omissions 
were primarily procedural. For example, Gandhi’s method suggested that if initial attempts to 
negotiate and arouse public opinion failed, the appropriate next step would be “parades and other 
colorful demonstrations.” In CORE’s translation, however, outside of the sporadic “poster walk,” 
parades dropped out of the process, in part, perhaps, due to the small number of people involved 
in the organization early on. Similarly, another step in Gandhi’s process encouraged activists to 
“perform rites of prayer and fasting to purify themselves of their own guilt arising from their 
previous failure to resist evil practices.” Yet like parades, the “rites of self-purification were 
discarded as inapplicable in the United States.”  In the same vein, the final step of Gandhi’s 
procedure, if all other avenues had failed, was to engage in civil disobedience. However, 
CORE’s literature made no mention of civil disobedience as part of the process. Meier and 
Rudwick speculate this might have been to avoid “[frightening] potential recruits,” or else 
because CORE was operating primarily in areas that were by and large “covered by state civil 
rights laws,” thus making civil disobedience an irrelevant tactic. Yet the absence of civil 
disobedience may also have symbolized a wider reluctance among early CORE activists to 
engage in direct action protest unless absolutely necessary. More often than not, CORE chapters 
remained unwilling to move beyond attempts at negotiation when confronting racial 
discrimination.12  
As this suggests, CORE not only consciously abandoned certain elements of Gandhi’s 
direct action procedure in the belief that it was not applicable to the U.S. context, they also, not 
surprisingly, drew on their own interests and values when translating Gandhian philosophy. 
                                                
12 Meier and Rudwick, CORE, 12. 
 63	
These emphases, I argue, have had a significant impact on the dominant interpretations of 
Gandhian nonviolence in the United States.  
 
Interracialism 
 The explicit emphasis on internal transformation in Gandhi’s philosophy would suggest 
that interpretations of satyagraha in the United States also put primacy on the impact of 
nonviolent direct action on the oppressed. However, the initial interpretation of Gandhian 
nonviolence that was translated to the Black freedom struggle through CORE infused satyagraha 
with their own emphases that often worked against Gandhi’s internally-oriented focus. Instead, 
CORE’s emphasis on interracialism explicitly de-emphasized a Black-centered approach to the 
pursuit of Black freedom.  
CORE’s explicit emphasis on being an interracial organization had a significant impact 
on their organizational goals and methods. From the beginning, CORE was an interracial group. 
The six primary founders of CORE included two African Americans: James Farmer and Joe 
Guinn, and four whites: George Houser, Bernice Fisher, Homer Jack, and James R. Robinson. 
Yet the interracial nature of CORE was not circumstantial, it was central to their vision of racial 
equality. Interracial action and Gandhian nonviolence were, according to Meier and Rudwick, 
“the twin ideological beliefs underpinning CORE’s organizational structure.” 13  As their 
Statement of Purpose clearly explained, “CORE has one method—interracial, non-violent direct 
action.”14  
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Indeed, the young activists even chose their organization’s name because it emphasized 
the interracial nature of the group itself. Debate over the group’s name centered primarily on the 
preposition: would they be the Committee for Racial Equality, the Committee on Racial 
Equality, or the Committee of Racial Equality? Because “racial equality exists,” they claimed, 
for was quickly eliminated as an option, as “working for it would be erroneous.” However, they 
were also drawn to the fact that of or on would allow for the acronym CORE, which they liked 
because it indicated that unlike the NAACP and Urban League, they “were working at the core 
of the problem” rather than on the “fringes.” The ensuing discussion was about what the “o” 
would stand for. According to James Farmer, the discussion was “lengthy and high-spirited” and 
“philosophical, not frivolous.” Ultimately, the group settled on the Committee of Racial Equality, 
as it reflected the fact that “[w]e were a committee of racially equal people.” As Farmer 
explained, “of…implied that the organization, in its structure, its methods, and its very being, 
would reflect the objective it sought.”15  
Yet CORE’s primary emphasis on interracialism, as opposed to expanding African 
American civil rights, for example, had a significant impact on how CORE approached notions 
of race. “One of our motivations,” Bernice Fisher explained, “had been the determination that 
there should be a thoroughly interracial organization…not another Negro group with token 
membership of whites.” CORE challenged the concept of the “Negro problem,” a popular phrase 
used during the 1940s to describe U.S. racism and opposition to it. Rather than a “Negro 
problem,” CORE founders maintained, the issue was actually a “human problem which could be 
eliminated only through the joint efforts of all believers in the brotherhood of man.” As Fisher 
recalled, “My avowed intention was to fight for the time that race would be a term of importance 
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only to anthropologists.” As these statements suggest, early CORE was relatively uninterested in 
thinking about the specificity of Black experiences in the United States. Instead, they challenged 
segregation and discrimination purely on the basis of a universal humanness.16    
In spite of CORE’s committed interracial focus, the group’s goals and interests generally 
overlapped with those of Black-led organizations. However, their explicit rejection of Black-
centered expressions of freedom also put them at odds with those who might otherwise be their 
primary allies. For example, interacialism led to an ambivalent response to the most promising 
mass organization for Black freedom during the 1940s, A. Philip Randolph’s March on 
Washington Movement (MOWM). James Farmer described Randolph as “the most feared and 
the greatest black leader of the thirties,” someone who had been called “the most dangerous 
Negro in America.” During the 1940s, he was still regarded as “the towering civil rights figure of 
[the] period” and his MOWM was the closest thing to a national organization that challenged 
racial discrimination, something CORE aspired to become. Sociologist Aldon D. Morris calls the 
MOWM a primary “forerunner to the modern civil rights movement” because it “demonstrated 
conclusively that masses of blacks could be organized for collective protest.”17  
In spite of Randolph’s prominence and CORE’s interest in becoming a national 
organization, they responded to Randolph and the MOWM with skepticism. In 1943, Randolph 
had decided to organize a massive campaign against Jim Crow laws, which he wanted to model 
after Gandhi’s nonviolent protests in India. Recognizing CORE’s and the FOR’s knowledge 
about Gandhian nonviolence, he consulted with members about the possibility of using Gandhian 
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techniques in a mass action. Though Bayard Rustin supported Randolph’s vision, the fact that it 
required mass participation led members of CORE to question its feasibility, arguing that 
participants would require a level of training in Gandhian methods that Randolph was not 
prepared to undertake. Rustin was convinced otherwise. In February 1943 Rustin celebrated 
Randolph’s investment in the possibility of nonviolent direct action, saying, “A. Philip Randolph 
spoke in a way that convinced me that he is really concerned to develop an understanding and 
use of nonviolence by the American Negro.”18  
Though the lack of training was a primary reason for some CORE members’ skepticism, 
they were also deeply concerned about the all-Black character of Randolph’s MOWM. 
Surprisingly, given Rustin’s later positions on integration, Rustin was not so concerned. 
Reporting in 1941, he noted that “Black nationalism is rampant” in the African American 
community with “a growing feeling that the Negro must solve his own problem.”19 Later, in 
October 1943, Rustin claimed, “When enough Negroes can be organized into a strong pressure 
group, they will be able to obtain their rights.” He stated further: “If whites were admitted to the 
MOW, they might control the movement…. They would take the leadership away from young 
Negroes, who ought to have it. If money were accepted from whites, they would control the 
thinking of the movement as well….There must be a peculiarly Negro organization to face the 
peculiarly Negro problems of today.”20 
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Though ultimately CORE joined Rustin in supporting Randolph’s efforts, they had 
serious reservations. James Farmer thought the movement “smacks of racial chauvinism,” 
explaining, “The stronger black nationalism becomes in Negro life in America, the farther we are 
from a real solution to the problem of color….We cannot destroy segregation with a weapon of 
segregation.” The conflict between a Black-centered approach and CORE’s interracialism struck 
both ways. Though CORE leaders often worked closely with A. Philip Randolph throughout the 
mid-century Black freedom struggle, on at least one occasion Randolph declined to collaborate 
with CORE on a particular project, claiming that “Negroes…themselves should take the 
leadership in the fight.” In spite of such critiques, CORE insisted on maintaining interracial 
campaigns.21 
CORE’s critique of the Black MOWM reflected a willingness within early CORE speak 
out against the “racial chauvinism” of Black nationalism just as they did of white supremacy. 
Ultimately, they were wary of anything that challenged interracialism. The “Negro voting bloc to 
us was anathema,” Bernice Fisher explained, as it “[built] up of the myth of differences.” Fisher, 
a white woman who was among the most outspoken on this point, even launched arguments 
against Negro History Week. Responding to a “black cleric who spoke of his pride in the historic 
heroes of the Negro race,” Fisher claimed she had “the equal right to be proud of them as a part 
of the human race.” For Fisher, even the notion of Negro History Week “seemed mere 
chauvinism…”22  
Fisher’s critical stance on celebrations of Black pride and history and Farmer’s critiques 
of the all-Black MOWM demonstrate the extent to which CORE’s steadfast commitment to 
interracialism positioned them in opposition to explicit expressions of Blackness. In this way, 
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while CORE’s interracialism sought to challenge U.S. racism and discrimination, their emphasis 
on interracial humanism necessarily stood in the way of visions of freedom that placed notions of 
Black humanity at the center. Thus, while CORE sought to use Gandhian nonviolence as an 
affront to racial oppression in the United States, their emphasis on interracialism encouraged 
them to interpret Gandhian philosophy in ways that put primacy on changing how African 
Americans were treated and perceived more so than on African Americans’ own internal 
experiences. This, combined with their emphasis on themes of moral persuasion and loving the 
oppressor, helped encourage externally oriented interpretations of Gandhian nonviolence in the 
Black freedom struggle. 
 
Christianity 
For many members of early CORE, the intensity of their commitment to interracialism 
and Gandhian nonviolence was also connected to their Christianity. Indeed, while Gandhian 
nonviolence was primarily rooted in Hinduism, Gandhi himself recognized nonviolence reflected 
in Christianity. He was heavily influenced by the Christian-anarchism of Leo Tolstoy, and said 
that the New Testament, and particularly the Sermon on the Mount, “went straight to my 
heart.”23 The link between Gandhian nonviolence and Christianity was very meaningful for 
many CORE members. As James Farmer explained, “…the Jewish-Christian faith in the 
universal community” was “at the very foundation of the pacifist philosophy” and part of what 
“urges that putting an end to racial discrimination become one of our major emphases.” Bernice 
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Fisher similarly recalled, “I had been caught up with the idea that we should live life now as if 
the Kingdom of God were at hand…To many of us [nonviolence] was a philosophy of life.”24 
One of the FOR workshops that Bayard Rustin led in 1943 during a speaking tour in 
California was called “Five Kinds of Nonviolent Direct Action Jesus Used.” In it he drew on 
biblical passages to explain how Jesus of Nazareth used nonviolent direct action tactics, 
including civil disobedience, noncooperation, mass marches, and “personal nonviolent direct 
action” (“he drove by drastic actions the exploiters [moneychangers] from the temple”).25  
  Christianity had always been a central aspect of the FOR’s organizational vision, which 
James Farmer recognized when he made his initial proposal for his vision of CORE to the FOR 
National Council. “I put my words in a religious context,” he explained, “because this was, after 
all, the FOR.”26 Though ultimately it was decided that CORE would not be explicitly connected 
to the FOR, the FOR’s intellectual and philosophical influence, as well as their financial and 
institution support, meant that the Christian-pacifist orientation of the older organization 
continued to be important in both organizations.  
The church played a significant role in the lives of CORE’s members. Half of CORE’s 
six founders were divinity students at the University of Chicago, while another, James Farmer, 
had just received his Bachelor of Divinity from Howard University. The Methodist church, 
which had a significant influence on the Christian-pacifist activism that fueled the FOR during 
the 1930s, was particularly influential on CORE as well. Another CORE founder, George 
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Houser, was the son of a Methodist minister and both he and Farmer “had been prominent in 
Methodist student circles in the 1930’s.”27 
Given the significant influence of Christianity, it is not surprising that their vision of 
Gandhian nonviolence was also inflected with religiously motivated themes. James Farmer 
recalled defending his interest in Gandhian nonviolence to his father in the early 1940s in terms 
of Christianity, arguing: “…if there is nonviolence in Hinduism, so also is there in Christianity. 
‘Turn the other cheek.’ Jesus putting the severed ear back on the head of the soldier. ‘He who 
lives by the sword, by the sword shall perish.’ ‘Love thine enemy.’ The Christians are the lions. 
And on and on.”28 Like Farmer, CORE applied a lens of Christianity to their interpretations of 
Gandhian nonviolence. In this vein, they regularly emphasized the value of conversion and moral 
persuasion, putting particular emphasis on the concept of loving and respecting the oppressor.  
 
Moral Suasion and Loving the Oppressor in CORE’s Interpretation of Gandhian Nonviolence 
The combination of Christian-pacifism and commitment to interracialism in CORE and 
the FOR played a significant role in the ways that they translated Gandhian nonviolence to the 
U.S. context. Interracialism, Christianity, and pacifism not only drew early CORE members to 
Gandhi, they also influenced how the young activists interpreted and implemented Gandhian 
nonviolent direct action. CORE particularly emphasized two themes in their interpretations of 
Gandhi’s philosophy. First, they emphasized the use of nonviolent direct action as method of 
conversion and moral suasion. Second, and relatedly, they drew heavily on Gandhi’s instruction 
to approach one’s adversary with love and respect.  
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The first two aspects of the nonviolent method outlined in CORE’s “Action Discipline” 
reflected these emphases: “the power of active good-will,” and “the power of public opinion 
against a wrong-doer.”29 Active good will symbolized CORE’s version of loving and respecting 
the oppressor, while using the power of public opinion drew on notions of moral suasion. 
Importantly, CORE’s approach was always concerned with how their actions would actually 
change social relationships in the service of building a more perfect interracial community. 
According to Meier, Rudwick, and Broderick, these themes “expressed the belief that direct 
action should always be accompanied by a spirit of good-will toward the discriminator, a frame 
of mind calculated to change not only his racist behavior, but his attitudes as well.”30 
The specific steps outlined in CORE’s process of nonviolent direct action began with 
attempts to “convert the opponent through negotiations,” and then “arouse public opinion 
[through] agitation.” This emphasis on conversion and public persuasion was at the heart of 
CORE’s nonviolent approach. In a newsletter from January 1943 CORE reiterated these key 
elements of the procedure, reminding its members to “Remember technique!...Gather facts. 
Negotiate. Rouse public opinion, and then, if absolutely necessary, and only as a last resort, Take 
Direct Action…”31 The newsletter reflected CORE’s emphasis on negotiation and engaging 
public sentiment. Further, by emphasizing the use of direct action only as a “last resort”, CORE 
demonstrated their primary concern with externally oriented results. In contrast, though CORE’s 
steps mimicked Gandhi’s process of nonviolent direct action, his satyagraha recognized direct 
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action as a valuable end in itself, meant to build strength and internal power in the satyagrahi. 
By de-emphasizing direct action, CORE implicitly framed it as a technique of persuasion, geared 
at changing the adversary not the actor.  
Another primary commitment in CORE was to “seek to love their opponents and refrain 
from committing violence, no matter what the provocation, even if this meant accepting death.”32 
Drawing on their shared investment in interracialism and Christian values, approaching the racist 
with love, understanding, and respect was essential in CORE’s interpretations of Gandhian 
nonviolence, and it was emphasized repeatedly in their training and literature. CORE’s 
“Statement of Purpose” required that they “develop a spirit of understanding rather than 
antagonism.”33 This was echoed in the “Action Discipline,” which dictated that the CORE 
member, “…seek at all times to understand the social situation which engendered the prejudiced 
attitude of the perpetrator of racial injustice.” In addition, it asked the member to “…seek to 
understand, without compromising his principles, the attitude of the person responsible for a 
policy of racial discrimination by discussing the problem through with him.” At all times, a 
CORE member was to “harbor no malice or hate toward any individual or group of 
individuals.”34 The “Action Discipline” also called on CORE members to “suffer the anger of 
any individual or group in the spirit of good-will and creative reconciliation.” Explaining, “In 
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suffering such anger, he will submit to assault and never retaliate in kind, either by act or word,” 
which required that he “never use malicious slogans or labels to discredit any opponent.”35  
According to Meier and Rudwick, the conception of Gandhian nonviolence that “set the 
tone” for CORE in its first decade, “emphasiz[ed] the reconciling spirit which was characteristic 
of FOR.” This spirit was based on the belief that “the activist, by taking unmerited suffering 
upon himself, mobilized public opinion and,” in the words of George Houser, exerted a 
“redemptive influence upon the wrongdoer.” Houser, who had a significant influence on CORE 
as its first executive secretary and primary editor for CORE’s newspaper, the CORE-lator, 
stressed that nonviolence should “incarnate the spirit of understanding, of good will, of 
humility.” The “non-violent campaign,” he explained, “cannot be considered a total success 
unless attitudes are changed in the process of changing policies.”36 Houser and Bayard Rustin 
emphasized this strategy of moral suasion and respectability in a 1948 memorandum to young 
men who were considering refusing the draft law: 
Your attitude must be one of absolute nonviolence…. Submit willingly and peacefully to arrest out of a 
sense of duty and never out of fear or embarrassment. Under no circumstance be mean, or curse, or look 
angry or strike back, even if you are struck. We are depending on the goodwill that we can express to win 
not only freedom and liberty, but more important, to win over to our side as many people as we can. We 
want to win the officials (including the police) to the belief that our cause is just. Behave in such a fine, 
dignified manner that the police officers become ashamed to arrest anyone who behaves so well.37 
 
Though the FOR and CORE shared the goal of ending discrimination with many other activist 
organizations at the time, it is important to recognize how distinct this approach was from that of 
other groups like the NAACP, for example, who were much more concerned with establishing 
firm legal barriers to racial discrimination than with the creation of a harmonious interracial 
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community. In the NAACP’s estimation, the thoughts and feelings of the discriminator were far 
less significant than the legal limitations imposed on their behavior, while for CORE it was quite 
the opposite. CORE was rather skeptical of the approach taken by the NAACP and Urban 
League, calling their programs “ineffectual.” As Houser explained, they believed that 
discrimination “must be challenged directly, without violence or hatred, yet without 
compromise…” Some of the “purists among the pacifists,” James Farmer remembered, even 
opposed legal action on the grounds that it was violent. Though he personally believed that 
“nonviolence and legal action must be twin weapons,” others in CORE and the FOR opposed 
legalism on the grounds that “it did not seek to be loving” and “relied on police action for its 
enforcement,” which, they argued, was “based ultimately on violence.” As Farmer suggests, 
though the implied presence of violence in legal approaches was part of their opposition, CORE 
activists were more likely to eschew legalism because it had little direct impact on the hearts and 
minds of the community and thus, they reasoned, was ultimately doing little to truly eliminate 
racism and discrimination from the culture. Instead, they believed that nonviolent direct action, 
not legal action, was the best way to impact the community and catalyze change.38 
 
Negotiation and Nonviolent Direct Action 
While CORE’s emphasis on themes of reconciliation and changing the attitudes of their 
adversaries reflected their emphasis on interracialism and Christianity, it was at times at odds 
with their commitment to direct action. As the 1943 newsletter implied, CORE chapters often 
found themselves stuck at the point of negotiation, unwilling to move further in Gandhi’s steps 
of nonviolent direct action. In part this was because of CORE members general “affinity for 
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intellectually oriented activities such as investigation and discussion,” which Meier and Rudwick 
suggest often came “at the expense of actions in the streets.” Thus because CORE members were 
often “more concerned with the philosophical emphasis upon loving and converting the enemy” 
and “upon reconciling whites and blacks” they were less focused on “the employment of 
nonviolent and direct action such as picketing and sitting-in.” At CORE’s convention in 1944, 
Bernice Fisher complained that CORE was attracting individuals who “are more interested in 
being nonviolent than in hitting the race question,” who “misinterpret the technique in terms of 
‘education,’” and who were more interested “in converting the exploiter…than in ending the 
exploitation.” These concerns were apparent throughout CORE’s first four years, where Meier 
and Rudwick explain, “only half the chapters attempted to move beyond negotiation,” and 
projects often “peter[ed] out” when “CORE locals failed to follow through with more militant 
tactics.” Though occasionally discussion and negotiation with discriminators had an impact on 
racist practices, more often this was not the case. Because CORE activists were equally 
committed to “convert[ing] the discriminator” as they were to “end[ing] discrimination,” Meier 
and Rudwick describe CORE campaigns between 1947 and 1954 as “tedious, time-consuming, 
and protracted.”39  
James Farmer’s reflection on a 1942 sit-in at Jack Sprat, a south side Chicago coffee 
shop, illustrates the limits of CORE’s overemphasis on negotiation. This action, Farmer 
estimates, might have been “the first civil rights sit-in” of the Black freedom movement. Farmer 
describes a particularly illustrative encounter with a white store manager during the initial 
“negotiation” phase of the 1942 sit-in. This manager, Farmer remembered, “was somewhat more 
civil” than the others they had encountered. She politely “explained that they refused service to 
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Negroes only because they feared the loss of white patrons.” For the young activists, this 
explanation was the foot in the door they needed. In response, they attempted to persuade their 
case and prove to this woman that such fears were unwarranted. They launched into a list of 
logical arguments about how serving Black patrons would not negatively impact white 
business.40  
“Our team expressed the conviction that they would not lose money,” Farmer recalled. 
“That close to the university, they assured her, most of her customers would approve a change of 
policy, and those who dissented would easily be offset by the new patrons a change would 
bring.” Perhaps not surprisingly, the manager was not persuaded. In response, Farmer 
remembered, CORE negotiators offered another option. They suggested that the manager could 
poll her customers or, they offered, she could let CORE do so, to see what the customers’ views 
really were. Yet after a second refusal from the manager, the CORE negotiators kept going, next 
proposing that perhaps “a third party, preferably a bookkeeper or CPA, [could] check her books 
after a month of serving all people, to determine whether Jack Spratt had lost income.” Though 
negotiations were clearly producing little movement, the CORE representatives kept at it. In their 
final proposal, the negotiators pledged that if it after a trial period it was shown that the coffee 
shop had indeed lost money, they would “guarantee in writing, if necessary, [that they would] 
make up the deficit for that month and not return again.” Though it seems difficult to imagine 
that CORE negotiators could have continued after this proposal, it was not them but the manager 
who finally ended their conversation by walking away.41 
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Farmer recalled his personal sense of great relief after hearing from the representatives 
that the manager had ended negotiations. It “sounded like an unwise proposition to me,” he 
remembered, as “it seemed to say that if racism is good business, we will allow it to continue.”42 
Though ultimately the early CORE activists did sit-in at Jack Sprat, reflecting on this encounter 
in 1965, Farmer expressed wonder at their initial “patience and good faith” throughout the whole 
process. Not only would a group no longer wait through a month of negotiation before turning to 
direct action, he explained, but further, their attempts to logically persuade the manager 
expressed “considerably more sympathy with her point of view than a similar group would 
today.” Significantly, rather than celebrate this aspect of early CORE’s approach, Farmer 
commented that by 1965, “we had grown too proud for that.” Instead, he suggested, he and the 
other young activists had been “childishly literal minded.” Echoing the concerns raised by 
Bernice Fisher in 1944, he elaborated: 
We believed that people meant exactly what they said to us and heard exactly what we said to them. We 
regarded the sit in as the successful culmination of a long campaign to reach the heart of the restaurant 
owner with the truth. What we took to be his conversion was as important to us as the fact that the 
restaurant had indeed been desegregated.43  
 
In this way, CORE activists in 1942 expressed considerable faith in their own capacity to 
change the hearts of their white opponents, and further, their faith in the capacity of whites to see 
and do differently. This faith led many early CORE activists to prioritize their impact on white 
attitudes over tangible results in the lives of Black people. Though individuals within early 
CORE had slightly different emphases in their own interpretations of Gandhian nonviolence, 
their overwhelming purpose, which was reflected clearly in CORE’s literature, was to use 
Gandhi’s framework of nonviolent direct action as a means of influencing change in others. 
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CORE emphasized the power of moral suasion and the value of loving the oppressor in the 
service of changing not only behaviors, but also attitudes of their adversaries, in the hopes of 
reconciling with them. Reflecting the interracial emphasis of their organization, CORE believed 
the best way to eliminate racial discrimination was by expanding their community of racial 
equality to the broader public or, as a younger James Farmer put it, to “radiate its equality in 
wider and wider circles until it encompassed the whole nation.”44  
 
Loving the oppressor in CORE and Gandhi  
While CORE’s emphasis on loving and redeeming the oppressor derived from Gandhian 
satyagraha, their purpose in cultivating such love was primarily for its impact on the adversary: 
to influence, persuade, and ultimately convert him to take part in their vision of a peaceful and 
harmonious interracial community. For Gandhi, this was very different. Instead, Gandhi’s 
emphasis was not on how loving or respecting the adversary would impact that adversary, or 
even how it would impact their tangible goals in the struggle. While Gandhi did advocate the use 
of nonviolent direct action as a political strategy, the outcome of such actions was secondary. 
Instead, his primary concern was how developing love for the adversary would influence the 
satyagrahi herself, how she and her community would benefit from growing a sense of love 
within.  
Gandhi’s distinction between satyagraha and duragraha is illustrative here. While 
having “understanding, openness, and respect for the adversary” are among the core values of 
Gandhi’s satyagraha, their purpose is for the satyagrahi to not “harbor enmity and anger 
within.” Thus, while “avoid[ing] physical violence” in an act of passive resistance may be a 
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useful expression of “the power of bias,” or duragraha, it does not embody the soul force of 
truth and love at the heart of satyagraha. In this way, Gandhi’s interest in removing hate from 
the heart of the actor takes primacy over the impact that such actions may or may not have. This 
distinction seems subtle, but in fact, it is the difference between recognizing nonviolent direct 
action as a strategy for pressuring change in others rather than a way to cultivate personal power, 
fearlessness, and strength inside oneself. In this way, though CORE often used the term 
satyagraha, their primary emphasis of nonviolent direct action as a form of moral suasion, 
influence, and bias was perhaps more accurately an expression of Gandhian duragraha.45 
This distinction illustrates that while the pairing of moral suasion and loving the 
oppressor derived from Gandhi’s framework of nonviolent direct action, CORE’s interpretations 
of these themes failed to effectively incorporate Gandhi’s primary emphasis on internal 
transformation. Instead, CORE’s version of Gandhian nonviolence demonstrated a primary 
investment in affecting the adversary rather than the actor herself. This outward rather than 
inward focus had a significant impact on how Gandhian nonviolence came to function during the 
civil rights movement. Recognizing these differences between an internally oriented and 
externally oriented interpretation of loving the adversary is key for understanding the framework 
of Gandhian nonviolence in the United States. 
 
Nonviolence influences the Civil rights movement 
Though the FOR continued to have a broader organizational agenda than just racial 
justice, they played a significant role in events such as the 1947 Journey of Reconciliation, in 
which a group of Black and white activists tested the federal ruling against segregated facilities 
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in interstate travel. Foreshadowing CORE’s Freedom Rides of 1961, the Journey of 
Reconciliation was among the most recognized national actions to oppose racial discrimination 
during the 1940s. At the same time, though CORE chapters spread from Chicago to various 
cities throughout northern United States including St. Louis, Oakland, New York City, and 
Baltimore, the organization went through a period of decline by the 1950s. Their particularly 
northern focus and organizational limits, like emphasizing negotiation over action, kept the 
organization relatively limited.  
Though both CORE and the FOR remained dedicated to using Gandhian nonviolent 
direct action to combat racial injustice throughout the 1940s and 1950s, they were not 
responsible for the mass mobilization that sparked the beginning of the civil rights movement in 
most mainstream historical narratives. Instead, the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott, mobilized 
around a mass campaign of nonviolent direct action, marked the starting point of the mass 
grassroots action of the civil rights movement and launched Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to 
national prominence as the movement’s symbol of Gandhian nonviolence. 
Though Gandhian nonviolence became a central strategic framework for the civil rights 
movement, it is probably more accurate to say that the Montgomery bus boycott initially derived 
from the longer traditions of boycotts and other protest activity in African American 
communities. Indeed, boycott leaders did not initially tie the protest explicitly to a philosophy of 
Gandhian nonviolence. However, King began making reference to Gandhi in his sermons and 
speeches within the first few months.46  
That boycott leaders in Montgomery would draw connections to Gandhi is not surprising. 
His campaign for Indian independence had been covered in the Black press since the 1920s and 
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it was clear to most that his movement was well-aligned with the struggle against white 
supremacy in the U.S. Initial connections between the bus boycott and Gandhian philosophy 
were also certainly influenced by King, who had just received his doctorate in systematic 
theology from Boston University and had been exposed to Gandhi’s philosophy as a student.47  
However, though Montgomery movement leaders in 1955 were certainly aware of 
Gandhian nonviolence, and its potential value in their campaign, it was not until Glenn E. Smiley 
and Bayard Rustin went to Montgomery in February 1956 that an explicitly Gandhian 
framework took root in the movement. According to Religious scholar and FOR member Walter 
Wink, “King himself, at the onset of the Montgomery bus boycott, had called on FOR to send 
someone who knew about Gandhian nonviolence firsthand.”48  
Glenn E. Smiley and Bayard Rustin had both been longtime staff members at the FOR, 
though Rustin had recently taken a position with the War Resisters League (WRL), another 
pacifist organization with ties to the FOR. Rustin arrived in Montgomery prior to Smiley, though 
he had been instructed to maintain a low profile. It had become important for the Montgomery 
movement to not appear to be influenced by outside organizations, and many believed Rustin’s 
particular positionality could exacerbate those concerns. Rustin, who was a FOR staff member at 
the time of CORE’s founding in 1942, had a long history with the Christian pacifists and was 
instrumental in both the founding of CORE and the FOR’s Journey of Reconciliation in 1947. 
However, Rustin had also been a member of the Young Communist League for a brief time in 
his youth and further, had served time in prison for draft resistance.  Most recently in January 
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1953, he had been arrested in Pasadena, California and sentenced to sixty days in jail on charges 
of “lewd vagrancy” after police approached Rustin and two other men having a sexual encounter 
in a parked car. Following this arrest, Rustin submitted his resignation and was terminated from 
the FOR. In the context of 1950s cold war America, Rustin had become a potentially dangerous 
associate for a developing protest movement, particularly one built around claims to 
respectability and legitimacy. “Bear in mind,” Rustin wrote to his friends in the WRL shortly 
after he arrived in Montgomery, “there must be not talk of me being here and reports should be 
made confidential in terms of no one here knowing that I am so closely tied in.”49 Less than a 
week after Rustin arrived, the FOR sent Smiley to join him. Though Smiley was under explicit 
instruction not to associate himself with Rustin or draw attention to the presence of the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, both Smiley and Rustin played important roles in introducing a 
more robust Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence to King, and by extension, the Montgomery 
movement.50  
Smiley recalled being eager in his first meeting with King, showing up with a pile of 
books on nonviolence. “I’m assuming that you’re very familiar and have been greatly influenced 
by Gandhi,” he said. In spite of King’s previous exposure to Gandhi, he admitted to Smiley that 
he was not. Though he admired Gandhi, King said, “I will have to truthfully say…that I know 
very little about the man.” Yet he was interested in learning more.51 In the following weeks, 
Rustin and Smiley began King’s serious political education about the contours of Gandhian 
nonviolence and how the FOR and CORE had been using it in their campaigns since the 1940s. 
Though they both admitted he had much to learn, they were also excited about King’s potential. 
                                                
49 Long, I Must Resist, 169. 
50 David Garrow, Bearing the Cross, 68; Long, I Must Resist, 149-165. 
51 Glenn E. Smiley, quoted in Garrow, Bearing the Cross, 68. 
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Smiley remembered, “He didn’t even use the word [nonviolence] at first...he used ‘passive 
resistance’ almost entirely.” But in spite of this, Rustin claimed, King was “developing a 
decidedly Gandhi-like view.”52 
The connection that Rustin developed with King in particular during his time in 
Montgomery left a significant impression on the both of them. As Smiley reported to the FOR 
shortly after his arrival, “Bayard has had a very good influence on King, wrote the much quoted 
speech last week, and was in on all the strategy.” CORE co-founder Homer Jack concurred, 
reporting that Rustin “seemed especially effective in counseling with the leaders of protest 
during the crucial 2 weeks after the mass arrests for the boycott. His contribution to interpreting 
the Gandhian approach to the leadership cannot be overestimated.”53  
Soon, Rustin was helping King with the business of being the face of a social movement 
organization. In this, Rustin excelled. Throughout the remainder of the decade, Rustin worked as 
one of King’s primary strategic advisors, helping to strategize the formation of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). He ghostwrote King’s first published article, which 
appeared in the April 1956 issue of Liberation, as well as many other speeches and publications 
thereafter. He and Stanley D. Levison, a white attorney active with Rustin in “In Friendship,” 
became King’s primary editing team. They heavily edited King’s first book, Stride Toward 
Freedom.54  
King drew on his training as a pastor and his relationship to the Christian church to root 
his expression of nonviolent philosophy in religion, but it was Rustin’s, as well as Smiley’s, 
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54 Garrow, Bearing the Cross, 73-111. “In Friendship” was a New York activist group that had 
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strategic interpretation of Gandhian nonviolence as a movement framework that played heavily 
into how King came to use and make sense of nonviolence as a part of his campaign for African 
American civil rights. The combination of King’s Christianity with the Christian-pacifist 
influence from the FOR, Gandhian nonviolence came to be used in the civil rights movement as 
as a philosophical and moral justification for a primarily strategic goal. The civil rights 
movement used morality claims in connection with direct action protest but like in CORE, the 
emphasis was most often externally oriented, as a means of moral suasion rather than internal 
transformation. In a memo from Rustin to King, sent December 23, 1956, Rustin highlighted 
some of the unique strengths of the Montgomery movement, emphasizing that “the actions of the 
people won the respect of their enemy” and gave “the closed mind of the white Southerner an 
airing it has never before had.” Though he recognized that African American self-respect was 
one of the gains of the movement, he explained that it was also “the respect of white people who, 
though they retain basic prejudice, have lost something in the course of this year that begins their 
long struggle to genuine understanding. In short,” Rustin continued, “Montgomery has 
contributed to the mental health and growth of the white man’s mind, and thus to the entire 
nation.”55  
Rustin’s emphasis reflected the growing notion that doing what was morally right was 
primarily valuable as a means of influence and persuasion in the civil rights movement and often 
only secondarily as an act of self and community empowerment. Though King’s sermons and 
speeches certainly connected the concept of nonviolence to a sense of internal power or 
transformation, he put primacy on using morality as a movement strategy. Though he rarely 
                                                
55 Bayard Rustin, Memo to Martin Luther King, Jr., December 23, 1956 in Long, I Must Resist, 
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credited Rustin and Smiley’s influence publicly, King’s strategic framework for Gandhian 
nonviolence reflected their guidance. King explained on a news broadcast in 1967: 
I became convinced that the Gandhian philosophy and the Gandhian method of nonviolent resistance, could 
serve as the most potent weapon available to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom and human 
dignity. Now I must admit that when I first became inspired by this method and became convinced that it 
was the most potent weapon available to the negro in struggle in America and to oppressed people 
generally, I had no particular plan of action. In other words, I was more or less intellectually committed to 
it. But I did not at that time conceive of the moment when I would start a movement where this method 
would be the guiding principle and the guiding technique….My mind went back, consciously or 
unconsciously, to the Gandhian technique or the Gandhian principle because I knew that this was a method 
constantly used by Gandhian struggle in India, and I knew that this was a kind of thing that could guide us 
through this struggle and bring about an ultimate victory if we adhered vigorously to nonviolent 
resistance.56 
 
While activists trained in Gandhian nonviolence in the tradition of CORE and the FOR 
had influence on the way first King and then other leaders used Gandhian philosophy in the civil 
rights movement, they also presaged another important development that framed the civil rights 
movement, namely the relationship to liberal allies. CORE reflected the growing awareness of 
liberals as significant allies for the growth of the movement in 1953, when CORE was at a 
serious organizational low point.  
Internal divisions had emerged within the organization, particularly in relation to 
heightened Cold War anticommunism. Though CORE had already adopted an explicit statement 
forbidding the membership of communists in the organization, a few members began to 
challenge this view. They argued that CORE was in a unique position to counter the “hysterical 
wave of McCarthyism” that was growing in the nation. Because of CORE’s image as a direct 
action protest group, these members reasoned, CORE’s “youthfulness and flexibility and its lack 
of ‘respectability’” actually gave the organization room to launch this critique. However, most in 
the organization felt differently. Concerned about CORE’s decline over the past years, CORE 
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leaders argued that rather than set themselves apart based on their perceived lack of 
respectability, the organization needed to do the opposite: make strides to “cultivate greater 
respectability and thereby gain greater acceptance.” Though he was one of CORE’s pacifist 
founders, James R. Robinson argued that CORE needed to lose its “cult image” and “appeal to 
the non-radical liberal…” In the 1950s, he claimed, CORE should try to “pitch itself through 
liberals to liberals rather than as once, through pacifists to pacifists and a few liberals.” Not 
surprisingly, given the nature of the organization at the time, Robinson’s position won out, and 
over the course of the decade, CORE worked to specifically to amass liberal supporters.57  
Though this chapter has argued that CORE emphasized strategic and externally oriented 
aspects of nonviolent direct action in its interpretations of Gandhi’s satyagraha, its founding 
members were nonetheless fully commitment to nonviolence as a philosophy and way of life. 
However, even this emphasis was subject to change in the face of CORE’s attempts to appeal to 
a more mainstream base in the 1950s. In spite of continued critiques from a small minority in the 
group that CORE was developing an “overconcern with ‘respectability,”’ CORE’s annual 
convention in 1953 voted to remove part of their “Action Discipline” statement that said, “the 
nonviolent method assumes the possibility of creating a world in which nonviolence will be used 
to a maximum degree.” Members of the New York chapter of CORE, who proposed the change, 
wanted to demonstrate that their commitment to nonviolence was not a “total philosophy.” 
Instead, they proposed an alternative, stating simply that nonviolent direct action “is a technique 
for developing a racially-integrated society in America.”58 
Given these shifts in CORE’s emphasis by 1953, it makes more sense why it was 
members of the FOR, rather than CORE, who influenced King’s interpretations of Gandhian 
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nonviolence in 1956. Though FOR activists were not exclusively committed to applying 
Gandhian nonviolence to racial discrimination in the United States in the way that CORE was, 
the FOR had developed a significant commitment to combatting racism over the course of its 
organizational life. Bayard Rustin in particular remained active in the FOR and simultaneously 
became a primary strategist for the civil rights movement, including the planning of the 1963 
March on Washington. Yet because the FOR remained tied more explicitly to its Christian-
pacifist origins, their emphasis on Gandhian nonviolence as a philosophy remained in tact 
throughout the 1950s. As such, while their emphasis remained much more externally oriented 
than Gandhi’s, the FOR was able to offer a framework of nonviolent direct action that bridged 
morality, legitimacy, direct action, and spirituality in a way that was particularly valuable in the 
context of the emerging civil rights liberal framework of the civil rights movement. 
As the civil rights movement developed around a dialectic of increasing opportunity for 
liberal support and mainstream visibility on one side, and the growing strength of the grassroots 
nonviolent direct action movement on the other, the FOR and CORE’s particular interpretation 
of Gandhian nonviolent direct action translated well. This framework for nonviolence fit well 
with the combination of mass action and mainstream legitimacy that the civil rights movement 
occupied. Further, Gandhi, as a simultaneous spiritual and political leader, was a perfect model 
for how to blend religion and politics in the civil rights movement. Thus, CORE and the FOR’s 
interpretation of Gandhi offered a fitting framework for how nonviolence would function in the 
civil rights movement, justifying the use of direct action through morality.  
 
Conclusion 
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The ways that we have understood nonviolence during the civil rights movement have 
derived from particular interpretations of Gandhian nonviolence that were translated into the 
U.S. context during the mid-twentieth century. The concerted commitment to nonviolent direct 
action in the Black freedom struggle started with CORE and the FOR during the 1940s. As an 
interracial and religiously rooted group that was deeply committed to pacifism, CORE translated 
Gandhian nonviolence to the context of the civil rights movement in particular ways that 
emphasized loving and redeeming the oppressor and using direct action as a form of moral 
persuasion. Though these themes manifested differently in Gandhi’s philosophy, CORE’s 
interpretations helped to make these themes central in the civil rights movement. 
This chapter argues that those particular interpretations of Gandhian nonviolence had a 
significant impact on the way nonviolence functioned in the civil rights movement. While 
Gandhi’s nonviolent philosophy put primacy on internal transformation, the predominant 
emphasis of nonviolence in the civil rights movement was external and primarily strategic. 
Often, these understandings were geared toward CORE-inspired notions of loving and changing 
the hearts and minds of white people. Because of their appeal to potential white allies, these 
themes were very conducive to cultivating and tending to the civil rights liberal alliance. As a 
result, direct action was less likely to be understood as a tool for transforming consciousness 
within the Black community than it was for the impact it had on white onlookers and racist 
oppressors. In this way, nonviolence became a way to publicly persuade and shame, rather than 
internally build and strengthen. 
The particularities surrounding the externally-oriented use of nonviolent direct action 
puts the civil rights movement in relief against a longer trajectory of Black freedom struggle in 
the United States. Not only does this suggest ways that the civil rights movement was able to 
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gain legitimacy in the political context of the mid-twentieth century, it also suggests that the 
distinction between internally- and externally-oriented philosophies of social action are highly 
relevant for understanding different moments and movements within the Black freedom struggle. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
LIBERALISM AND BLACK HUMANITY IN SNCC’s “GOLDEN ERA” 
 
 
Southern student protesters formalized into the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC) in April 1960 in the midst of the wave of student sit-ins that spread across 
the South. Rather than accept the offer to become a student wing of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
SCLC, the students instead chose to maintain their autonomy as a student-run organization. Their 
choice was guided by the direction of the then SCLC Executive Secretary, Ella J. Baker, who 
was one of the most significant organizers in the 20th century Black freedom struggle and also 
the students’ most influential advisor and teacher. 
Over the next year and half, SNCC students’ political education expanded significantly. 
They maintained their commitment to nonviolent direct action as a way to challenge segregation 
in public accommodations, and gained national attention when they took over the Freedom Rides 
that had been initiated by CORE in 1961. They began to develop an organizational reputation as 
a group of young people willing to put themselves on the line for what they believed and this 
contributed to their growing sense of their own power as political actors, as well as their 
developing reputation as formidable force in the civil rights movement. 
In 1961, SNCC transitioned away from being a coordinating body of local campus protest 
groups and moved into the local community-organizing model that would come to characterize 
SNCC thereafter. As historian Charles Payne explained, “SNCC initiated the mass-based, 
disruptive political style we associate with the sixties, and it provided philosophical and 
organizational models and hands-on training for people who would become leaders in the student 
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power movement, the anti-war movement, and the feminist movement.”1 Rather than student 
volunteers, SNCC became a staff of full-time workers committed to developing local 
organizations that encouraged Black political participation and challenged racism and 
discrimination throughout the South. In this regard, Ella Baker’s influence was again 
fundamental. Baker’s long organizing history included work as a community organizer in New 
York City during the Depression, playing a leading role in the Young Negroes’ Cooperative 
League, which facilitated the development of black economic cooperatives throughout the 
nation. She also worked with the Adult Education Program in Harlem. During the 1940s Baker 
became a field secretary for the NAACP and the first Executive director of SCLC in the final 
years of the 1950s. Throughout her work Baker maintained an approach to organizing that was 
distinct from most civil rights leaders at the time. According to her biographer, Barbara Ransby, 
Baker was always the  “outsider within.” She constantly “criticized unchecked egos, objected to 
undemocratic structures, protested unilateral decision making, condemned elitism, and refused to 
nod in loyal deference to everything ‘the leader’ had to say.” She encouraged this approach 
within SNCC, arguing for the need to develop “people who are interested not in being leaders as 
much as in developing leadership among other people.”  This, Baker called “group centered 
leadership.”2  
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Charles Payne includes Baker along with Myles Horton and Septima Clark in a group of 
southern organizers who re-imagined how power and leadership functioned in community 
organizing. Septima Clark is most remembered for developing Citizenship Schools in 
conjunction with Highlander Folk School, which Myles Horton co-founded during the 
Depression. Highlander was first conceived of as a site for developing individual and community 
self-determination among poor people in Appalachia. In the 1940s it expanded to include 
education for labor organizers, and by the 1950s Highlander had become a training center for 
people involved in the civil rights movement. Because of its central role in developing and 
connecting organizers together, sociologist Aldon D. Morris has called Highlander a movement 
halfway house.3 As Payne explained it, “…people like Septima Clark and Ella Baker and Myles 
Horton tested[…]the limits on the ability of the oppressed to participate in the reshaping of their 
own lives.”  Each of them “espoused a non-bureaucratic style of work,” and approached local 
communities with “sensitiv[ity] to [their] social structure,” and “appreciat[ion] of the[ir] 
culture.” Less concerned with “whether a community achieved this or that tactical objective,” he 
explained, Baker, Horton, and Clark were more interested in “whether the people in [the 
community] came to see themselves as having the right and the capacity to have some say-so in 
their own lives.”4 Though Baker had the most direct influence on SNCC, Payne contends that 
“the distinctive style of work SNCC would carry into the hard-core South drew directly and 
indirectly from the congealed experience of people like Ella Baker, Septima Clark, and Myles 
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Horton, experience acquired in exactly the kinds of communities the SNCC kids would work 
in.”5   
Baker introduced the students to another kind of civil rights activity rooted in many of the 
same ideas that had already been present in the students’ direct action protests. For many student 
sit-in participants, particularly those most versed in the philosophical elements of nonviolent 
direct action, they saw their sit-ins as a means to not only change their perception of themselves 
but also their relationships with other people. As SNCC’s Jane Stembridge explained: “…it all 
boils down to human relationships. It has nothing to do finally with governments. It is the 
question of whether we…whether I shall go on living in isolation or whether there shall be a we. 
The student movement is not a cause…it is a collision between this one person and that one 
person. It is a I am going to sit beside you…Love alone is radical. Political statements are not; 
programs are not; even going to jail is not…”6 In the same way, Baker’s organizing style was 
rooted in the concept of relationship building. Yet unlike the students’ previous direct action 
orientation, Baker’s organizing style took the concept of relationship building and brought it 
more explicitly to the level of the community. Through the influence of Baker, Horton, and 
Clark, SNCC transitioned from an organization defined by their use of nonviolent direct action 
into a group of local community organizers.  
SNCC’s organizational transition from student protest group to a locally oriented 
community organizing framework is often celebrated as the dawn of a “golden era” in SNCC’s 
organizational history, bookended by SNCC’s first entrée into McComb, Mississippi in 1961 and 
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the beginning of SNCC’s organizational decline, which is often located at the end of 1964. This 
period is celebrated for the bravery and commitment of the overall-clad student activists who 
faced the horrors of white supremacy while registering voters, organizing resistance to southern 
segregation, and helping to establish local community organizations in the rural counties and 
small towns of the Deep South. Often, this high point in SNCC is tied directly to their use of 
egalitarian rather than authoritarian internal practices, community based decision-making, de-
centralized organizational structure, and participatory and consensus-oriented processes, all 
geared toward empowering local people. As such, it is counterposed to a period of organizational 
collapse within SNCC, where, against a backdrop of frustration and disillusion, calls for 
centralized power and authoritarian hierarchy combined with a rejection of SNCC’s longstanding 
commitment to interracialism, resulting in a turn away from the celebrated local community 
organizing focus and toward a nationally-directed, rhetorical campaign associated with Black 
Power. In so doing, most of the definitive historical narratives on SNCC claim that they 
abandoned their most important commitments and ushered in their own eventual demise.  
 Though variations on this narrative exist, SNCC’s history is most often a story of 
declension, mapping the transition from civil rights to Black Power in our larger understandings 
of the Black freedom struggle. A key limit in such declension narratives has been an 
overemphasis on internal explanations for changes within SNCC and, concomitantly, relatively 
minimal critical engagement with the various forms of state-sponsored repression that were 
directed at SNCC throughout its organizational life and heightened substantially in the final 
years of the sixties. Historian Clayborne Carson, who has attended to questions of state 
repression more than other declension-oriented scholars, still demonstrates this limit when he 
concludes: “Although police harassment and covert repression exacerbated division among black 
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militants, SNCC hastened its own decline by losing touch with its roots in the deep South.” 
Though some scholars have challenged this internal and programmatic declension narrative, the 
story of SNCC’s “golden era” remains largely uncomplicated. While recognizing the need for 
more scholarly engagement with the external repression of SNCC, this chapter seeks to examine 
the earlier period in SNCC’s organizational trajectory and offer an alternative reading.7 
There are good reasons to celebrate SNCC’s community organizing work in the first half 
of the 1960s. SNCC activists’ willingness to put their bodies on the line, for example, helped 
facilitate an essential political education within SNCC about political and social power 
relationships between self and community, ally and actor, as well as local and national struggle. 
However, I contend that the most promising aspects of this period remain obscured. Specifically, 
what goes under-acknowledged are the ways that SNCC’s organizational transition to a local 
community organizing framework opened space for a set of relationships, practices, and values 
within SNCC that encouraged a new level of Black-centered organizing and consciousness to 
develop in the interactions between and among members of local African American communities 
and Black SNCC workers in the Deep South. Previously, scholars have recognized and 
acknowledged these developments within SNCC’s history. However, in their analyses SNCC’s 
efforts are most often grouped into the larger heroic picture of SNCC’s pre-1965 on-the-ground 
work in order to facilitate declensionist narratives.  
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This chapter claims that the existence of Black-centered organizing and the development 
of Black consciousness within SNCC’s Deep South projects before 1965 signals a longer 
trajectory of themes that were made more explicit within SNCC after 1965, particularly through 
their embrace of the Black Power as an organizational slogan in 1966. Rather than a testament to 
SNCC’s community organizing heyday, I argue that these themes developed in spite of a set of 
liberal organizational trends within SNCC that worked against and limited the pursuit of Black 
freedom during SNCC’s “golden era”. As SNCC workers sought to empower local people and 
democratize processes of community engagement, hierarchies of race, class, education status, 
region, and gender operated within SNCC’s organizing tradition, often working in opposition to 
their on-the-ground goals.  
This chapter suggests developing an alternative emphasis for understanding themes of 
declension in SNCC’s organizational trajectory. SNCC’s transition away from being a 
mainstream civil rights organization at the end of the 1960s was not a product of political 
radicalism, the authoritarian centralization of power, or a turn away from SNCC’s original 
investments in on-the-ground organizing, nonviolence, or interracialism. Instead, a primary 
factor in SNCC’s decline was their longstanding investment in liberalism. Deeper analysis of this 
formulation during SNCC’s post-1965 period is needed to fully develop this argument. For now, 
two examples suggest its validity. In an August 1970 letter, New York SNCC leader Muhammad 
Hunt told staff that in their “process of rebuilding the organization” they needed to “destroy ALL 
vestiges of certain bourgeois ideas, attitudes and behavior patterns[…]within the organization.” 
Hunt’s concerns echoed those of longtime SNCC staffer James Forman, who reflected on the 
continued limitations posed by internalized liberalism within SNCC between 1964 and 1966. 
“[A]n organization that is seeking revolution,” he explained, “[…]cannot afford the fear of 
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power. It cannot afford weak or vacillating leadership; it cannot afford liberalistic forms of self-
assertion.” This chapter examines the concept of internalized liberalism within SNCC as a 
prelude to broader examinations of liberalism in relation to SNCC’s organizational development 
and decline throughout the 1960s. In this context, internalized liberalism refers to the practices 
and approaches that SNCC activists used in their local organizing work, often unintentionally, 
that recreated power dynamics similar to the ones they critiqued on a broader, national scale 
among white liberal allies. This chapter argues that the limits of liberalism were already clear 
during the period that declension narratives celebrate as SNCC’s “golden era”.8  
This chapter contends that while SNCC pushed back against the liberal framework of the 
civil rights movement in its early attempts to place Black humanity at the center of the struggle, 
those attempts were simultaneously undermined and limited, not only by their continued 
organizational commitment to the overarching liberal framework of the civil rights movement, 
but also by the ways in which liberalism was internalized and functioned on the ground, even 
during the height of SNCC’s organizational strength in the first part of the decade. 
 
Black-centered Organizing in SNCC  
Through the new organizational orientation that emerged in 1961, SNCC transitioned 
toward community organizing rather than their previous student protest framework. In this 
process SNCC students turned into community activists and the relationships they built 
facilitated an important expansion of political consciousness among Black SNCC workers and 
the local communities in which they worked. Between 1961 and 1963, SNCC established local 
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community organizing projects in Mississippi, Georgia, Arkansas, Alabama, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Maryland.9 Through their encounters with local people and in the 
local communities of the Deep South, including the daily terror and threats of violence from 
local whites, SNCC activists’ political education grew. As they settled further into their roles as 
community organizers, a new set of values emerged among SNCC workers on the ground. The 
new organizer orientation allowed SNCC to develop a set of practices and values that contributed 
to the students’ sense of power and uniqueness. This new organizing emphasis focused on 
expanding the personal and community power of local people by building relationships and 
using forms of participatory democracy to expand local people’s control over the structures that 
shaped their lives. In the process, SNCC helped to increase a sense of shared political 
consciousness and identity as Black people, not only within the local community, but also among 
Black SNCC workers. 
Part of SNCC’s organizational philosophy was to prioritize local decision-making so that 
local people decided and enacted their own goals and processes. This was a key part of what kept 
internal transformation a continued aspect of their local organizing approach: everyone’s sense 
of pride in self and community power expanded when they took control of the decisions and 
directions of the movement. SNCC increasingly saw their emphasis on local decision-making as 
a central part of their politics. It not only encouraged community empowerment but it also set 
them apart from the mainstream civil rights establishment, a value that was becoming 
increasingly significant for SNCC activists. At a SNCC meeting in March 1962, SNCC staffer 
Charles Jones claimed that SNCC was unique because they sought to “form community 
movements, not organizations.” Julian Bond agreed. What set SNCC apart was that when their 
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organizers left a local area they left behind “a community movement with local leadership, not a 
new branch of SNCC.” A SNCC promotional pamphlet from August 1963 claimed, “SNCC 
workers have organized and guided local protest movements which are never identified as SNCC 
projects. This is part of its program of developing, building, and strengthening indigenous 
leadership.”10  
For SNCC workers it was important to let local people direct the struggle. A SNCC 
volunteer in Shaw, Mississippi explained her project’s decision to picket a local merchant in 
terms of local direction. “[T]he people, residents of Shaw, decided,” she said. “This is important, 
because staff people don’t make this kind of decisions.” She further used this to set SNCC apart 
from other civil rights groups. “This is where we differ from M.L. King and his officers,” she 
explained. “In their work the staff people make the decisions, rather than letting the people in the 
town where they’re working decide what they want to do, when and how.”11 This, Albany, 
Georgia’s project director Charles Sherrod recalled, was because they “were always people 
conscious,” something he says was heavily influenced by Ella Baker.12  
Ella Baker’s influence on SNCC’s organizing model also put primacy on building 
relationships as the key to organizing. This became a central drive in SNCC’s philosophy, as 
Sherrod said, “getting together…was our main strategy; people doing things together, people 
helping people.” He explained further: 
If you’re hungry, and need a place to stay, you’re thrown out of your house, then you can come to my 
house, and I’ll feed you. That’s the kind of conception we had in the movement. That’s the kind of 
conception we promoted at mass meetings. We took names of people who were willing to help, willing to 
feed. We had any number of places we could go—to take people to, if something happened. They said this 
                                                
10 Charles Jones and Julian Bond, quoted in Carson, In Struggle, 62; “SNCC,” Organizing 
Brochure, August 1963, p. 4.   
11 Mary Sue Gellaty, “Mary Sue Gellaty to Mrs. Franz,” (April 6, 1965), COFO-Shaw Papers, 
State Historical Society Wisconsin (SHSW). 
12 Charles Sherrod, Columbia Oral History Archives interview, p. 46. 
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in mass meetings. That’s a part of organizing: getting a list of this, and list of that, and a list of the other. 
That’s organizing. We had that down pat. 
 
Building relationships was about “a kind of caring” and mutual support: “He’s learning from me; 
I’m learning from him or her.”13  
One of the primary ways that SNCC began to cultivate relationships and build strength 
within the local community was by emphasizing shared participation in meetings, trainings, 
workshops, and even conversations. “We were trying to give the people we were living and 
working with ownership of the movement,” Bob Moses explained. “The meetings—that’s your 
tool for building….And there you get into what has come to be called participatory 
democracy…in which the people who are meeting really get more and more of a feeling that this 
is [their] meeting.”14 One of the ways that SNCC sought to transfer the sense of meeting 
ownership from organizer to local community members was by talking about the concept of 
leadership itself. This had the potential to undermine internalized notions among SNCC workers 
and community residents about what made a legitimate leader. SNCC activist Gwen Patton 
explained, “SNCC’s concept of organizing was for its workers to serve as assistants in the 
development of indigenous leadership and to build up trust in the community.”15 
As SNCC projects became more firmly rooted in the community, local people often 
turned into SNCC organizers. Simultaneously, as SNCC publicized their activities, new 
volunteers from elsewhere also arrived. In this context, the use of meetings as a space for 
leadership training was even more crucial as the SNCC staff were engaged in a process of 
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political education themselves. Often in these situations, the organizer would introduce a 
problem to be discussed and participants would then talk about the key issues and options 
available. This was not only valuable for developing innovative ideas, it was also a key part of 
their shared political education. Bob Moses said that it became clear early on in Mississippi, 
“that sustaining the work would require a consensus that linked [different parts of the] 
community. Such a consensus could override specific points of disagreement.”16  
 SNCC’s organizing projects not only encouraged local people to participate in decision-
making and strategizing, but the experience of participating in shared action and struggle began 
to break down hierarchical divisions within the Black community as well. In Albany, Georgia in 
1961, SNCC staff helped initiate the Albany movement, where traditional middle class leaders 
joined together with the working class and poor people in a campaign of nonviolent direct action. 
The result was mass arrests (over seven hundred in jail by the end of the first week). As a result, 
Sherrod recalled, new alliances developed within the Black community, who “came to know 
each other as people, and not as classes.” “Doctors and lawyers and teachers and domestics 
walked together to jail, and got to know each other in the cells, as they sat next to each other, and 
felt, breathed, and slept the passion that they had about their own desires to be free.” Local 
activist Janie Culbreath agreed, saying, “You find people walking together, people talking 
together. People who would never think they would speak to this person, or that person…” The 
community, she suggested, was “not the same anymore.”17  
 The Albany movement’s president, William Anderson, said the people in the movement 
“made a determination within their own minds that they would never accept that segregated 
                                                
16 Robert P. Moses and Charles E. Cobb, Jr., Radical Equations: Math Literacy and Civil Rights 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 54-55. 
17 Sherrod and Culbreath quoted in Hogan, Many Minds, One Heart, 69. Hogan, on Albany 
Movement, 66-77.  
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society as it was, anymore.” Bernice Johnson Reagon, a SNCC worker from Albany, said it gave 
her “the power to challenge any line that limits me.”18 In the words of Historian Wesley Hogan, 
Sherrod attempted to use SNCC meetings as a way to “[teach] people to become their own 
leaders and think for themselves.” He “taught others to value their own experiences as vital 
knowledge, the most central information of their lives….He emphasized that it was they and not 
him, who knew best how to solve their problems.”19 
 Throughout organizing projects in Mississippi, community meetings became an 
important part of developing consciousness. Historian John Dittmer called them the “most 
effective organizing tool.” According to Bob Moses, the mass meeting was an “energy machine.” 
Michael Thelwell explained, “In the meeting, everything—uncertainty, fear, even desperation—
finds expression, and there is comfort and sustenance in ‘talkin’ ‘bout hit.’” Meeting attendees 
could talk about “whatever troubles their minds—mostly the absence of food, money, work, and 
the oppressiveness of the police[…]loss of credit, eviction, and voting.” Dittmer called the 
meetings a “combination of spontaneous testimony, old-fashioned preaching, wickedly hilarious 
observations about the character of white opposition, and inspiring oratory from the young 
organizers.” Through community meetings people “began to acquire a new sense of themselves 
as a people in the community and in that county who were willing to take a stand and take some 
risk…”20 Fannie Lou Hamer, who became one of SNCC’s most powerful organizers after 1962, 
remembered her sense that other civil rights groups, like the NAACP, were primarily interested 
in the needs of Black homeowners and others in the middle class. After encountering SNCC’s 
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community projects in LeFlore County, Mississippi, she recognized that SNCC was different. 
Through this, she said, she felt “treated like a human being, whether the kids were white or 
black.” 21  Through the community projects started through SNCC, she felt that African 
Americans had “the chance to act as people with power.”22 
 Sometimes SNCC’s most powerful act was to model fearlessness in the face of 
repression. Eddie Johnson recalled what it was like to witness SNCC’s Charles McLaurin in 
Indianola, Mississippi during July 1964: “They saw a policeman ask to talk to McLaurin. And 
they saw McLaurin say, ‘Wait till I’m finished talking.’ And McLaurin went on and talked. And 
they sang ‘Ain’t gonna let no policeman turn us around.’” Johnson called them, “Brave people 
ready to join you in the fight for freedom.”23 
 SNCC workers saw themselves as part of the community they were working in, and often 
framed their organizing work as a way to unite local people and SNCC workers together in a 
broader struggle for racial justice. Bob Moses emphasized the need to recruit young Black 
people “who identified with SNCC…[and] with each other in terms…of being from Mississippi 
and more or less thinking that their job, and even their life’s work, would be to work to make 
some sense of living in Mississippi.” Moses interpreted the recruitment process in SNCC to be 
about developing African American political actors in a very locally oriented frame. In this way, 
SNCC was committed to sharing in the development of a locally oriented Black consciousness.24 
While building local community power among Black people was a primary way that 
SNCC facilitated a foundation for building Black consciousness, Charles Sherrod actually 
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pursued a way to use white people as a way to strengthen Black consciousness. Though SNCC 
would eventually make the broad programmatic decision to bring white volunteers into SNCC in 
1963 and again in 1964, Charles Sherrod sought to recruit white SNCC workers in the Albany 
project much earlier. Sherrod saw white people as a tool for Black liberation. They gave the 
Albany project expanded access to resources. “White people were in charge of the news media, 
they had all the money in the country,” Sherrod explained. Though “[t]hey would give to causes 
that they identified with,” he reasoned, “…white people in this country didn’t care enough about 
us…[t]hey cared about white people.” To gain access to those resources, he thought, Albany 
could use white volunteers.25 
Though Sherrod’s approach was unusual for SNCC in 1962, SNCC leadership approved, 
in large part, he said, because they knew it would not cost them any money. In Sherrod’s 
estimation, his aims were met. By 1963, he said, “we had gone through a year of South Georgia 
being number one in the papers all across the country…[if] I wanted to get in the news, I could 
get in the news. I could make an issue. I could determine the issue. Any issue I wanted to 
determine, I could make an issue of it, right then, because I had the tools to do it.” For Sherrod, 
white people offered the movement three things: “one, fund-raising; two, promotion of image 
and communications…[and three,] [g]etting work done; getting busy work done; getting records 
kept. We probably had some of the best records in the group. I made everybody write. I made 
everybody keep reports.”26 The results, were effective for supporting the movement: 
That’s the reason we got a ship load of blankets: because this white here has got a cousin who’s director of 
a factory in such and such a place. We got this money because this guy here is in jail, and his daddy is a 
corporation executive. And in order to get his son out—he’s going to come to get his son out. Without 
getting his comrades out, his son isn’t going to want to get out—unless he can help get the rest of them 
out.27  
                                                
25 Sherrod interview, Columbia, 62. 
26 Ibid., 63; 63-64. 
27 Ibid., 65. 
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In this way, Sherrod’s approach was explicitly to gain access to the resources that white people 
had greater access to. Though this rationale was not directly linked to the expansion of Black 
consciousness, and in fact reflected SNCC’s broad commitment to liberal allies, Sherrod’s 
approach itself reflected an important kind of centering of Blackness in the struggle. Unlike 
narratives of respectability, morality, and merit that drove earlier SNCC approaches and wider 
civil rights interactions with white allies, Sherrod was explicitly uninterested in proving the 
worth of the project to white allies. Instead, his strategic emphasis was directed explicitly toward 
the impact white resources would have on the Black community.  
But Sherrod’s emphasis on interracial work in SNCC was also driven more directly by a 
desire to make a positive psychological impact on Black consciousness. “[T]he idea that white is 
superior,” he said, “has eaten into the minds of the people, black and white.”28 Sherrod claimed 
he was getting at the root of the problem in Albany, Georgia by encouraging African Americans 
to face their internalized fear of white people. “All our lives we’ve had to bow and scrape, laugh 
when there was nothing funny and scratch our heads and say yes sir. We want to change that. We 
want to be men; that’s what the power of the vote can do.…It’s people like you[…]who are 
going to change this country. And we’ll do it together.” This, for Sherrod, was a key part of 
transforming Black consciousness.29 “There is an indoctrination,” he explained, ”…Negroes 
don’t stick together…White is right…Jail is a hammer…But we broke the hammer of jail with 
another maxim: ‘A jail is just another house,’ and with this lever we broke the other two.”30  
                                                
28 Sherrod, quoted in Hogan, Many Minds, One Heart, 72; Carson, In Struggle, 75-76. Anne 
Braden, “The Images are Broken; Students Challenge Rural Georgia,” Southern Patriot 
(December 1962), 1. 
29 Sherrod, quoted in Howard Zinn, SNCC: The New Abolitionists (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), 
139-140. 
30 Sherrod, quoted in Zinn, The New Abolitionists, 146. 
 106	
Thus, while centering Black consciousness and pride did not explicitly defy the larger 
complex of the civil rights liberal framework, Sherrod and other Black SNCC workers 
contributed to placing Black humanity at the center of struggle. Inherent in this was a tension 
between the kinds of on the ground work that SNCC was doing and the larger political 
framework they were still operating within. Their everyday practices and local goals were often 
geared toward encouraging pride, Black consciousness, and self-determined political power 
within the local community. While these did not reflect a radical agenda, the centering of themes 
related to Black humanity opened space for a framework of struggle that moved beyond the 
bounds of liberal alliance. In this way, though they were functioning within the liberal 
framework of the civil rights movement, some of SNCC’s on-the-ground political practices 
foreshadowed the more explicit move toward Black Power in 1966.   
 
The Limits of Liberalism: Terror, Political Education, and Local People 
Though SNCC’s on-the-ground community organizing efforts encouraged the 
development of Black consciousness and Black self-determined political participation within 
local communities and among Black SNCC workers, SNCC’s organizing approach was 
fundamentally rooted in a liberal framework. Because of this, the same practices and values that 
encouraged Black consciousness simultaneously limited SNCC’s ability to enact meaningful 
change in people’s lives. SNCC was programmatically limited by their consistent reliance on 
liberal allies, the federal government, and mainstream press for resources, protection, and 
publicity. They were also limited by their commitment to gaining access to existing political 
processes and mainstream institutions. However, beyond these external alliances, SNCC’s 
organizing efforts were fraught with the contradictions and challenges posed by internalized 
 107	
liberalism within the organization. Enacted through divisions and hierarchies including class, 
race, region, and gender, SNCC’s organizing approach often de-centered people in the local 
Black communities they sought to empower. Though liberal declensionist narratives suggest 
otherwise, it is these problems, rather than SNCC’s later attempts to overcome them, that more 
accurately derailed SNCC’s trajectory. Even during SNCC’s celebrated organizational zenith, it 
is the presence, rather than the absence of internalized liberalism, that defined their limits.  
Developing relationships in the community, as well as practices and values associated 
with their new community-organizing framework, expanded SNCC workers’ political education 
immensely. However, these lessons were also always in relation to their everyday experiences of 
violence and repression from local whites who went to grave lengths to protect the system of 
white supremacy in the South. Beyond the immediate physical threat to the lives and safety of 
local people and organizers, violence and repression also had more indirect implications. The 
fear of death, increased violence, arrest, or other forms retribution often increased local anxiety 
about the role of SNCC workers in the community.  
SNCC workers’ experience in the organizations’ very first voter registration project is 
illustrative of the continued and varied terror SNCC workers and Black residents faced daily in 
all of their organizing campaigns throughout the 1960s. Within the first month of SNCC’s 1961 
campaign in Pike, Amite, and Walthall counties, based out of McComb, Mississippi, SNCC 
workers experienced multiple arrests and assaults in their attempts to register local Black voters. 
Bob Moses was arrested in Amite County, jailed for two days before posting bond through the 
NAACP, and assaulted by the sheriff’s cousin, who, after Moses pressed charges, was acquitted 
within a week of the assault. Moses was with another SNCC worker, Travis Britt, when they 
were surrounded by a mob of angry whites outside the Amite County courthouse and Britt was 
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beaten. John Hardy, also a SNCC worker, was beaten with a pistol by the county registrar in 
Waltham County while attempted to assist local African Americans to register. He was 
subsequently arrested on disorderly conduct charges. Another group of SNCC workers, including 
Charles Sherrod, Diane Nash, Jim Bevel, and Marion Barry, initiated a series of nonviolent direct 
action training workshops in McComb, which attracted a number of eager Black high school 
students. From that group, Hollis Watkins and Curtis Hayes, who would soon become key SNCC 
field workers in Mississippi, were arrested after a sit-in at a Woolworths. A few days later, three 
more Black teens were arrested for staging a sit-in at a Greyhound bus terminal. Included was a 
fifteen-year-old girl, Brenda Travis. Her presence contributed to the community outrage over the 
fact that the five high school students remained in jail for over a month.31 
Though perpetual violence and repeated arrests taught SNCC workers difficult lessons 
about the extent of the resistance they faced, nothing compared to SNCC’s first encounter with 
the murder of a local resident in connection with their voter registration activities. Herbert Lee, a 
local Black farmer, father of nine children, and resident of Amite County, had been assisting 
SNCC with voter registration efforts. On September 25th, 1961 Lee’s neighbor, state 
representative E.H. Hurst, shot and killed Lee in front of a handful of witnesses outside the local 
cotton gin. This murder came the day after a U.S. Justice Department Attorney, John Doar, had 
left McComb. After continued unresponsiveness on the part of Justice Department to requests for 
help from SNCC workers in relation to the aforementioned incidents, Doar had finally been 
dispatched to McComb to investigate the violence and police misconduct that SNCC had 
reported. On September 24th Moses accompanied Doar to speak with former NAACP leader 
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E.W. Steptoe, another key local African American activist who was active in the voter 
registration efforts. They asked Steptoe about any possible danger in the area, and he replied that 
his neighbor, E.H. Hurst, who was also a state representative, had been making threats against 
people involved in voter registration work. He also told them that he believed himself and two 
others to be in particular danger. Their names were George Reese and Herbert Lee. The next day, 
Doar left town and Herbert Lee was murdered.32 
The impact of Lee’s murder on SNCC was profound. For one, it stopped their voter 
registration project almost completely for a number of years as local African Americans were no 
longer willing to risk attempting to register. But it was also emotionally devastating for the 
young workers, especially Moses. Lee’s wife approached him and fellow SNCC worker Chuck 
McDew at Lee’s funeral. “Looking into our faces,” Moses recalled, “she spit out in bitter 
accusing tones, ‘You killed my husband! You killed my husband!’” Afterwards, Moses said, 
“second thoughts seemed about to immobilize me. Can we do this? Can we really keep doing 
this?” Rather than be dissuaded, his conclusion was that “staying with this work was more 
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important that ever. It was the only way to make sense out of Herbert Lee’s death.” This, along 
with all of the other forms of unceasing terror enacted against SNCC workers and local people, 
became part of the reason that Moses and SNCC staffers committed themselves even further to 
their organizing efforts.33   
Yet the response from Lee’s wife demonstrated a central tension that SNCC workers had 
to face in the process of community organizing. Though many SNCC workers were from small 
towns and rural areas in the South, they were still perceived as outsiders when they entered a 
new area, in part because of the nature of their work. Claims of organizers being “outside 
agitators” was, and continues to be, a primary response used by local officials to dismiss 
community mobilizing efforts and dissuade local participation, regardless of who actually 
initiated them. At the same time, this sense of division between “organizers” and “locals” could 
also be present among SNCC workers and the local communities they were working in.  
Their sense of difference was most often felt when SNCC workers found themselves 
pushing reluctant local people to challenge societal norms and face potential danger; more than 
stepping outside of their comfort zone, they were being asked to face the prospect of retaliatory 
violence and even death. This kind of organizing work was hard. Moses later admitted that the 
constant terror made him “very, very depressed.” Constance Curry, one of SNCC’s white 
advisors, said “the long years of struggle…violence…anguish,” all took a “terrible, terrible, toll.” 
She saw “the changes in Bob Moses,” who she explained was very sensitive, “…it broke his 
heart.”34   
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For SNCC workers, facing daily terror and, increasingly, recognizing the ways that their 
efforts had a direct impact, both positive and negative, on the local people with whom they 
worked, contributed to their own need to think through and process their experiences. In this 
way, meetings, workshops, trainings, and discussions among themselves were not only a part of 
their community organizing program, they became part of how they dealt with and made sense of 
their experiences. Bob Moses explains, “As organizers we were just getting our feet wet, but in 
personal as well as political terms we were beginning to see the outlines of what organizing in 
the state required. I learned to live with my fears. Organizing myself was a necessary first 
step.”35 SNCC staffers soon learned that part of organizing oneself was recognizing the power 
you wielded as an organizer. Moses, whose own organizing philosophy was heavily influenced 
by Camus, recognized the simultaneous “need to cease being ‘a victim’ while at the same time 
not becoming ‘an executioner.’”36 Navigating these tensions became one of the central struggles 
within SNCC. 
 
The Limits of Liberalism: Romanticizing the Struggle 
SNCC’s community organizing framework was a source of pride for SNCC workers yet 
it was often tied to justifications and narratives (particularly when translating it to outside 
audiences) that fostered greater psychological divisions between SNCC organizers and the local 
communities they organized. SNCC advisor and historian Howard Zinn reflected this in his 1964 
history of SNCC, which began by celebrating the great sacrifice that SNCC workers made in 
committing themselves to community organizing. He called it a “cause for wonder,” leaving 
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“ripples of astonishment behind,” that those from “the Negro colleges of the South, the Ivy 
League universities of the North, the small and medium colleges all over the country” chose to 
“turn on their pasts, to decide to live and work twenty-four hours a day in the most dangerous 
region of the United States.” It was “no irresponsible whim of adolescence,” he continued, 
“when young people of sixteen or twenty or twenty-five turn away from school, job, family, all 
the tokens of success in modern America, to take up new lives, hungry and hunted, in the 
hinterland of the Deep South.”37  
Zinn’s heroic and sacrificial formulation of SNCC left little place for people from the 
local communities themselves to be part of the freedom struggle. In an exception he noted, 
“Others found it easier—and harder—for they came right out of the Black Belt and, even though 
they tasted college, they had nowhere then to go but back towards danger and freedom: John 
Lewis, Sam Block, Willie Peacock, Lafayette Surney, MacArthur Cotton, Lawrence Guyot and 
too many more to name.” Though Zinn admitted the members in this last group were too 
numerous to name, they were nonetheless the afterthought in his narrative of privilege and 
sacrifice. The Deep South, their home, was reduced only to a symbol of danger, where they were 
“hungry and hunted,” trapped, with nowhere else to go. Unlike their northern counterparts, 
whose college attendance indicated their access to “all the tokens of success,” the “tast[e] of 
college” for these southern organizers was instead a symbol of their destitution. Beyond this, 
there was no mention of the community members who were not a part of SNCC staff in this 
characterization. Instead, they became part of the background in which SNCC was organizing. 
When they were mentioned, Zinn framed them as a “cushion” that SNCC workers used against 
their critics: “The SNCC youngster is in the midst of his people, surrounded by them, protected 
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by them. To be cut off, by harsh criticism of his ‘extremism,’ from Northern white intellectuals 
or from those in national political power is a minor blow, cushioned by a popularity based on the 
poor and the powerless, but perhaps even more comforting because of that.” In spite of SNCC 
workers’ emphasis on unity, and Zinn’s estimation that the SNCC worker was “in the midst of” 
and “surrounded by” his people, such narratives ran counter to the pursuit of relationships and 
shared community at the heart of SNCC’s organizing framework.38 
In an attempt to celebrate the SNCC workers’ bravery Zinn betrayed another kind of 
privilege. “The mood of these young people,” he wrote, “which they convey to everyone around 
them in the midst of poverty, violence, terror, and centuries of bitter memories, is joy, 
confidence, the vision of victory…” Similarly he said, “They are happy warriors, a refreshing 
contrast to the revolutionaries of old. They smile and wave while being taken off in paddy 
wagons; they laugh and sing behind bars.” Though these descriptions were meant to characterize 
the energy or strength among SNCC workers, they also convey the relative privilege of the 
organizer. As organizers, SNCC workers recognized a usable value in such incidents. While they 
did face grave danger, which should not be understated, daily terror, the threat of violence, or an 
arrest meant something very different for incoming SNCC staffers and volunteers than it did for 
local people in their own communities. For SNCC workers, to put one’s body on the line was an 
act of individual sacrifice that was an extension of their previous decision to leave their lives and 
homes and move into unfamiliar communities in the Deep South in order to participate in the 
movement. For people who had lived in the local community for their entire lives, the stakes and 
meaning of the risks they faced were different. Local people’s bodies were engaged in mutually 
constitutive, complex networks of community support and survival: their labor, social roles, and 
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relationships provided support, sustenance, and resources for families and community that 
extended well beyond their own lives. It was much easier to smile and wave when arrested, to 
face terror with joy, when you did not have to worry about the loss of your job or the immediate 
safety of your family. And though SNCC workers felt as if they were treated like family by the 
local communities in which they worked, most SNCC workers had another family and home to 
go to if needed. For local people, their lives and the broader networks that they were a part of 
were on the line in a different way.39  
Gwendolyn Robinson (now Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons) worked as a project director 
in Laurel, Mississippi during Freedom Summer 1964. She remembered a sense of this disconnect 
from the growing awareness within the community that most volunteers would be leaving at the 
end of the summer. “I knew that the white reactionary forces were just waiting for the COFO 
volunteers to leave,” she explained, “especially the white ones, so that they could step up their 
reign of unfettered terror.” Though she knew the local activists with whom she had lived and 
worked “would not ask us to put our education on hold,” she also “could see their concern for the 
future without all the human and material resources that we brought with us.” Because of this, 
she said, “I felt a real commitment to the community.” Robinson, along with two white women 
from California, chose to stay on after the end of Freedom Summer, but the fact that this was a 
decision demonstrated their relative positions of privilege.40 
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SNCC’s commitment to building community organizations with local control of decision-
making was a central part of their organizing approach and their egalitarian politics. Yet 
somewhat paradoxically, their emphasis on local decision-making had the potential to exacerbate 
the unequal power dynamics between organizer and “organized.” If Zinn’s narrative 
romanticized SNCC workers for their sacrifice and bravery, some SNCC activists had the 
tendency to “romanticize” local people as a result of SNCC’s local organizing values. Many in 
SNCC most critical of this romanticizing tendency suggested that it was often the northern and 
middle class SNCC activists who were guilty of this. James Forman called this “local people-
itis”: “This carried with it the idea that local people could do no wrong; that no one, especially 
somebody from outside the community, should initiate any kind of action or assume any form of 
leadership.” Michael Thelwell critiqued this tendency in a position paper entitled, “Mississippi: 
A Metaphysic Wrapped in a Mystique.” He called this “bourgeois sentimentalism.” Instead of 
strengthening the sense of personal and community power, this romanticization contributed to a 
rather flattened, uncomplicated, and less dynamic vision of “local people” that made them less, 
rather than more, fully human in the eyes of some SNCC workers.41  
Though SNCC sit-ins during 1960 reflected an investment in mainstream perceptions of 
respectability, SNCC approached respectability differently in their roles as community 
organizers. One of the ways that SNCC workers sought to build community with local people 
was to pay attention to social conventions, practices, and mores. Gwendolyn Robinson 
remembered enforcing norms of respectability in Laurel: “Given the conservative nature of this 
community and our need to gain and maintain approval,” she recalled, “I did insist on a dress 
code of no shorts in the streets and generally modest dress. Since the church was such a strong 
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and respected institution in the community, we all had to attend church regularly, generally with 
our host families.”42 This investment in respectability reflected both a desire to blend in and also 
an expression of difference. White Freedom Summer volunteer, Heather Tobias Booth, recalled 
the sense that she “really had to be on good behavior.” She was asked to bring a Bible with her 
and, though she was Jewish, was expected to attend church every Sunday. Through her 
experience, Booth recognized the organizing value of this practice. “I realized that this church 
was a major center of their lives. It was what partly held them together. In times of real need, 
there were financial collections. You got information. It was social.” Because of this, she said, “I 
didn’t perceive it…as fundamentally a religious experience, but I saw it as a political experience 
in changing the world and in changing people’s lives.” Booth’s assessment of her experience in 
church as a Freedom Summer volunteer demonstrates the kind of dual value of honoring local 
customs for SNCC organizers. Booth’s willingness to attend church was because it was an access 
point to the community, and simultaneously, an expression of how she was changing local 
people’s lives. Most likely, local people’s lives were not so deeply affected by her presence at 
church yet this is part of the narrative that allowed SNCC workers to push themselves outside of 
their own norms.43 
Paying attention to local norms in terms clothes, customs, and politics became a part of 
how SNCC workers identified with and simultaneously romanticized locals, occasionally 
approaching their interests, habits, and values as quaint or parochial. According to SNCC 
associate Gloria Wade-Gayles, SNCC activists viewed locals, whom she called “black people of 
the soil,” as “a fascinating primitive people.” SNCC workers approached them as “racial and 
cultural artifacts,” she wrote, who they could “talk about in the life of comfort to which most of 
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us returned.”44 At the same time, adopting local customs also became a marker of a particular 
SNCC style and mystique. SNCC leader Cleveland Sellers explains, “…the organization’s 
members had begun to walk, talk, and dress like the poor black farmers and sharecroppers of 
rural Georgia and Mississippi.” By the end of 1962, he explained, SNCC had a “definable 
lifestyle,” a “powerful esprit de corps. They worked, ate, socialized and slept together, read the 
same books and wore the same kind of clothing.”45 The classic SNCC overalls, for example, 
came to be a symbol of SNCC’s élan in activist circles. They set them apart from other 
mainstream civil rights organizations. Eschewing the suit and tie for the overalls and work shirt 
indicated their commitment to the rural poor African American communities and the struggle.  
Yet by adopting the style of southern sharecroppers, the attempt to blend in became, 
simultaneously, an expression of difference. Though not quite parodying the local sharecropper, 
SNCC’s overalls nonetheless set SNCC organizers apart from the community they were trying to 
embrace. South African singer Miriam Makeba responded negatively to SNCC’s style of dress, 
exemplified by her soon-to-be husband Stokely Carmichael: “He and his friends say that being 
dirty and wearing tattered clothes means that a person identifies with the masses. This makes me 
mad, because it is just wrong and sounds patronizing.” Makeba, who grew up poor outside of 
Johannesburg, responded, “Hey man, I grew up with the ‘masses.’ We were not proud of our 
poverty.”46 In her examination of the politics of dress among SNCC women, historian Tanisha C. 
Ford explains, “Although Carmichael wore the denim uniform, in Makeba’s view he had the 
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privilege of putting it on and taking it off as he saw fit.”47 In this sense, the politics of dress 
reflected part of the challenge for SNCC: workers from northern and middle class backgrounds, 
like Carmichael, had the potential to reproduce hierarchies of difference even in their attempts at 
building shared community. At the same time, the attempt to approach local communities with 
respect typically meant something very different for Black organizers from the South. Often 
these workers pushed to respect local traditions and norms with much more seriousness than 
their northern, middle class counterparts. In this way, the same practice could have a very 
different meaning in different hands. SNCC’s encounter with mores of sexuality and race 
provide example of this. 
 
The Limits of Liberalism: Race, Sex, and Local People 
SNCC staffers were well aware of the tensions, both exciting and challenging, that the 
increased presence of white volunteers brought to their organizing efforts. Some SNCC workers 
believed that increased white volunteers would help SNCC realize its beloved interracial 
community. By pursuing this, they could demonstrate to local people another way of interacting 
with whites beyond the oppressive racial hierarchy of the Deep South. SNCC’s ideological or 
philosophical intentions drew on SNCC students’ early conception of themselves as a “beloved 
community.” Reminiscent of the initial philosophy of early CORE in the 1940s, they sought to 
operate as a realized interracial community and “make the means reflect the ends.” This was 
partially an organizing vision, but it was also connected to the excitement of such a possibility. 
Though not expressed explicitly, in practice, part of pursuing this idyllic interracial community 
included developing interracial friendships, romances, and sexual relationships. Of course the 
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reality of this was not idyllic at all, as like all interpersonal relationships, motivations and 
practices were complicated, drawing on existing power hierarchies as much as they subverted 
them. Sex and romance among SNCC workers, and sex and romance between SNCC workers 
and local people, brought up a host of challenges and potential for hard consequences.  
More than fuel for excitement, the taboo of interracial sexuality was a primary flashpoint 
for racial violence in the South. Probably more than anything else, white supremacist narratives 
justified themselves through the need to police Black sexuality and protect white women’s 
sexuality. Sex between white men and Black women had a very different character in the white 
southern imagination that did sex between Black men and white women. In a disgusting reversal, 
Black women, who were victims of sexual violence, rape, assault, and murder at the hands of 
white men for centuries, were more often characterized as immoral, sexual deviants, and 
aggressors, while the motivations and character of their white rapists and assailants, even amidst 
open acknowledgement of their violation and abuse, was not under question. Black men, like 
Black women, were similarly characterized as sexual aggressors, deviants, and immoral. But 
these characterizations were key justification for protecting the allegedly pure and chaste white 
women from the Black sexual predators. As Gwendolyn Robinson explained it, “Gender 
relations were difficult, to say the least. For many white Mississippi males this was the thing that 
galled them the most. They thought all black men wanted to rape all white women, so they were 
livid over the fact that white women were living in black homes where black men lived.”48 Thus, 
deviant Black sexuality became the narrative to justify both forms of white supremacist terror 
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and violence: sexual abuse and violence against Black women and also systematic violence, 
lynching, and murder of Black men.49  
In this context, interracial relationships in the Deep South were nothing about which to be 
cavalier. Unsurprisingly, the mortal danger of interracial relationships in the South meant that 
local Black communities often seemed as committed to maintaining racial segregation in social 
relationships as their white counterparts. Because of this, norms of respectability, particularly 
around sexuality and romance, were very important. Some SNCC workers, particularly those 
who were Black and from the South themselves, understood this. “As a black southerner,” 
Gwendolyn Robinson explained, “I was much more acquainted with these mores and therefore 
insisted that my insights on these matters had to be respected.”50 However, this was less often the 
case for white volunteers and those who had not been as intimately connected to the climate of 
sexualized racial terror in the South. In this dynamic, SNCC’s vision of enacting a beloved 
community through visions of interracial harmony itself betrayed a kind of privilege that 
smacked against centuries of hard lessons in the South. 
In seeking to enact this anti-hierarchical, interracial vision in the rural Black communities 
of the Deep South, SNCC workers betrayed another kind of social, political, and historical 
naivety. The logic of exposure rested on the notion that in witnessing examples of white and 
Black people living, working, and being together, local Blacks would somehow also be 
compelled to want the same. This ignored the gravity of the psychological history of white 
oppression in the daily lives of Black people, implying that their mere exposure was all that was 
needed to encourage the creation of a beloved interracial community. Further, it suggested that 
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rural southern Blacks were not already familiar with these concerns. Personal historical 
narratives from African Americans who grew up in the South abound with stories of having 
notions of human equality shattered when they first confronted racism in interactions with white 
childhood playmates and their families. Herbert Lee, for example, was murdered by his white 
neighbor and childhood playmate, E.H. Hurst. In this context the idea that rural southern Blacks 
were unaware of a vision of racial harmony seems unlikely. Instead, it is more likely that Black 
southerners had already faced and deliberately moved past such interpersonal ideals.  
But beyond the impact this vision of a beloved community would have on local people, it 
is also important to note that racial harmony certainly did not actually exist among white and 
black workers in SNCC. These contradictions were obvious to local people around them. Though 
SNCC workers were unwilling to address this issue outright, internal racial tensions were clear to 
a local minister in one Mississippi project meeting, who said in the midst of a long debate about 
the nature of authority: “The thing that bothers me is that there really is a basic black-white 
problem here which you don’t say but which is at the bottom of a lot of what you’re saying. Why 
don’t you deal with your black-white problem?”51  
At the same time, some SNCC workers were also aware of the excitement of interracial 
sexuality. “…[W]e did some crazy things,” Charles Sherrod recalled. “I’m talking about in the 
South, too. Right underneath their nose.” Yet this too was deeply complicated. Sherrod, whose 
Albany project was the first to integrate a significant number of white workers in SNCC’s 
community organizing efforts, recalled the sense that interracial sexuality was also connected to 
the political process of overcoming fear among Black southern men. “Sex had a lot to do 
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with…breaking down those fears,” he said. “[I]t made a lot of difference.” But, he suggested, it 
was fraught. “Most of us were young, you know,” he explained. “All that curiosity, and fear. 
You have fear of a rope around your neck in these contexts.” “I guess a psychiatrist could better 
explain that than I can,” he continued. “Sex and white women…Helped to alleviate that fear…”52 
Yet as some SNCC workers sought to challenge societal racial and sexual norms, they 
were also simultaneously enacting them. This was particularly true in the perceptions of 
sexuality between Black men and white women. Gwendolyn Robinson recalls the, “mutual 
attraction between the black men and white women,” which, she says, was made “even more 
irresistible” by “the forbidden nature of those relationships, even in the North...”53 SNCC 
workers observed that relationships between Black men and white women were more prominent 
than other configurations, however they were only one part of what historian Cynthia Griggs 
Fleming has identified as “a broad range of sexual attractions and combinations” within SNCC. 
Fleming points out that to the extent that this had a negative impact on Black women’s 
perception of themselves the negative impact was equal, if not greater, on movement politics and 
safety. Sociologist Doug McAdam has argued that one of the reasons for tension between Black 
and white women was that sexual relationships with Black male SNCC leaders gave white 
women access to power within the organization. Historian Paula Giddings contends this was not 
the case, arguing, “the influence of Black women was actually increasing.” Further, she argues, it 
was white women who were more often “relegated to minor responsibilities, in part because of 
indiscriminate sexual behavior.” In this sense, the amount of attention that romantic and sexual 
relationships between Black men and white women received risked redirecting focus away from 
the main goals of the movement. Rather than an expression of beloved community, it was more 
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often a derailment that had real consequences. Black women and Black men in SNCC 
recognized the dangers of this in terms of retaliatory responses from the white community and 
also in its effects on their ability to build relationships with local African Americans. Such 
tensions brought increasing challenges to the vision of building a shared sense of community.54  
In light of these competing understandings of race and sexuality within SNCC, southern 
Black leaders often went to great lengths to make sure SNCC workers abided the norms of 
respectability within the Black community. This was part of the general function of how SNCC 
envisioned building relationships and developing trust, but around the question of sexuality, this 
was often most stressed. Charles Sherrod recalled:  
I told the whites…they can’t walk down the street with a black girl. I told them ‘you think you all can deal. 
I’m saying that you can’t be involved with that.’ I tell the blacks the same thing: you can’t walk down the 
street hand in hand with some white girl. It’s part of being young and curious, and I certainly had the same 
drives that the others were having so, knowing what problems could arise in myself. I was speaking for all 
of us. ‘We got to be careful. Wait ‘til you go to Atlanta; wait till you go to New York.55 
 
Other project directors were even less forgiving. Ivanhoe Donaldson, project director in Holly 
Springs, Mississippi during Freedom Summer, forbade interracial relationships, arguing they 
would “provide local whites with the initiative they need to come in here and kill all of us. Even 
if the whites don’t find out about them, the people will, and we won’t be able to do anything 
afterwards to convince them that our primary interest here is political.” As Donaldson’s warning 
suggested, there was a strong sense that SNCC leaders needed to police the internal behavior of 
SNCC workers, particularly around sexuality. “Courtships among COFO volunteers were 
permitted but were to be carried out in a low-key way with no public displays of affection,” 
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Gwendolyn Robinson explained. “We had to respect the moral code of the community, which 
was very strict in comparison to the lifestyles of most of the volunteers.”56  
Because of these challenges, Robinson recognized the need to manage the incredibly 
volatile and complicated race, sex, and power dynamics at play. She explained, “As one of the 
few women project directors in the state, I was particularly sensitive to sexual harassment. One 
of my few nonnegotiable edicts was to disallow all forms of sexual harassment…” In particular, 
she said, she “declare[d] all underage local women off-limits to project males. There would be 
one warning and one warning only. If it happened again, out you went.”57 Sherrod also focused a 
lot of energy on managing romantic and sexual dynamics of the staff. He recognized the 
complexity of this task as project director in terms of both public perceptions and also the 
experiences of SNCC workers themselves:  
I had black and white women, black and white males. To say nothing about what the white community was 
thinking, or the black community was thinking; what about this community of thirty or forty young people? 
What about us? What were we thinking? So I know that we had to be halfway clean ourselves. We couldn’t 
just allow things to go any way they went, because one little spark, one of us getting mad because of them 
was taking another one’s girlfriend or boyfriend, and you got an explosion out of proportion to the 
problem.58 
 
As a result, Sherrod spent a good deal of time managing these internal relationships, which put 
him in a supervisory role. “[T]here were times—we didn’t have all the accommodations. When I 
had thirty, forty kids, I put this woman in one room, the men in the other room, and I slept at the 
door. I knew what that was about.”59   
As this suggests, project directors were serious and dedicated to managing sexuality. 
Project directors regularly complained about the time they spent dealing with issues of sexuality 
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and romance among SNCC workers. “Becoming a sexual relations counselor was another one of 
the tasks that was in my unwritten job description,” Gwendolyn Robinson explained, “Often this 
issue took up an inordinate amount of time and taxed me the most.”60 Charles Sherrod recalled a 
similar problem, explaining, “When you bring them down here you’ve got to supervise them 
twenty hours a day.” He continued: “[T]hose kinds of things had to be dealt with.” And while he 
claimed they were not always “difficult to deal with,” they also “took a certain consistency, a 
certain amount of time and dedication…” It was important “to keep on top of them,” Sherrod 
continued, “so that when a little incident occurred… you catch somebody screwing somebody in 
the toilet, or somewhere… it wouldn’t get blown out of proportion.”61  
The tensions between policing sexuality/individual behavior in SNCC, justifications of 
respecting the community, and desires to live and enact racial harmony through pleasure and 
sexuality, were also simultaneously entwined with questions of power, authority and decision-
making in SNCC. During and after Freedom Summer in particular, complaints of project 
directors’ heavy-handedness, control, and abuse of power proliferated, often in response to what 
seemed to some to be arbitrary expressions of power. Charles Sherrod recalled being accused of 
being “so God-like or autocratic to a certain extent.”62 For Black women, critiques of their power 
were often tied to a host of sexist and racist narratives about being angry, controlling, man-
hating, etc. Though Robinson described her leadership style as “feminist,” “extremely 
democratic,” even “sometimes to a fault,” her attention to sexual harassment, which she said 
accounted for her “few top-down edicts,” got her the reputation of an “Amazon,” who hated 
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men.63 “[I had to] grow up real fast and assume an air of authority,” Robinson explained, 
“especially with the white male volunteers, who could not believe that a black girl younger than 
they were was the project director. Boy, did I learn a lot about the northern liberal brand of 
racism and about male sexism.”64 
This reflects a broader dynamic that emerged at the end of 1963, after SNCC began 
actively recruiting northern white volunteers to work in Mississippi. It was further exacerbated 
when white northern recruitment expanded during Freedom Summer 1964. Often white, usually 
middle class and northern, SNCC workers challenged the authority of Black project directors on 
the grounds of being anti-democratic. Sometimes challenges were explicit, like Robinson’s 
experience. But sometimes they were less direct, a generalized challenge to authority. Black 
SNCC worker Cleveland Sellers recalled Ivanhoe Donaldson’s “long list of rules and 
regulations”: “Everyone was to be on his job by eight-thirty each morning; no one was to make 
any trip into the city or county without leaving his time of departure and expected return on the 
check-out list in the office; no one was to be out after dark unless he was on official business; all 
shades were to be pulled as soon a the sun went down, and no one was to make a target of 
himself by casting a shadow on the shade; local whites and the police were to be avoided 
whenever possible and never unnecessarily provoked.”65  
According to sociologist Francesca Polletta, white volunteers complained of being 
“bombarded with rules—about not leaving the project, not using cars for their personal needs, 
not socializing with local young people...” However, they simultaneously witnessed instances of 
SNCC staff “ignoring the rules.” In this context, internal tensions of hierarchy abounded. One 
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worker in Gulfport, MS challenged the “whole concept of project director as feudal lord.” 
Echoing this, another complained, “people can’t trust their project director,” asking, “Who 
decides who goes where and what to do if people don’t work out?” Many new volunteers came 
to see these internal dynamics as expressions of individual power mongering, calling project 
directors “taciturn.” They drew on SNCC’s values of community-oriented relationship building 
to point out the perceived contradictions. As another Gulfport volunteer explained, “There are 
people who are in positions of power and they are interested in retaining this power and then 
there are the have-nots.” Polletta argues that this created a dynamic in which “an enormous 
amount of time was spent in project meetings discussing the roles, responsibilities, and 
prerogatives of project directors, with newcomers calling simultaneously for more guidance and 
more democracy.”66 
Though in their critiques white northern volunteers often took up the cause of defending 
SNCC’s organizational values of participatory democracy, local decision-making, and consensus 
over authority, in light of the challenges project directors faced around issues of race, sex, and 
power, their critiques simultaneously exposed the lack of developed political analysis within 
SNCC. In one particularly illustrative example, a project director in Canton, Mississippi 
instructed the white volunteers that the movement would be better served if they left the project 
and worked on fundraising instead. Volunteers responded with accusations of staff 
authoritarianism. One white volunteer asked, “How can I hope to get rid of authoritarianism in 
Miss. if I leave it in the Canton staff?...It’s like the bossman telling his sharecropper to get off the 
land just because the sharecropper thinks differently from the owner.” That a northern white 
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volunteer would find it acceptable to uncritically compare her situation to a southern 
sharecropper being evicted from her land not only reflects her own limits but also the inability of 
SNCC to preempt such blatant demonstrations of race and class privilege within its ranks. 
Further, the fact that this volunteer drew specifically on SNCC’s own organizing values also 
illustrated how SNCC’s organizing framework operated with a limited political analysis.67 
 
The Limits of Liberalism: Decision-Making and the Failure of Ownership 
Out of this tangle of race, power, sex, and privilege, critiques of internal power dynamics 
resulted in the very liberal phenomenon that the people most identified with Black southern local 
communities became symbols of oppressive hierarchy while northern, middle class, often white 
allies became champions of the people. The irony of this, however, is that while challenges to 
Black southern leadership emerged among northern volunteers on the basis of democracy, 
consensus, and anti-authoritarianism, part of SNCC’s original emphasis on consensus and 
participatory democracy began specifically as an attempt to curb the tendencies of northern, 
middle class authority. As Polletta explains, “In their deliberations as a group, students dispensed 
with parliamentary procedure and strove for consensus. In part, they wanted to discourage 
sophisticated northern students from dominating discussion with their ready command of 
parliamentary maneuver.”68 This was a matter of practicality, as SNCC workers found it much 
easier to develop discussion with community members outside of such structures, but it was also 
a response to privilege. As one field worker described it, “white college-educated Northerners 
[had] a tendency to take command of an assembly through rapid-fire parliamentary maneuvers 
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which [left] local people baffled and offended.” 69  Though participatory democracy and 
consensus processes later became associated with the white New Left, its origins in SNCC were 
“as a way to prevent northern whites’ domination through their command of parliamentary 
maneuver. In other words, it was seen as black and southern rather than northern and white.”70 
As Forman explained, “To some extent this represented a reaction to the tendency of white 
volunteers to ‘take over’ in black Mississippi, and in that sense it was a good thing to reassert the 
importance of local leadership. But too often ‘local people-itis’ meant simply an excuse for 
inaction. It became almost a religion.”71 
In spite of this recent history in SNCC, Black southern project directors had become the 
symbol of hierarchy and those with northern, white, and middle class backgrounds most often 
took on debates about power in the name of local people. This reinforced the dominant liberal 
narrative of “organizer” as savior and “organized” as recipient. And yet, this dynamic between 
“organizer” and “organized” was not lost on SNCC workers. In fact, many were openly critical 
of it. As one worker complained, there were “[t]oo damn many nursery schools, and milk 
programs,” while someone else wondered sarcastically: are “we are a social service agency or a 
band of revolutionaries[?]”72  
The larger political context of 1964 aggravated these tensions. SNCC’s Freedom Summer 
had been geared toward a massive voter registration campaign connected with the recently 
formed Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP). In August, after months of intense on-
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the-ground preparation, many SNCC workers accompanied a slate of MFDP delegates to the 
Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City. Their purpose was to unseat the white 
supremacist delegation of Mississippi’s Democratic Party and replace them with the group that 
more accurately represented the political interests of Mississippi’s African American population. 
The results were devastating for SNCC and the MFDP. Their purported allies in the federal 
government and the civil rights mainstream betrayed the spirit of the MFDP delegation, refusing 
to unseat the white slate and offering a compromise of only two seats to the MFDP. In the wake 
of this defeat, SNCC workers faced a looming struggle over political identity. Their perceptions 
of themselves as revolutionaries came into crisis with the nature of their organizing efforts within 
a liberal framework. Rather than responding to those concerns by re-imagining a political and 
organizational program that could work outside the limits of liberalism and place more power in 
the hands of local people, those most vocal about shoring up SNCC’s internal practices and 
political vision retreated deeper into liberal reaction.73 
As SNCC activists’ political education expanded after the MFDP defeat, they became 
even more invested in how local campaigns fit into larger civil rights and national political 
contexts. Though local control was paramount, SNCC organizers often experienced tension 
between the interests of the community and the goals that they wanted to see achieved. As such, 
local decisions or goals that were counter to SNCC organizers’ political vision had the potential 
to create great tension for SNCC activists between their values associated with local 
empowerment and those related to broader movement goals. A discussion among a handful of 
volunteers in Holmes County, Mississippi during 1965 demonstrates this. “These federal 
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programs [...], Head Start being the best example […],  are bad for Mississippi at this stage of the 
movement in Holmes County,” one volunteer claimed. “The people aren’t educated enough to 
stop things from going which are going to go wrong….So there’s a certain element in the 
movement that I see that means having selfish desires to take advantage of federal programs… 
Before, there was a pure movement. Now, it is a corrupt movement.” When questioned about 
this distinction the volunteer continued:  
What I mean is that before people were going to the court house and doing things in the movement just 
because it was the thing to do to become a good first class citizen. Now, there’s other motives. Getting a 
deep well. There’s things like learning how to fix tractors better. Now all these things require time and 
energy and that’s a decrease in the time they can spend or the energy they can spend working for their 
freedom—working towards the right to vote, working towards the right to register.74 
 
Such distinctions reflected the strange political position civil rights workers often held. In this 
case, the movement’s purity was limited to when local people wanted “freedom” through the 
vote. Pursuit of local, tangible goals that improved people’s daily lives were a sign of corruption. 
Another worker explained, “…if the people want to have a water pump…they want to have 
better water, if they want to have kindergartens….they probably won’t get the things which 
they’re working for which are the right to be equal.”75 Though SNCC’s focus on localized power 
was a key part of their own sense of themselves as a radical vanguard, local people’s apparently 
more moderate choices undercut SNCC workers’ vision of what their agenda was. As Polletta 
explains, it became clear that “letting the people decide was not yielding the radical programs in 
was supposed to.” This put activists who saw themselves as the “radical cutting edge of the 
movement in a difficult position.” They wondered, “How do we deal with poor people whose 
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aspirations are justifiably middle class?”76 According to Polletta, amidst growing uncertainty 
about SNCC’s political and programmatic future after Atlantic City, “SNCC workers became 
increasingly aggressive in their efforts to push local people to articulate their ‘real interests and 
increasingly critical of each other for failing to draw out in black communities the radical 
interests they knew were there.’”77 Challenging local people’s perceived moderate politics was 
another way of provincializing them and setting them apart from SNCC. This not only 
influenced the ways in which SNCC workers viewed community members, it also negatively 
impacted their relationship to their own power.  
SNCC organizers’ reluctance to impose themselves and their views on local people could 
create a context in which SNCC activists no longer were willing to hold a position or make a 
decision on anything. Some SNCC workers complained that the obsession with letting local 
people decide stopped their organizational progress. Questions of authority and power were 
common, including internal struggles over who gets to make decisions, why, and how. 
Accusations of “power mongering” and imposing decisions on staff combined with reports that 
programmatic planning were getting derailed by discussion on ”why people don’t speak.” “‘Who 
decided that?’ became a familiar, dreaded rebuttal.”78 By the end of 1964, the right to decide had 
become a major stumbling block in SNCC meetings. Staff complained in Mississippi, “I asked 
someone to deal with the two personnel problems…We sat there and nobody talked, and Stokely 
                                                
76 Polletta, “How Participatory Democracy Became White: Culture and Organizational Choice,” 
277; Barbara Schwartzbaum, “Hattiesburg Report from Barbara Schwartzbaum,” November 
1964, SNCC Papers (microfilm), Reel 66, frame 1270; Dick Kelley, “November 28—Dick 
Kelley,” 1964. Samuel Walker Papers, SHSW. 
77 Nancy and Gene Turvitz, Nancy and Gene Turvitz to Dear Friends, July 4, 1965, SNCC 
Papers (microfilm), Reel 61, Frames 1092-1094; Polletta, “How Participatory Democracy 
Became White: Culture and Organizational Choice.” 
78 Francesca Polletta “How Participatory Democracy Became White: Culture and Organizational 
Choice,” 277. 
 133	
[Carmichael] said he was the only one there who was willing to make decisions. He said people 
were afraid someone would ask them who gave them the right to make a decision.”79 
The increasing unwillingness of SNCC workers to own their power, decide, and take the 
responsibility of deciding initiated a culture of fear where people were shut down for trying to 
make decisions and simultaneously, people became less willing to be someone who spoke up. 
Forman identified this tendency as a central aspect of the organization’s problem with 
internalized liberalism. “The liberalism of which I have spoken tended to negate leadership as a 
valuable factor in an organization,” Forman explained, adding, “This tendency was not 
something new.” It stemmed from their early rejection of “the ‘great leader’ orientation of other 
civil rights organizations….We believed in community organizing, in the power of the people to 
develop their own strength and direction.” Forman described that such values turned into “a kind 
of general neurosis in the organization….What had been born as an affirmation became a 
simplistic negation. Instead of finding ways that people with natural leadership qualities could 
make their contribution and help to develop leadership qualities in others, this attitude simply 
said, Curb your leadership.”80 
 Forman saw the effects of this in particular on Bob Moses in 1964. “He was made to feel 
guilty, I think, about his power—and lost sight of the fact that it was a power achieved not 
through manipulation and tyranny, not out of self-interest, but as a result of performance, good 
ideas, hard work, tremendous courage, self-sacrifice, and, above all, a spirit of humanity. Bob’s 
attitude was crucial because people looked to him for leadership in Mississippi—and he was no 
longer providing it.” Instead, Moses felt the need to “abdicate his leadership.” “From my 
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viewpoint, this feeling was in large part produced by the pressure on him of that liberalism, 
which said, beware of your own leadership, your own power.” In order to stave off the 
corrupting influence of power, they sought to “maintain some kind of purity.” Forman argued 
that “the answer [to the potential for corruption] is not to run away from power, as this group 
sought to do.” Rather than own their critiques, they couched them in the language of group 
advocacy: “to me their attitude seemed condescending and patronizing,” Forman argued. “They 
never said, ‘I am concerned about decision making,’ but, ‘The staff is concerned about decision 
making.’” They were “mystifying and rationalizing their own desires in a very paternalistic 
way.” “I felt that everyone must acquire the strength to stand up, present their own ideas, fight 
for them if necessary, criticize the ideas of others, and recognize their own weaknesses. We all 
had to overcome the low level of political consciousness and insecurity—the lack of maturity—
which caused these problems.”81 
 This problem was a “fundamental plague upon all the revolutionary movements in the 
colonial world,” Forman argued. Though middle-class liberals were “on the outside waiting to 
descend….Our adversaries had only to wait, I thought, for SNCC to destroy its own power by 
failure to understand its historic role, by a fear of power among some of its members, and by a 
negation of leadership.”82  
After 1964, SNCC struggled to re-assert an effective organizing program and was 
stymied by a series of internal rifts around questions of power, structure, and authority. In spite 
of growing tension around wanting local people to adopt more “radical” politics, SNCC workers’ 
efforts to “let the people decide” had developed into a widespread aversion toward taking 
ownership of their role in directing the political and programmatic agenda of SNCC’s local 
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community projects. Instead of being willing to own and claim a political agenda, they 
invisibilized their own power. In this way, SNCC confirmed the stronghold that liberalism still 
had on the organization, even while they attempted to imagine an alternative.  
 
Conclusion 
Though local organizing projects continued amidst this internal struggle, declensionist 
historical narratives have pointed to this period as the precursor to SNCC’s organizational 
decline. The most promising parts of SNCC’s community organizing efforts after 1961 were tied 
to practices and values that were not firmly rooted within the liberal civil rights framework: 
Black, locally-led campaigns geared toward community-defined goals. Though these were not 
necessarily part of a radical political agenda, they were oppositional to the prevailing liberal civil 
rights framework. They placed African American interests and goals at the center of struggle, 
even if those interests and goals were not outside the prevailing liberal framework of the 
movement. The practice of locally-led and defined community organizing opened space for the 
development of radical programs; however, they were not in themselves the realization of 
radicalism. Instead, they represented a burgeoning anti-liberal practice within SNCC, even while 
they were operating within a liberal framework.  
SNCC’s on the ground experiences also demonstrated the limiting effects of liberalism. 
Declensionist narratives often point to a rejection of interracialism and nonviolence, and the turn 
towards rhetoric rather than programs to signal the shift in SNCC from its heroic beginnings to 
its maleficent decline. Instead, this chapter suggests that the internalized hierarchies of power, 
which Forman called internalized liberalism, operated in tension with the best parts of SNCC’s 
organizing tradition from the beginning. They limited the ability of SNCC to follow the on-the-
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ground lessons they were learning as organizers that were directing them towards a more 
liberatory vision of change. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
BLACK POWER AND THE MARCH AGAINST FEAR 
 
On June 5, 1966, James Meredith set out across the state of Mississippi from Memphis, 
Tennessee to begin his “March Against Fear.” Meredith, who gained national attention in 1962 
when he became the first African American admitted to the University of Mississippi, initiated 
the “March Against Fear” as a solitary protest in support of African American voting rights and 
to challenge the notion that African Americans in Mississippi had to live and travel in fear of 
white racism and violence. His plan was to walk for 220 miles from Memphis to Jackson, 
Mississippi, drawing media attention and offering a symbol of hope to Black people across the 
US South. The protest did not go as planned. On the second day of his march, having crossed 
only fourteen miles into Mississippi, Meredith was shot three times by a white assailant near 
Hernando, Mississippi. This shooting transformed Meredith’s solitary march into a mass action. 
Though initially Meredith’s march had received little interest from national civil rights 
organizations (nor had Meredith had much interest in their participation), this changed once 
Meredith was shot. In short order, leaders from the most prominent national civil rights 
organizations convened at Meredith’s hospital bed in Memphis and decided to continue the 
march in his honor. Nearly 25 people restarted the march at the location where Meredith had 
been shot. Among the most prominent national civil rights leaders were Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), Reverend James Lawson, Floyd 
McKissick of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee’s (SNCC) Stokely Carmichael. Over the course of the next weeks, the group would 
expand to hundreds and, by the end, thousands of marchers. By Sunday, June 26, over 15,000 
people walked the final eight-mile leg of the march into Jackson, including Meredith, who at that 
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point was well enough to rejoin them. What began as a solitary protest became the largest civil 
rights march in Mississippi.1  
While Meredith’s March Against Fear was an important moment of protest and solidarity 
in the Black freedom struggle, it has become memorialized in historical memory as something 
else: it was the context for Stokely Carmichael’s most famous “Black Power” speech. On the 
evening of June 16, 1966, Carmichael ignited an historic pandemonium with his shouts and the 
crowd’s response of “Black Power” during an evening speech in Greenwood, Mississippi. 
Though this was not the first time Carmichael and other SNCC leaders had used the term “Black 
Power” in their organizing efforts throughout the South, national media coverage of the March 
Against Fear gave this particular speech greater significance. Seemingly overnight, “Black 
Power” became a national symbol, evoking panic and fear in the mainstream as media, 
politicians, and moderate civil rights leaders scrambled to define and understand it.  
The significance of this speech in the dominant historical narrative of the Black freedom 
struggle of the 1960s is hard to overstate. It has been positioned as the moment of rupture, 
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ushering in the transition out of the “good” civil rights movement, and into its destructive, 
radical foil: Black Power. In this narrative a nonviolent, integration-oriented civil rights 
movement that was steadily progressing toward equality for African Americans was devastated 
by the angry, disruptive call for “Black Power” that originated with Carmichael’s speech in 
Greenwood, 1966. This perpetuated the violent, separatist, and racist uprisings of angry Blacks, 
which stunted the potential and delayed the progress that civil rights liberalism was poised to 
achieve. Though historical scholarship on the Black freedom struggle has expanded 
tremendously in the past few decades, offering nuances and alternatives to this dominant 
understanding; and though “Black Power” has resurged as a sometimes celebrated, though often 
misunderstood, symbol in popular culture; this traditional interpretation continues to dominate 
popular and mainstream historical narratives of the civil rights movement and its legacy.2  
The March Against Fear, and the initial mainstream response to Black Power in 1966, 
occurred in a broader context of liberal anxiety about the fate of the civil rights liberal alliance. 
This anxiety centered heavily on SNCC, whose relationship to their so-called liberal allies had 
taken a turn in early 1966 when they began to publicly question the federal government as an 
ally in the Black freedom struggle. SNCC made a series of public statements that openly broke 
ranks with the federal government, first condemning the war in Vietnam and then boycotting the 
White House Conference on Civil Rights. At the same time, SNCC went through a series of 
internal organizational changes that were covered in mainstream media. These developments 
openly demonstrated a new vision of the Black freedom struggle in SNCC that no longer 
centered the interests of their former liberal allies. 
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Against this backdrop, the March Against Fear symbolized a new direction in SNCC as 
well as the potential for a new direction in the movement more broadly. When civil rights leaders 
converged at James Meredith’s bedside in Memphis, they debated a series of questions about the 
march itself that reflected many of the central threads that seemed to be at the heart of what was 
unraveling in the civil rights liberal alliance: what would be the role of whites and liberal allies? 
What did it mean for the march to be nonviolent? Was the goal of the march to persuade federal 
action or was it to expand the political consciousness of Black people in Mississippi? These 
questions became primary sites of contention among civil rights leaders and ultimately resulted 
in a split among them.  
The march itself reflected the new Black-led emphasis in SNCC and the potential for 
those themes to be meaningful in the movement more broadly. The march, and in particular the 
call for Black Power, had psychological and political effects on African Americans who 
participated. This included the march leaders themselves. The media and television coverage of 
Carmichael’s speech exposed the  power of Black-centered organizing to the nation. The 
response among some of the most committed civil rights liberals and mainstream media 
demonstrated just how threatening this was. The success of the march signaled the possibility 
that change was afoot. It demonstrated the possibility that Black unity could manifest  in the 
movement among civil rights leaders and Black people outside of the frame of the civil rights 
liberal alliance. 
In this political context, the massive attack on SNCC and Black Power that emerged after 
the March Against Fear made sense. Amidst the unity and power displayed during the march and 
through the slogan Black Power, the term itself appeared open to interpretation. This perceived 
ambiguity was the foot in the door for those invested in preserving the centrality of white liberals 
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in the civil rights movement. The initial responses to Black Power from mainstream media, civil 
rights moderates, and others in the civil rights liberal alliance were strategic responses to the 
symbolic meaning of the march and the broader context of SNCC’s public rejection of liberal 
allies. In the wake of these changes, interpretations of Black Power became the primary way for 
the civil rights liberal alliance to reassert its primacy in the Black freedom struggle.  
 
SNCC and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, 1964 
Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP from 1955 to 1977, claimed in his 
autobiography: “If there was a single turning point [in the movement], it probably came about 
the time James Meredith took up his walking stick and struck off down Highway 50 for Jackson, 
Mississippi, marching against Jim Crow and fear.”3 Though Wilkins’ perspective represents a 
prevailing interpretation, SNCC activists saw it differently. SNCC Program Secretary Cleveland 
Sellers located the defining moment in the movement two years earlier with the defeat of the 
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party’s (MFDP) bid for congressional seating at the 
Democratic National Convention in August 1964. As Sellers recalled, “The national Democratic 
party’s rejection of the MFDP at the 1964 convention was to the civil rights movement what the 
Civil War was to American history: afterward, things could never be the same.”4 What lies 
underneath these competing narratives about a moment of rupture in the civil rights movement is 
a fuller understanding of the relationship between Black freedom and the civil rights liberal 
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alliance. By targeting these different moments, Wilkins and Sellers reflect two very different 
visions of that relationship.  
For Wilkins, the moment of rupture is linked to another important moment in the year 
prior to the March Against Fear. In spring and summer 1965, he explained, “the civil rights 
movement seemed to be at the very apex of its power.” Not coincidentally, this apex of power 
was also the apex of closeness in the relationship between the NAACP and the federal 
government. Wilkins recalled a phone call from President Johnson in anticipation of the 
president’s famous Howard University commencement speech in 1965 to illustrate this 
familiarity, and the commitment of the federal government to the cause of civil rights. Johnson 
told Wilkins, he was “ready for an all-fronts assault on the problems of race.” Being so moved 
by the President’s words, Wilkins said: 
I was astonished by his fervor and by his daring. He called the race crisis a “seamless 
web,” he acknowledged the damage that had been done to the Negro family over the 
centuries, and he argued that it would not be enough to open the door of opportunity to 
Negroes. After three hundred years of slavery, then enforced second-class citizenship, he 
believed that the victims had to be helped through the door and on their way. No 
President before had ever been so enlightened or bold in facing these truths. I came away 
from the conversations I had with LBJ feeling that he was not only with us but often 
ahead of us.5 
 
At the same moment that Wilkins positioned Johnson as leading the struggle for Black freedom, 
SNCC was coming to a radically different conclusion in the wake of a very different experience 
with the federal government.  
When SNCC formed in 1960, they were quickly established as the student wing of the 
civil rights liberal alliance. Though SNCC’s position within the liberal civil rights framework 
was always complicated, over the course of the next six years, SNCC’s disenchantment with the 
alliance deepened. Instead of increased political and economic opportunities for African 
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Americans in the rural South, SNCC’s efforts at collaboration with liberal allies seemed to result 
in continual disappointment and frustration. Promises of federal protection for civil rights efforts 
had more often than not proved false as SNCC workers and local African Americans faced daily 
terror in their efforts to challenge Jim Crow, secure voting rights, and increase Black political 
participation. Some Black SNCC workers experienced increasing tension with their white allies 
during SNCC’s “Freedom Summer” campaign in 1964, when hundreds of northern college 
students, mostly white and middle class, came to Mississippi to help with their voter registration 
and education campaigns. According to historian Clayborne Carson, “The steady increase in the 
proportion of whites on the staff during 1963 and 1964 concerned many who doubted whether 
local black leadership could develop in the presence of a large number of whites.”6  
That same summer, SNCC activists felt betrayed once again by their liberal allies in 
government and the civil rights establishment. SNCC had been working tirelessly with other civil 
rights organizations and local Black communities to establish an alternative to the white-
dominated, historically racist Democratic Party in Mississippi. For months they had been 
organizing to establish a democratic, anti-racist, and inclusive Democratic Party in Mississippi: 
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP). In August the MFDP attempted to seat 68 
delegates at the national Democratic convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Seeking to replace 
the all-white group of Democratic delegates whose political power in Mississippi was supported 
by long-standing racism and white supremacy, the MFDP believed their careful legal and 
political planning would make them successful. “[T]he MFDP was open to all Mississippi 
residents, had followed Mississippi rules regarding political party operations, and was committed 
to the election of Johnson,” historian Clayborne Carson explains. This was in contrast to 
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Mississippi’s all-white party, which had excluded black participation in the political process and 
was not only opposed to much of Johnson’s domestic agenda, but was also in some instances 
actively supporting his Republican opponent, Barry Goldwater. In this way, even beyond the 
morality of seating a delegation that was actually representative of Mississippi’s population, 
SNCC and the MFDP imagined their bid to be politically persuasive.7 
However, this was not the case. Johnson was unwilling to threaten his southern white 
support and instead of embracing the MFDP’s pro-Johnson democratic bid, he responded by 
ramping up FBI surveillance of SNCC and the MFDP. Impending vice-presidential candidate 
Hubert H. Humphrey became the leader of the White House response to the MFDP challenge, 
which the MFDP later characterized as “the most massive pressure.” It began with compromise 
proposals, one of which was to offer the MFDP delegates access to the convention without 
granting them actual votes. Given the exclusionary history of voting practices in Mississippi, it is 
not surprising that the MFDP refused. The result was a series of political maneuvers that 
included political threats to the MFDP supporters on the Credentials Committee. The final 
compromise offered was two “at-large” seats specifically designated for two of the most 
politically legible delegates in the group: Mississippi’s head of the NAACP Aaron Henry and 
white chaplain at Jackson’s Tougaloo College, Edwin King.8  
The choice of King and Henry was significant. As Bob Moses later explained, the MFDP 
challenge was not only a challenge on the “obvious racial grounds” but was also about pushing 
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the Democratic party to “recognize the existence of a whole group of people”: poor people and 
sharecroppers, who were not included in the party’s middle-class oriented base. SNCC staffer, 
MFDP delegate, and former sharecropper Fannie Lou Hamer demonstrated this challenge when 
she addressed the convention’s Credentials Committee. According to historian John Dittmer, 
Hamer’s personal testimony was so moving she even “overshadowed” comments made the same 
evening by Martin Luther King, Jr.  Hamer spoke about her life and her personal experiences 
with racial injustice in Mississippi. She told of being evicted from her home and losing her job 
simply because she registered to vote. She described being severely beaten in a Winona, 
Mississippi jail after being arrested for attending a civil rights training workshop. These 
comments were “high drama,” Dittmer said, and in response the President “hurriedly called a 
press conference,” which forced the networks to cut away in the middle of her statement. 
Recognizing the manipulation, networks aired her full testimony later that evening, including her 
concluding remarks: “Is this America, the land of the free and the home of the brave, where we 
have to sleep with our telephones off the hooks because our lives be threatened daily, because we 
want to live as decent human beings, in America?”9  
Though Hamer’s remarks elicited swarms of support, Humphrey decried the idea that 
people like Hamer would become part of the official delegation. “The President will not allow 
that illiterate woman to speak from the floor of the convention,” he said bitterly, illustrating the 
depth of the challenge the MFDP faced. In spite of such derision, civil rights moderates, 
including Roy Wilkins, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Bayard Rustin, were steadfast in their 
loyalty to the White House: they pushed for the delegation to take the two seat compromise. The 
ensuing debate within the MFDP was lengthy and intense. People on both sides had strong 
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opinions: was it better to accept compromise now in order to maintain political allies in the 
Democratic Party for the future, as the perspectives of Rustin, King, and Wilkins suggested? Or 
did such compromise fundamentally undermine the principle that it was unacceptable for 
Mississippi’s white supremacist delegation to represent the state’s majority African American 
population when there was a slate of more representative and democratically elected delegates 
right there? Ultimately, the latter won out and the MFDP rejected the compromise. As Hamer 
famously explained, “we didn’t come all this way for no two seats!”10   
While the MFDP’s decision was primarily on principled grounds, it was not entirely 
devoid of strategic considerations. When they rejected the compromise, they planned to go 
forward with a roll call vote on the floor and believed they had enough support from sitting 
delegates at the convention to win. They were not prepared for the politics that ensued. Hubert 
H. Humphrey led the campaign to shut it down and, through serious political and personal 
maneuverings, Humphrey pressured the liberal politicians who had previously allied themselves 
with the MFDP to change course. One by one liberal delegates fell in line with White House 
interests and the MFDP bid for representation in the Democratic Party failed.11 
The events at the 1964 convention were symbolically meaningful and politically 
awakening for SNCC. The failure of the MFPD bid for representation pushed on a door that 
almost no one who benefited from the existing power structure wanted to open:  it forced an 
explicit choice for liberal allies between bolstering their own political power and expanding 
African American access to full citizenship rights. The results were devastating for many in 
SNCC, who had spent countless hours, sleepless nights, and long days organizing Black 
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Mississippians to believe that the MFDP could be politically significant. While Wilkins and 
others plowed ahead in the pocket of the federal government, nothing was the same for leaders in 
SNCC. Instead of drawing closer to Johnson through the passage of the Civil Rights and Voting 
Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, as Wilkins’ NAACP had done, SNCC only grew increasingly 
disillusioned. Rather than a testament to the White House’s commitment to civil rights, SNCC 
saw the passage of national civil rights legislation in relationship to the defeat of the MFDP as a 
sign of contradiction. Their own experiences showed them that efforts to support civil rights only 
happened on their “allies” terms. Rather than assuage their concerns about federal investment in 
Black freedom, this legislation seemed too little, too late. Indeed, Wilkins’ “apex” of the civil 
rights movement came on the heels of SNCC’s nadir. These narrative differences are telling.  
For Wilkins and the civil rights liberal establishment, Carmichael’s “Black Power” 
speech during the 1966 March Against Fear was a turning point because it represented the 
moment that SNCC abandoned the civil rights movement. For Sellers, the story looked different. 
In his estimation, SNCC had finally recognized the truth about their purported “allies” in 
Atlantic City. As SNCC activist Julian Bond summarized years later, “We did not abandon 
liberalism; liberals abandoned us.”12  
 
SNCC and the Civil Rights Liberal Alliance, 1966: Statement Against the War in Vietnam 
As Bond’s comments indicate, between 1964 and the beginning of 1966, SNCC’s 
relationship with the federal government and other liberal allies in the struggle for Black freedom 
had taken new shape. By the beginning of 1966, SNCC had developed a new public stance 
                                                
12 Julian Bond, “The Politics of Civil Rights History,” in Armstead L. Robinson and Patricia 
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toward its former allies in the federal government and the liberal civil rights establishment. This 
became clear on January 6 1966 when SNCC solidified its open critique of the federal 
government by becoming the first mainstream civil rights organization to publicly state its 
opposition to U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam. Mainstream politicians, right-wing 
organizations, liberal allies and civil rights moderates claimed that civil rights organizations had 
no business involving themselves in foreign policy. However, SNCC saw a direct relationship 
between the war and their struggle. Bob Moses had developed connections between SNCC and 
antiwar activists in the peace movement during summer 1965 as part of the Committee of 
Unrepresented People, an ad hoc organization made up of representatives from various political 
groups. At the end of 1965, SNCC had decided to explicitly condemn the war. “Mississippi and 
Vietnam…are very much alike,” SNCC’s Courtland Cox argued in a December 1965 staff 
meeting. “Think about the problems of Mississippi’s poor, disenfranchised peasants; big 
business is making a killing in both places.” Not only did Cox draw parallels between the context 
of Mississippi and Vietnam, he also saw SNCC in relationship too: “…consider the similarities 
between Vietnam’s National Liberation Front and SNCC. They ought to be very much alike!” 
Cox’s arguments demonstrated that SNCC was beginning to imagine themselves as part of a 
broader, global struggle for freedom. The links he drew between SNCC and the NLF also 
illustrated SNCC’s internal self-perception at the time: they saw themselves as comparable to a 
group engaged in armed revolution against the United States.13  
Though there was some dissention within SNCC about their relationship to the war, 
things changed on January 4, 1966 when Sammy Younge, Jr., a SNCC worker and navy veteran, 
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was murdered by a gas station attendant for using a “whites only” restroom in Tuskegee, 
Alabama. Younge’s murder devastated SNCC. They issued a press release the following day 
with a statement from SNCC’s chairman John Lewis, which called for federal marshals with “the 
power to make on-the-spot arrests, in order to protect not just the civil rights, but the lives and 
limbs of the Negro people and civil rights workers of Alabama.” Lewis’ statement pointed to the 
hypocrisy of federal intervention to that point. Earlier the same day of the murder, SNCC 
requested federal intervention after Younge had reported that a Macon County registrar told his 
co-worker Jimmy Rogers, “I’m tired of fooling around with you, I’m going to spill your guts all 
over the floor.” SNCC contacted the FBI and Justice Department for federal intervention and, as 
the press release stated, after listening to their report an FBI agent told them “You’ve done your 
duty. We’ll take care of it.” Hours later, Younge was murdered. Demonstrating the public shift in 
SNCC rhetoric, Lewis said:  
If the federal government cannot provide protection for people seeking civil rights guaranteed by the 
constitution, then people will have no protection but themselves. We find it increasingly difficult to ask the people 
of the Black Belt to remain nonviolent. We have asked the president for federal marshals for over three years. If our 
plea is not answered, we have no choice.14 
 
Younge’s murder provided the impetus for SNCC to release its statement against the war 
two day later, which called the U.S. government “deceptive in its claims of concern for the 
freedom of the Vietnamese people, just as the government has been deceptive in claiming 
concern for the freedom of colored people in other countries as the Dominican Republic, the 
Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia, and in the United States itself.” The statement argued that “our 
country's cry of ‘preserve freedom in the world’ is a hypocritical mask, behind which it squashes 
liberation movements which are not bound, and refuse to be bound, by the expediencies of 
United States cold war policies.” Their years of organizing work in the U.S., the statement 
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claimed, “ha[ve] taught us that the United States government has never guaranteed the freedom 
of oppressed citizens, and is not yet truly determined to end the rule of terror and oppression 
within its own borders.” SNCC too had been “victims of violence and confinement executed by 
United States governmental officials,” the statement claimed. “The murder of [Sammy Younge] 
is no different than the murder of peasants in Vietnam, for both Young and the Vietnamese 
sought, and are seeking, to secure the rights guaranteed them by law. In each case, the United 
States government bears a great part of the responsibility for these deaths.” Their statement 
offered sympathy and support for “the men in this country who are unwilling to respond to a 
military draft which would compel them to contribute their lives to United States aggression in 
Vietnam.” Challenging the notion that “responsibility to freedom is equated with the 
responsibility to lend oneself to military aggression,” SNCC encouraged “all Americans” to 
“work in the civil rights movement and with other human relations organizations” as “a valid 
alternative to the draft…knowing full well that it may cost them their lives—as painfully as in 
Vietnam.”15 SNCC’s statement drew explicit connections between their own struggle and events 
in Vietnam as shared struggles for liberation, putting responsibility directly on the federal 
government and calling for draft resistors to join the Black freedom struggle in the United States.  
The response to SNCC’s statement was fierce. “Our support among liberals was sharply 
curtailed,” James Forman recalled. Cleveland Sellers said, “SNCC was inundated with a storm of 
criticism….Several major contributors notified us by telegram and telephone that they would no 
longer support the organization.” “But,” concluded Forman, “we continued down a revolutionary 
path.”16 
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SNCC and the Civil Rights Liberal Alliance, 1966: The Black Power Program 
SNCC’s “revolutionary path” took new form in spring 1966. SNCC had already been the 
subject of political scrutiny and media attention for some time but, after their January statement 
against the war, this intensified, reaching new heights during May 1966. SNCC’s self-conscious 
efforts to separate their visions of freedom from a reliance on the federal government and liberal 
allies included the pursuit of organizing programs that would break from their previous 
dependence on federal protection and media publicity in order to foster liberal outrage at white 
southern retaliatory violence. Though the realization of these goals were incomplete, SNCC 
made great strides toward them through the development of a new organizing model in Lowndes 
County, Alabama.   
SNCC had established an organizing project in Lowndes County, Alabama in March 
1965. Headed by Stokely Carmichael, this project had helped establish a Black political party in 
the county that was independent from either the Democratic or Republican parties. This 
independent Black third party was called the Lowndes County Freedom Organization (LCFO). 
Within SNCC it signaled the next step in local political organizing after their efforts to 
participate in the Democratic Party through the MFDP had been squashed at Atlantic City in 
1964. The LCFO held its first nominating convention on May 3, 1966 where nearly one thousand 
Black residents of Lowndes County participated. The successful turnout for this convention in 
Lowndes County solidified a new faith within SNCC that they could start building Black 
independent political institutions in other projects throughout the nation. SNCC’s staff retreat in 
Kingston Springs, Tennessee came on the heels of the LCFO nominating convention and this 
recent success became the programmatic basis for a new Black-centered organizing approach 
within SNCC. Program Secretary Cleveland Sellers explained, “Everyone present seemed to 
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believe that the tactics used to organize the Lowndes County Freedom Organization were what 
we had been searching for since Atlantic City.” According to historian Hasan Kwame Jeffries, 
SNCC developed three major policy decisions at Kingston Springs: independent third parties 
would become their central organizing goal; they would begin to promote Black consciousness; 
and they would limit organizing in Black communities to Black workers.17  
The Kingston Springs meeting was subject to particular media scrutiny not only for 
SNCC’s new Black-centered political organizing program, but also because it was at this 
meeting that Carmichael was elected to the position of chairman. Media highlighted a 
controversial middle-of-the-night election in which he replaced John Lewis, the organization’s 
longstanding chairman who symbolized SNCC’s position within the liberal civil rights 
establishment. Media responses to this change in leadership and characterizations of Carmichael 
were often alarmist and extreme. Historian Hasan Kwame Jeffries argues that while this change 
from Lewis to Carmichael was often characterized as a “coup by a radical fringe element,” it was 
more accurately “veteran organizers acting on their belief that it made more sense to have the 
architect of the Lowndes County organizing program spearhead that program’s broader 
implementation.”18 The Washington Post’s Roscoe Drummond called Carmichael a “militant 
exclusionist,” and, reflecting the media’s general confusion about Black freedom movement 
politics, claimed that Carmichael was “intent upon taking SNCC as far to the right as he can.” 
Drummond pointed to SNCC’s new response to the federal government, including their 
opposition to the war in Vietnam and their boycott of the White House Conference on Civil 
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Rights as evidence of their new political stance. He also drew attention to the Lowndes-modeled 
organizing program, explaining that they planned to build a “’black power structure’ capable of 
seizing the ‘instruments of social change’ from the ‘white power structure’ and controlling 
them.” He characterized this turn as “a kind of ‘black nationalism,’” which he described as 
having “some affinity with the Black Muslims and the late Malcolm X.”19 SNCC had not 
conceived of Black Power as the international rallying call for Black consciousness and Black-
led political participation that it would come to be, but it was a symbol of SNCC’s new 
organizing program, which inspired renewed hope within the organization that their struggle for 
Black freedom had new legs.  
 
SNCC and the Civil Rights Liberal Alliance, 1966: The White House Conference on Civil Rights 
If SNCC was in the process of establishing a local model of Black power organizing, they 
brought their explicit rejection of white liberal dominated, two-party politics onto a national 
scale when SNCC openly boycotted the White House Conference on Civil Rights only few 
weeks before Carmichael’s infamous Black Power speech. President Johnson had initiated plans 
for the conference the previous year in response to the release of the 78-page report to the 
President from a study group headed by former Assistant Secretary of Labor, Daniel P. 
Moynihan. “The Negro Family—The Case for National Action,” now known informally as the 
Moynihan Report, gained national attention as people attempted to make sense of the Watts 
rebellion that took place in Los Angeles during August 1965.20 The Moynihan Report, which 
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called for national effort to address the “tangle of pathology” in the Black community, was both 
heralded by white liberals as a much needed explanation for the state of the African American 
community and criticized by some Black leaders for popularizing a narrative that blamed and 
pathologized Black communities, and particularly Black women, for the effects of racism and 
structural inequality.21 Embracing the logic of the report in full, President Johnson planned the 
conference around the argument that “we need to give stability to the Negro family, which has 
been damaged by centuries of slavery and injustice.” In a speech at Howard University the 
previous summer, Johnson claimed that white Americans needed to accept responsibility for the 
breakdown of the Negro family structure.22  
Though Johnson believed the conference’s focus on the Black family would “help Negro 
Americans ‘move beyond opportunity to achievement’ and dissolve remaining barriers that have 
kept them ‘a people apart,” most civil rights leaders had a different perspective. In November 
1965, sixty representatives from a variety of religious and civil rights groups met in New York 
and adopted a resolution calling for the removal of “family stability” from the conference 
agenda. The question should be approached instead, the resolution stated, “through an economic 
and urban analysis and needs in the critical areas of jobs, housing and quality integrated 
education.” Ultimately, the resolution was successful in removing “family stability” from the 
                                                                                                                                                       
running single parent households were to blame for the perceived lack of political and economic 
progress in African American communities. 
21 Melissa Chappell argues that while civil rights leaders’ positions changed on the Moynihan 
report, Martin Luther King, Jr., Roy Wilkins, and Whitney Young initially supported its 
perspectives. Each of them had preapproved a draft of President Johnson’s Howard University 
commencement address, which drew heavily on the report. See Marisa Chappell, The War on 
Welfare: Family, Poverty, and Politics in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 39. 
22 John Herbers, “Report Focuses on Negro Family: Aid to Replace Matriarchy Asked by 
Johnson Panel,” New York Times (August 27, 1965), 13. See also: Forman, The Making of Black 
Revolutionaries, 453-54; Carson, In Struggle, 204-205. 
 155	
agenda, yet SNCC remained unconvinced of the federal government’s ability and willingness to 
support civil rights efforts. While in previous years SNCC had held private skepticism about the 
federal government, they nonetheless worked with the federal government, usually 
unsuccessfully, to seek protection and support for African American challenges to white 
supremacy in the South. By May 1966, in the wake of the betrayal in Atlantic City, weakening 
support from liberal allies and civil rights leaders, and the murder of Sammy Younge, Jr., SNCC 
was no longer willing to adopt this approach. In a SNCC statement attributed to Executive 
Secretary Ruby Doris Robinson in the press, they said, “In the process of exploiting black 
Americans, white America has tried to shift the responsibility for the degrading position in which 
blacks now find themselves away from the oppressors and to the oppressed…The White House 
Conference, especially with its original focus on the Negro family as the main problem with 
which America must deal, accentuates this process of shifting the burden of the problem.”23  
These comments reflected the mounting tensions in the weeks previous to the March 
Against Fear, in the buildup to the White House Conference of Civil Rights that was to be held 
June 1-2, 1966 in Washington D.C. Approximately 2500 delegates were chosen to attend the 
conference, which, according to the Times, included the usual civil rights leaders and 
government officials but also a wider range of public figures including Mississippi Governor 
Paul B. Johnson and actor Marlon Brando. The conference also included representatives from  
“the very poor,” whose attendance was funded in part through contributions from private 
foundations. In addition to inviting “the very poor,” the Times reported, conference planners had 
erected large pictures of “debris-littered slums” and “children [with] hungry eyes” in one 
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hallway of the Sheraton Park Hotel, where the conference was held, in order “to remind [the 
conference attendees] of one reason why they are there.”24  
Such gestures confirmed SNCC’s contempt for the White House Conference. Though 
SNCC’s former chairman, John Lewis, had attended some of the preliminary council sessions 
(much to the dismay of most of his compatriots), the organization had otherwise been wholly 
skeptical of the conference and its purpose. In late May, SNCC announced that rather than 
participate, they would be boycotting the White House Conference on Civil Rights. According to 
the Times, SNCC chose to boycott because their leaders questioned the Johnson administration’s 
sincerity in “helping the Negro.”25 SNCC’s questioning stemmed from a longer history of 
growing tension with the federal government, and their increasing recognition that the Johnson 
administration was not the kind of ally for Black freedom that SNCC had once imagined. The 
statement on the conference issued by SNCC’s Central Committee called the conference an 
“absolutely unnecessary” and “useless endeavor.” Reiterating their earlier position on the U.S. in 
relation to international struggle they said, “We believe that the President has called this 
conference within the United States at a time when United States prestige internationally is at a 
low ebb due to our involvement in the Vietnam Civil War, the Dominican Republic, the Congo, 
South Africa and other parts of the Third World. We cannot be party to attempts by the White 
House to use black Americans to recoup a loss of prestige internationally.” Echoing the 
programmatic resolutions recently adopted in Kingston Springs, the statement concluded by 
saying: “We reaffirm our belief that people who suffer must make the decisions about how to 
change and direct their lives. We therefore call upon all black Americans to begin building 
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independent political, economic, and cultural institutions that they will control and use as 
instruments of social change in this country.”26 
Though SNCC was the only national civil rights organization to boycott the conference, 
CORE demonstrated their own disillusionment with the federal government in their response as 
well. Like SNCC’s John Lewis, CORE’s Floyd McKissick had been appointed to the preliminary 
council charged with developing a broad set of recommendations that would structure the 
conference. Unlike Lewis, McKissick chose not to attend any of those sessions, claiming that the 
money for such travel was needed for other organizing projects in CORE. In his absence, the 
preliminary group had decided unanimously that they would present their framing 
recommendations at the start of the conference and let the 2,500 conference delegates discuss 
them, make recommendations in response, but not be allowed to vote. If votes were taken, 
conference chairman and Chicago railroad executive Ben W. Heineman said, “great 
parliamentary confusion” would ensue and nothing would be accomplished. On the day before 
the conference, McKissick announced that he would make a motion to throw out the prepared 
agenda for the conference and ask that they start from scratch at the conference itself, allowing 
all 2,500 delegates to be part of the decision making process. His most particular concern was 
that conference attendees be able to vote on any resolution put before them.27 McKissick’s 
response to the conference, though different from SNCC’s boycott, reflected a shared critique of 
liberal bureaucracy: CORE and SNCC were invested in direct, participatory democracy rather 
than representative and bureaucratic structures. 
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CORE’s internal challenge to the structure of the White House conference complimented 
SNCC’s boycott, demonstrating a political shift away from the liberal, civil rights mainstream 
that was happening within those national civil rights organizations. Importantly, their turn away 
from the federal government as an ally in civil rights efforts coincided with their reassertion of 
Black-led organizing in Mississippi. Only days after the White House Conference on Civil 
Rights, James Meredith initiated the “March Against Fear.” The juxtaposition of these two 
nationally prominent civil rights events helps us understand why the media spectacle of “Black 
Power” emerged the way it did. SNCC rejected the federally sponsored civil rights event but 
embraced the Black-led March Against Fear; this was an articulation of the values underneath 
SNCC’s new approach, symbolized by the “Black Power” slogan.  
When the March Against Fear took place, mainstream responses from the federal 
government, liberal politicians, Civil Rights moderates, and media were all informed by SNCC’s 
recent rejection of the White House conference, their turn towards organizing Black political and 
economic power bases in Lowndes County, and their statement against the war in Vietnam. In 
this particular context, “Black Power” became a perfect target to address the threats that SNCC 
and other changing civil rights organizations posed to the power structure and liberal framework 
of the civil rights establishment. Understood in this way, the term “Black Power” was in itself a 
lesser threat than the boycott, SNCC’s anti-Vietnam war stance, and their emphasis on Black-led 
organizing. More than anything, “Black Power” offered a convenient way for members of the 
civil rights alliance to explain the much larger and more worrisome shifts that were already 
happening in SNCC. 
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Movement Tension and Black Unity in the March Against Fear 
If the mainstream response to “Black Power” was more accurately about the growing 
threat that SNCC posed to the liberal establishment, which had been developing over the course 
of many months, and if SNCC had already been using the term “Black Power” for some time, the 
question remains why Carmichael’s speech in Greenwood during the March Against Fear 
became the particular focus in media and political discourse. Why that speech and not another 
moment? The answer, in large part, is because of publicity, symbolism, and timing. Meredith’s 
March Against Fear was the most nationally publicized Civil Rights event since the Alabama 
march from Selma to Montgomery in 1965. By June 1966, however, evidence of a shift in the 
movement was clear. The March Against Fear illustrated both the tensions that had developed 
within the civil rights mainstream, and, at the same time, the unity that still existed. The march 
itself also symbolized a potential new direction in the movement: it was Black-controlled, locally 
focused, and headlined by some of the most unpredictable leaders in the civil rights 
establishment, most notably: King, McKissick, Meredith, and Carmichael. At this moment when 
heightened public attention was drawn to a movement fraught with tension and in the midst of 
transformation, “Black Power” became a compelling media target. 
The March Against Fear symbolized in itself many of the changes that were taking place 
in the movement. This contributed to the climate of anxiety surrounding Carmichael’s speech. 
SNCC, for example, approached the march as an attempt to enact its vision of what Black-led 
organizing might look like. Carmichael and other SNCC leaders saw the march as an opportunity 
to get their message across to a wider audience. By 1966 SNCC had become astute about the 
mainstream press and they recognized that the March Against Fear would be a highly publicized 
action. SNCC saw the march as an opportunity to engage a national audience, since press 
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coverage of the march would far surpass the press coverage that SNCC’s local organizing efforts 
had received in the previous months.28 
 Though some SNCC’s leaders were wary of getting involved in another nationally 
covered civil rights march, others saw the March Against Fear as an opportunity to put SNCC’s 
approach to organizing on a national stage. They wanted to push for Black-led political 
campaigns to take a more central role in the movement. Cleveland Sellers recalled, “We knew 
we were going to have to be supersalesmen to get [SNCC’s Central Committee] to allow us to 
join the march.”29 Part of the Central Committee’s hesitation was because of how disappointed 
they had been in the two large-scale marches that SNCC had participated in previously. SNCC 
leaders remembered the March on Washington in August 1963, where then SNCC chairman 
John Lewis was compelled by other civil rights leaders to water down his speech in order to 
make it more palatable to a broader audience, including the labor organizations and other 
financial and political supporters of the march. SNCC felt betrayed and became concerned that 
civil rights efforts on a national level forced them to compromise their values and message.30 
SNCC responded similarly during the march from Selma to Montgomery in 1965, where 
SNCC leaders were less willing to participate because the march failed to represent their values 
and vision of the movement. SNCC had not wanted to participate in the march as they felt the 
danger outweighed the benefits given the violent nature of the counties around Selma. SNCC’s 
experience at the March on Washington had suggested that nationally publicized marches were 
not in line with their organizational goals. Given their commitment to community organizing, 
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they were skeptical of the march as a movement tactic. Though SNCC chose not to participate as 
an organization, they offered resources to the marchers and allowed SNCC workers to participate 
as individuals. Their Chairman, John Lewis, chose to go as he favored the march, having close 
relations with King and the SCLC. SNCC’s fears were realized on “Blood Sunday” when local 
and state police attacked the mass of two thousand marchers at the Pettus Bridge. Instead of 
King, John Lewis had led the march alongside Bob Mants, a SNCC organizer in Lowndes 
County, and the SCLC’s Hosea Williams, as King had returned to Atlanta to deliver a sermon. 
The marchers were severely beaten and bloodied. Lewis’s skull had been fractured. SNCC 
staffers reversed their decision and hurried to offer support in the wake of the violence and help 
continue the march as planned. However, SNCC found that upon King’s return to Selma, he had 
brokered a deal with the U.S. Justice Department in fear of further violence. King agreed that 
when the marchers reached the bridge, instead of crossing they would turn around. Though King 
did not publicize this arrangement, he enacted it, leading the new group of one thousand 
marchers to the bridge, stopping for a prayer, and then instructing them to turn around. As the 
marchers retreated, they sang, “Ain’t Gonna Let Nobody Turn Me ‘Round.”31 The events in 
Selma had left a bitter taste in the mouths of SNCC activists. Silas Norman, SNCC’s field 
secretary in Selma said, “I felt that we had been betrayed, and I no longer wanted to participate 
in that.”32 
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SNCC leaders who supported participation in the March Against Fear argued that this 
was an opportunity to make it their own, do something new, and do something more reflective of 
SNCC. These leaders advocated for making the march into an organizing experience: they would 
talk to local people rather than just march by, and do voter registration along the way. One of 
their most persuasive arguments was that the march would be taking place in Mississippi, 
territory that SNCC considered to be its own. SNCC had been organizing in Mississippi for over 
five years and the march would be going through counties where they were well known, and that 
they themselves knew well. Many, including Carmichael, had lived, organized, and struggled in 
those same spaces for years. They knew the terrain, they knew the local politics, and most 
importantly, they knew the people. After some convincing, the supporters of participation won 
out and SNCC agreed to send Carmichael, Sellers, and a handful of others to take the lead. 
Demonstrating the Central Committee’s reluctant support for the march, Sellers recalled that 
their final words were: “We don’t want to hear anything more about this march. Don’t call us for 
help!” Unfortunately for the more skeptical members of the Central Committee, they could not 
anticipate how much more they were going to have to hear about the march. In spite of initial 
reluctance, for those who were invested in the march, they viewed this as an opportunity to make 
it their own: it would reflect their values and their ideas.33  
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Tension in the Ranks: Civil Rights Leaders Envision the March 
Overcoming internal questions was the least of the challenges that SNCC faced that June. 
Their vision of an organizing march was not shared by many of the other civil rights leaders who 
also sought to take up the march in Meredith’s place. After visiting James Meredith in the 
hospital in Memphis, Whitney Young of the Urban League, Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, Floyd 
McKissick of CORE, Martin Luther King, Jr. of SCLC, and a handful of SNCC leaders met at 
the Centenary Methodist Church, where Reverend James Lawson was the pastor, to discuss the 
logistics of the march. Tensions were apparent from the very start. The makeup of this group was 
the first point of contention as Young and Wilkins expressed discomfort about the fact that 
SNCC’s chairman Stokely Carmichael was not the group’s sole representative. Eventually, 
Wilkins and Young were willing to continue the meeting when they were assured that despite the 
group, SNCC would only have one vote.34  
 Whitney Young and Roy Wilkins continued to be SNCC’s main adversaries throughout 
the conversation. Among the most contentious issues at the meeting were SNCC’s suggestions to 
deemphasize white participation, highlight the importance of independent, Black political 
organizing, and allow the march to include the Deacons for Defense, a black self-defense group 
from Louisiana who would be armed. Young and Wilkins, instead, advocated for a public 
statement in support of nonviolence, the exclusion of the Deacons for Defense, and a mass call 
for whites to join the march. In addition, Wilkins offered a vision for the march that competed 
with SNCC’s organizing focus: to use it as a way to mobilize support for the upcoming 1966 
Civil Rights Bill. Tensions continued when SNCC and CORE offered a statement about the 
march that they had drafted, which they called a “manifesto,” and pressured the other leaders to 
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sign. Again, Young and Wilkins were put off. They took issue with the content of the statement, 
which Wilkins called “a personal attack on President Johnson.” But perhaps as important as the 
content, they also took issue with the fact that they called it a “manifesto,” raising unwanted 
associations with radical politics and specifically, Communism.35  
Needless to say, the organizations were split: SNCC and CORE on one side, and the 
NAACP and Urban League on the other. Martin Luther King, as the representative of SCLC, 
held the deciding vote, a position that was representative of King’s role as mediator between the 
growing rift among these mainstream civil rights leaders. Characteristic of his larger role in this 
struggle, King’s primary concern was maintaining unity within the movement. Though he was 
personally in favor of an explicit commitment to nonviolence and the inclusion of whites in the 
march, he was also unwilling to take a stand against Carmichael and the other SNCC 
representatives. Because of this, the meeting continued deep into the night, which infuriated 
Young and Wilkins.36 “Stampeding the crowd, Stokley accused me of selling out the people,” 
Wilkins recalled, “and his SNCC clique shouted to back him up.” Things became increasingly 
contentious, and eventually, without resolution, Wilkins and Young left the meeting. “I refused 
to sign the manifesto,” Wilkins explained, “I got nowhere with my idea of using the march to 
back the Civil Rights Bill. Finally, in disgust, I left the meeting to catch a 1:10 AM plane 
home.”37 Clearly, SNCC and CORE’s interests clashed significantly with the goals and concerns 
of the NAACP and Urban League, whose disinterest in Black-led, on-the-ground organizing was 
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matched by SNCC’s unwillingness to support federal civil rights initiatives. Though they still 
shared the same general goal of Black freedom, their ideological and strategic visions of what 
that meant were becoming different enough to make these groups increasingly illegible to one 
another.38  
The tensions that emerged among leaders on the eve of the march represented some of 
the larger political struggles that undergirded the historical moment in the movement. The role of 
armed self-defense was a particular sticking point, but this was connected to larger concerns 
within the movement about their relationship to the federal government, including the role of 
white liberals as allies in the Black freedom struggle. Mainstream news reports demonstrated the 
visibility of these struggles when in late May and early June the Times and the Pittsburgh 
Courier reported on SNCC’s changing approach to organizing, and particularly, Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s comments against it. King challenged SNCC’s “new endorsement of ‘all-black parties 
for black power’, as it was called in the Courier or as the Times put it, the “’Black Nationalist’ 
stand taken by the new chairman.”39 In the context of the March Against Fear, Carmichael’s 
suggestion to de-emphasize the roles of whites in the march, for example, reflected these larger 
themes. His concerns grew in part out of some of SNCC’s earlier experiences in which financial 
support from white liberals demanded a certain amount of political “softening.” These examples 
included their October 1960 conference, where SNCC students acquiesced to pressure from labor 
organizations to remove Bayard Rustin from the list of conference speakers, as well as the March 
on Washington, when John Lewis was compelled to change the content of his speech at the last 
minute. These examples, where financial support from white liberal organizations came with 
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complicated and sometimes invisible strings attached, influenced SNCC and other organizations 
to call those alliances into question.40  
A front-page article covering the March Against Fear in the Times a few days before 
Carmichael’s Greenwood speech further demonstrated the relevance of these questions within 
the mainstream civil rights movement and their visibility within mainstream media. Entitled 
“Whites’ Role Splits Leaders of March,” the article claimed that the “philosophical differences” 
among march participants, which reporter Gene Roberts described as “vast,” “center[ed] more 
than ever before on their relationship to the white man.” While most civil rights organizations 
depended on financial support from white liberals, Roberts explained, some leaders were 
beginning to note that financial contribution often came with the expectation that contributors 
would get to have a say in civil rights policy. Even one of Martin Luther King’s aides said that 
despite their dedication, some white organizers “just don’t understand the problem.” Though 
King’s aide criticized SNCC for “no longer let[ting] whites organize in rural areas,” he conceded 
that even the SCLC was “becoming more selective about the whites we use.” Floyd McKissick 
similarly noted a new challenge in the movement: as white financial supporters grew 
increasingly concerned with what they saw as “rising anger and racism among Negroes,” 
McKissick found himself “spending much of his time ‘holding hands’ with white financial 
supporters.”41  
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Black Unity in the March 
The Times article, as well as the debates among civil rights leaders on the eve of the 
march, highlight a number of central challenges that SNCC and other mainstream civil rights 
organizations were confronting in June 1966. Though the NAACP and Urban League abandoned 
the march, and despite the air of tension that surrounded them, the March Against Fear also 
represented a sense of solidarity within the Black freedom struggle. While leaders continued to 
argue over organizing techniques and political message, and debated the presence of the Deacons 
for Defense as potential armed protectors for the marchers, photographs also captured a palpable 
sense of shared purpose, as Stokely Carmichael, Floyd McKissick, and by the end, a healthy 
James Meredith, stood arm-in-arm with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., smiling and marching 
toward Jackson together. “Dr. King was enjoying himself immensely,” Sellers recalled, albeit 
with a slight tongue in cheek. “For one of the first times in his career as a civil rights leader, he 
was shoulder to shoulder with the troops.” As they walked together over many days, these 
leaders began to talk about their different views. Sellers remembered King as “easygoing, with a 
delightful sense of humor.” “His mind was open,” Sellers recalled, “and we were surprised to 
find that he was much less conservative than we initially believed.” King began to acknowledge 
that emphasizing Black consciousness “might be necessary” and forming independent, black 
organizations “might just work.” After the first week, King was “giving speeches at the nightly 
rallies in favor of blacks’ seeking power in those area where they were in the majority.”42  
Media reports confirmed this in the days after Carmichael’s speech, claiming that while 
King had before “avoided use of the term,” he told marchers the next day that Black Power was 
“the ability to make the power structure say ‘yes’ when it wants to say ‘no’.” He continued, 
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saying: “When we get this power, we will try to achieve a society of brotherhood.” SCLC’s 
Hosea Williams was even more explicit in his expressions of Black Power: “Get that vote and 
put black faces in those uniforms…Get that vote and whip those policemen across the head with 
it.” Looking at the sheriff’s deputies lined up near the rally he echoed SNCC’s recent statement 
on Vietnam, “If we can die in Vietnam, we can die in Mississippi.” Presaging Carmichael’s 
assessment of media response to Black Power over the coming years, Williams turned to the 
press and said, “I don’t think the newsmen can interpret me because they aren’t black.”43   
Even the front-page Times article on the split among civil rights leaders recognized this 
sense of unity, when Gene Roberts claimed that in the face of waning white financial support, 
civil rights groups were developing “a common bond in trying to create a new financial base 
among Negroes.” Though it was clear that the march was a symbol of change and tension within 
the civil rights establishment, it was still understood to be a productive tension. As Roberts 
explained, “…the civil rights movement appears to be thriving on the controversy, as it did in 
Selma, Birmingham and in the days of the sit-ins and freedom rides.”44 Though civil rights 
leaders did not always agree, and tensions were apparent in the course of the march, they stood 
in contrast to the clear sense of solidarity among African Americans and movement leaders, 
which was apparent in the mainstream press. The march was Black-led and Black-centered, and 
despite some of the tensions, it was also an expression of Black unity in the movement.  
Carmichael expressed his excitement about this unity, and SNCC’s efforts to transform 
the march from a mobilizing event to an organizing experience. Throughout the march SNCC 
workers registered voters, encouraged African Americans to run for elected office, and talked to 
them about forming independent political parties. “We wouldn’t just talk about empowerment, 
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about black communities controlling their political destiny, and overcoming fear. We would 
demonstrate it.”45 The clearest symbol of this was in Grenada, Mississippi where marchers faced 
an unusual response from local officials: none. Instead of resisting, Grenada authorities agreed to 
hire six Black teachers to function as deputy registrars and opened the community to nighttime 
and neighborhood registration while the march passed through town. After two hundred 
marchers entered the town and headed to the courthouse, locals had more than doubled the size 
of the crowd. “For a day and a night,” historian John Dittmer explained, “Grenada became an 
open city.” In the course of two days, 1,300 Black residents were added to the county’s list of 
registered voters. However, just as quickly as this occurred, Governor Paul Johnson claimed that 
the march had “turned into a voter registration campaign.” In response he cut the number of state 
patrol cars protecting the marchers from twenty to four, and called on local authorities to take 
over the responsibility. As marchers headed from Grenada to Greenwood, local repression tactics 
resumed on the eve of Stokely Carmichael’s famous “Black Power” speech.46 
This unity was a source of strength, but also contributed to heightened anxiety. Martin 
Luther King’s participation in the march, for example, exacerbated white liberal anxieties 
because of his power, political position, and level of widespread support. In this respect Sellers 
account of King’s pleasure on the march was in itself a significant symbolic threat. The idea that 
King might be in line with the more radical-leaning SNCC and CORE was threatening to civil 
rights moderates, mainstream media, and white liberal politicians. King’s awareness of this fear 
contributed to the nature of his own critiques of Black Power that would emerge after the march. 
While media and anxious civil rights moderates zeroed in on the divisions and disillusionment of 
this moment as a frame for the tragedy of “Black Power,” unity within the Black Freedom 
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Movement was just as apparent as its tensions during the March Against Fear, when SNCC’s 
“Black Power” emerged onto the national scene. Though both contemporary media and the 
historical record overshadowed the significance of the march with their focus on “Black Power,” 
the slogan was just one part of SNCC’s larger investment in making the march their own, and 
using the march to demonstrate their changing approach to Black freedom. Most importantly, for 
African Americans who were impacted by the march, divisions between movement leaders were 
of little concern. As Dittmer explained, “For black Mississippians [Black Power] made sense—it 
was what they had been about since the first voter registration drive in McComb.” They were not 
interested in choosing between Carmichael and King, or SNCC and the SCLC. When the march 
concluded in Jackson, Mississippi on June 26, 1966, Dittmer commented, “the rally was a 
display of unity” as “the overwhelming black audience cheered all the speakers.”47 
 
Conclusion 
It is not by chance that in 1966, after a year of internal struggle, and at the same moment 
that SNCC began to re-establish its footing, the liberal civil rights establishment began to dig at 
the ground below them. SNCC’s emphasis on Black-centered organizing pushed SNCC to more 
fully separate the means and goals of achieving Black freedom from its entanglements with the 
civil rights liberal establishment. As SNCC increasingly disentangled their vision of freedom 
from mainstream liberal interests, they threatened to uncover some of the unspoken systems of 
privilege that had undergirded the civil rights-liberal alliance.  
White liberals in the early 1960s had begun to ally themselves more explicitly with the 
civil rights movement, which benefited them immensely. By positioning themselves as allies, 
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white liberals were shielded from complicity in the systems of white supremacy that stood in the 
way of Black freedom. While it was framed through narratives of change and progress, this civil 
rights-liberal alliance actually worked to maintain the status quo. It reinforced existing 
hierarchies of power in national politics by positioning white liberal leaders in the federal 
government at the top, and the “racist”, “backwards”, conservatives in the southern power 
structure as their adversary. This alliance allowed white liberals access to narratives of moral 
superiority that had gained such traction within the civil rights movement in exchange for limited 
gestures of support for African American civil rights.  
When SNCC demonstrated the possibility that Black freedom was no longer contingent 
on maintaining these existing hierarchies, white liberals risked losing their delicate but highly 
effective network of supremacy. If the critical gaze was turned upon them, white liberals risked 
exposing not only their complicity in systems of white supremacy but also the underlying 
hierarchy within the liberal civil rights alliance, and specifically, the ways in which their interests 
often took precedence over those of the Black community. If previous narratives of Black 
freedom positioned southern racism as the opposition and white liberals and the federal 
government as allies, emerging narratives in SNCC were reimagining the role of liberal allies, 
recognizing that they, too, were complicit in the systems of white supremacy that stood in the 
way of Black freedom.  
White liberals were the greatest beneficiaries from the civil rights-liberal alliance in the 
early 1960s: their political and social power grew with only minimal effort toward the goal of 
Black freedom. The presidential election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 was one of the earliest and 
most obvious demonstrations of this dynamic. Kennedy’s rise to the presidency solidified the 
federal government as a central figure in the liberal-civil rights alliance. However, it was 
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Kennedy, and not his African American supporters, who stood to gain the most from this 
alliance. As it turned out, his election depended directly on the support of African Americans in 
the voting booth, yet this crucial support did not require legislative policy or executive political 
action. Instead, Kennedy simply capitalized on a strategic and highly publicized phone call that 
he made to Coretta Scott King, offering sympathy, not action, in response to the arrest of her 
husband.48 Kennedy’s election demonstrated a dynamic that would continue to characterize the 
civil rights-liberal alliance: Black alliance with white liberals worked to the advantage of white 
liberals.  
As Black activists in SNCC and elsewhere in the movement became increasingly 
disillusioned with the idea that they benefitted from this alliance, the power and supremacy that 
civil rights liberalism offered white liberals was threatened. When media, politicians, white 
liberals, and the civil rights establishment targeted “Black Power,” it was in defense of their 
continued power and supremacy permitted by the civil rights-liberal alliance. The actual meaning 
of “Black Power” was less important than the fact that it was a convenient and vulnerable target 
to undermine SNCC’s larger critiques.  
Popular understandings of the civil rights movement often position the spontaneous 
eruption of “Black Power” in June 1966 as a destructive foil that thwarted the promise of hard-
fought civil rights efforts for achieving Black freedom. A closer examination of “Black Power” 
in relation to SNCC’s experiences with liberal allies and the federal government by 1966 expose 
the fissures in this story. The dominant civil rights narrative was largely a creation of the civil 
rights liberal mainstream in 1966, and an attempt to paint over the cracks in the civil rights 
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liberal alliance that SNCC’s experiences and critiques exposed. By 1964, SNCC began to 
recognize a fundamental incompatibility between Black freedom and white liberalism. Though 
the programmatic implications of this would not be realized fully within SNCC until later, it was 
this recognition, rather than the specific meaning of “Black Power,” that presented such a threat 
to the civil rights mainstream. The media consolidation of Black Power into violence, racism, 
and separatism that followed Carmichael’s Greenwood speech was primarily an expression of 
the liberal civil rights mainstream’s attempt to reassert its power in the Black freedom struggle. 
Contrary to claims in the media and among civil rights liberals, “Black Power” was not a 
new concept within SNCC or the Black community in June 1966. Similarly, it was also not a 
full-blown radical philosophy that had anything to do with racism, separatism, or violence. 
Carmichael’s speech became central to media distortion and the historical narrative because of 
the context surrounding the March Against Fear. The march occurred in the wake of SNCC’s 
most explicit rejection of the federal government and in the larger context of SNCC’s political 
shift in relation to the role of white liberal allies in the movement after 1964. The march 
symbolized the de-centering of white liberal interests through on-the-ground organizing and 
Black centrality. It was a Black-led, Black-focused, nationally publicized event, in which the 
most prominent Black collaborators in the civil rights liberal alliance were not in control. 
Though the march ended with national panic about “Black Power,” it was also a testament to the 
possibility of de-centering the interests of white liberals in the movement for Black freedom 
more permanently. This was the threat that SNCC and other advocates of Black-centered 
organizing posed during the March Against Fear; “Black Power” was simply the red herring.  
SNCC’s “Black Power” slogan captured national attention at a moment of heightened 
concern over the Black freedom struggle and its broader implications for race relations in the 
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United States. Many people expected the historic passage of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights 
Acts of 1964 and 1965 to usher in a sense of relief or success in the movement. But liberal civil 
rights efforts had produced little evidence of change in African American lives and Black people 
still lacked economic opportunities and access to political power. New voices began to question 
liberal integration and federal legislation as effective avenues toward Black freedom. A highly 
publicized urban rebellion in Watts, California the previous summer exemplified this shifting 
terrain. White liberals responded to critiques of liberal integration with fear and frustration. 
African Americans seemed angry instead of appeased, which ignited new racist questions about 
African American political “fitness”, and contributed to a general climate of fear and anxiety 
about race in the U.S. Amidst this, Black leaders, politicians, mainstream media, and the general 
public were all trying to make sense of  “the Movement” and what it meant. It was in this context 
that a national audience turned its attention to SNCC’s “Black Power” slogan in June 1966.49 
As a symbol of Black consciousness and political power, Black Power resonated with 
Black audiences politically and psychologically. In this way, “Black Power” was a 
transformative symbol for Black people and important slogan for SNCC. However, it did not 
have the significance that was portrayed in the mainstream media and reproduced in dominant 
historical narratives. The term “Black Power” became so important in these venues in part 
because it made for an easy target: mainstream media and liberal politicians zeroed in on “Black 
Power” as a way to explain some of the more complicated and more destabilizing 
transformations that were happening in the Black freedom struggle. They perpetuated a distorted 
narrative of “Black Power” that preyed on white liberal anxieties by re-directing attention toward 
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themes of violence, racism, and separatism. Though these themes characterized “Black Power” 
inaccurately, this re-direction was nonetheless successful in drawing focus from the larger issues. 
“Black Power” served as an effective lightning rod by absorbing and diffusing the potential 
impact from the critiques of liberalism that were amassing within the Black community and 
within organizations like SNCC while permitting an overly simplistic narrative that could be 
easily contained and dismissed. 
This essay re-centers SNCC’s 1966 call to “Black Power” as an important moment of 
rupture in the Black freedom struggle. It is no coincidence that SNCC’s use of the term “Black 
Power” became so significant at this moment in 1966. It reflected SNCC’s public attempt to 
transition out of a liberal framework, though importantly, not yet into a Black radical one. 
Evidence of this rejection had been building since 1964. Black-led organizing in Lowndes 
County, SNCC’s boycott of the White House conference, and its increasingly public critique of 
the War in Vietnam demonstrated a new public face that rejected, rather than hesitantly 
embraced, efforts from the civil rights liberal alliance. To be sure, SNCC’s embrace of Black 
Power was not exclusively a matter of rejecting national liberal civil rights efforts. Indeed, 
themes like Black consciousness and self-determination were more central elements of SNCC’s 
emerging vision. However, SNCC’s particular public rejection of mainstream liberal politics was 
the most legible to the civil-rights liberal establishment, and thus the most incendiary. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
FRAMING HISTORICAL NARRATIVES OF BLACK POWER AND SNCC 
 
 
SNCC’s organizational trajectory has become a primary example in mainstream 
narratives of the Black freedom struggle to tell the story of what happened to the civil rights 
movement and how it came to be eclipsed by the call for Black Power. Using the framework 
proposed throughout this dissertation, that the civil rights liberal alliance was a defining and 
ultimately limiting aspect of the civil rights movement, this chapter examines some of the 
narratives that have developed about SNCC, civil rights, and Black Power in media and 
mainstream commentary during the 1960s, as well as in the historiography. This chapter focuses 
on two different types of narratives: first, it examines various responses to Black Power that 
emerged in mainstream coverage of SNCC and the Black freedom struggle more broadly during 
1966 and 1967. Then, it examines the historiographical narratives from the past few decades 
about SNCC, Black Power, and particularly, the role of on-the-ground organizing.  
I make a series of interrelated arguments. First I argue that the ways in which Black 
Power and was initially framed in media and mainstream commentary set a standard for now 
dominant narratives of the civil rights movement and Black Power. I point out distinct emphases 
in how African American civil rights leaders and white civil rights allies framed Black Power, 
arguing that those distinctions reveal another way that Black humanity was de-centered from the 
civil rights movement through the civil rights liberal alliance. Next, I turn toward the 
historiography. Though initial histories of the Black freedom struggle followed step with the 
narrative arcs developed in initial responses to Black Power in media, I explore a particular trend 
in the scholarship around SNCC that focused more directly on what was happening on-the-
ground. I argue that a primary way that our historical narratives of SNCC, civil rights, and Black 
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Power continue to implicitly reinforce the civil rights liberal framework is through 
uncomplicated engagement with themes of on-the-ground, local organizing as well as liberalism 
and radicalism. This historiographical analysis seeks to name some of the ways that our current 
historical work perpetuates the predominance of the civil rights liberal alliance and to call for a 
more robust engagement with themes of local, on-the-ground organizing as well as with 
categories of liberalism and radicalism. 
  
Civil Rights Moderates, Press, and the Black Power Narrative 
The movement narratives taken up by media in the wake of Carmichael’s Black Power 
speech in 1966 were the basis for the narratives that were initially offered in movement histories 
of the civil rights movement and emergence of Black power. In them, Black Power was the 
radical foil that ruined the promise of the civil rights movement. These frequently rehearsed 
stories encouraged historiographical associations between a “good”, moral, disciplined, and 
peaceful civil rights movement that was primarily southern, rural, integration-oriented, and 
nonviolent, and the rise of the disruptive, angry, mob-ruled turn toward Black Power, which was 
northern, urban, violent, racist, and separatist. Like the narrative offered by NAACP Executive 
Secretary Roy Wilkins described in the previous chapter, Stokely Carmichael’s speech during 
the March Against Fear is often positioned as the pivot point between these two phases, 
emerging against the backdrop of urban unrest that was becoming increasingly legible in the 
mainstream after the 1965 urban rebellion in Watts, California. Narratives of youthful rage and 
impatience were targeted at northern urban youth and “radical infiltrators”, who were framed as 
disrupting an otherwise promising movement for African American civil rights.  
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 Historian Peniel E. Joseph has described such understandings of Black Power as the civil 
rights movement’s “evil twin,” the enraged enfant terrible that spun the movement into decline. 
Proponents of this narrative have typically derided Black Power by conflating it with radicalism 
and violence, anti-white racism, and separatism. Implicit in this is the assumption that each of 
those individual themes were related to one another and, at the same time, necessarily worthy of 
derision. With only minor variation, these arguments were articulated most directly by moderate 
civil rights leaders and white liberal politicians. This initial framing of Black Power in the 
summer of 1966 has come to dominate popular understandings of Black Power even today.1 
In the weeks following the March Against Fear, Wilkins gave voice to the defamatory 
characterization of SNCC and Black Power that would come to dominate mainstream narratives. 
Though he, Martin Luther King, Jr., and other major civil rights leaders had publicly challenged 
SNCC and their new Black-centered orientation in the month leading up to the famed march, he 
was the first major civil rights leader to seriously denounce Black Power in its wake. He did so 
with ferocity, calling Black Power “the father of hatred and the mother of violence,” claiming it 
was an “open declaration of war” from SNCC and CORE. “It is a reverse Mississippi, a reverse 
Hitler, a reverse Ku Klux Klan.” “It has to mean ‘going it alone’,” he said, “it has to mean 
separatism.” “No matter how endlessly they try to explain it,” he told delegates at the annual 
NAACP convention in July, “the term ‘black power’ means anti-white power.” He noted that 
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“some segments of a beleaguered people” were adopting the Black Power slogan in a “quick, 
uncritical, and highly emotional” fashion. This, he said, “can mean in the end only black death.”2 
The themes that Wilkins emphasized in his comments on Black Power: hatred, violence, 
anti-white racism, separatism, and an emotional, uncritical, death drive, came to define the term 
in popular narratives thereafter. Mainstream media quickly followed course. “If ’Black Power’ is 
not a call to racist violence but a move to separatism, then the slogan is more naïve than 
dangerous,” proclaimed Life. According to a New York Times editorial, Black Power advocates 
were “romantics and would-be revolutionaries for whom the greatest triumph is lying down in 
the street in protest of getting arrested by a southern sheriff.” The term, editors contended, 
“clearly…mean[t] Negro nationalism and separatism along racial lines—a hopeless, futile, 
destructive course expressive merely of a sense of black impotence...”3  
Drawing on comments from Wilkins and other civil rights moderates, mainstream media 
began to deliberately frame “Black Power” in terms of these themes. Historian Todd Gitlin, in 
his analysis of New Left media coverage, explains that what becomes news begins through a 
process of framing: “selection, emphasis and presentation.” In this way, journalists and editors 
used these themes to strategically choose examples and structure articles. As a result, mainstream 
media drew on white liberal fears to effectively consolidate a distorted image of Black Power 
that reduced it to irresponsible radicalism, violence, anti-white racism, and separatism. As media 
historian Jane Rhodes explains, early reporting “situated black power and black nationalism in 
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the national lexicon, and issued a warning to white Americans that a new threat was on the 
horizon.” In her study of the relationship between media and the Black Panther Party, Rhodes 
argues that once the group “became a recognizable media subject through the frames produced 
by mass media, the simple invocation of its name or image was sufficient to call up a host of 
ideas and assumptions about who its members were and what they stood for.” This was true for 
Black Power after 1966 as well. In the absence of an acceptable definition in the mainstream, 
Black Power served as a media target to explain larger shifts that were happening within SNCC, 
and within the Black freedom struggle more broadly. Though violence, racism, and separatism 
did not accurately describe SNCC’s conception of Black Power, they became Black Power’s 
most important descriptors because they were made to be so in public discourse, through 
deliberate framing efforts in the mainstream press.4 
Following Carmichael’s speech, SNCC came to view mainstream media’s continual 
misrepresentations of “Black Power” as deliberate and aggressive. “[T]he torrent of 
attacks…were preemptive strikes,” Carmichael later argued. “Disinformation intended, 
collectively—so it seemed to us, by its volume—to drown out any free or open discussion of the 
idea, the strategy among our people. To impose their definition.”5 In this way, mainstream media 
solidified a perception of Black Power that became more important than the reality. This 
perception had real consequences and lasting effects. 
 
The Civil Rights Liberal Framework in Black and White Responses to Black Power 
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While initial mainstream media coverage of Black Power drew significantly on responses 
from moderate civil rights leaders, it is important to acknowledge a distinction between the 
analyses generally offered by Black leaders and those of white commentators. In spite of Wilkins 
scathing words at the NAACP convention, his perspective also reflected a strategic, movement-
focused emphasis that was fairly particular to African American civil rights leaders. In these 
narratives, the unrealized promise of the civil rights movement was attributed to the destructive 
efforts of arrogant, impatient, and ignorant youth who, in refusing to be strategic, instead made 
poor choices that got in the way of the otherwise promising, albeit slower, process of freedom. 
This “new generation was short on history and long on spleen,” he said. “Negroes had amply 
shown how aware they were of their own political power. None of these things was new. The 
younger people were either ignorant of the long record or they chose to ignore it.”6 Wilkins also 
reflected the common conflation of Black Power with violence and revolution when he 
continued:   
The real question, so far as I was concerned, was whether SNCC and Stokely were after a 
revolution. I had always believed that for American Negroes revolutionary fantasies were 
suicidal. To oppose revolution did not mean to fear whites; I knew that anyone who was 
not cautious in leading a one-tenth minority into conflict with an overwhelming majority 
was a fool. You can face a lion one way when you have real artillery, but if you have a 
powder puff, you have to handle yourself differently—if you want to keep your people 
alive. For all Stokely’s reckless talk of guns and power back then, I still don’t think he 
could tell the difference between a pistol and a powder puff.7 
 
 
This strategic line of argument was not new. In a 1964 interview with Robert Penn 
Warren Wilkins explained: “the Negro in this country is a very practical and pragmatic 
animal...he has never forgotten that he’s a ten percent minority numerically, and economically 
and politically he is a much greater minority than ten percent. So that he does not have the 
                                                
6 Roy Wilkins, Standing Fast, 314, 316. 
7 Ibid., 317. 
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power, except the moral power, to mobilize—how many guns, to put it bluntly—how many guns 
can he get?”8  
  Other less moderate civil rights leaders echoed this strategic emphasis. At an Urban 
League planning session held in Washington DC a few days after Carmichael’s Black Power 
speech, Edwin C. Berry, executive director of Chicago’s Urban League echoed Wilkins’ 
conflation of Black Power with violence and his strategic arguments: “[They] can talk about 
black power, but that’s a juvenile approach,” he said. “These boys who want a shooting war are 
crazy…Even without the morality thing I tell them, ‘Count the guns’.”9 Though Martin Luther 
King, Jr. typically maintained a philosophical and moral allegiance to nonviolence, his 
comments could also emphasize a strategic, rather than a moral disagreement. For example, a 
few weeks prior to the March Against Fear, King previewed the numerical argument made by 
Berry and Wilkins in responding to the SNCC-supported Lowndes County Freedom 
Organization (LCFO), the “Black Panther” party in Alabama. “As a 10 per cent minority in a 
pluralistic society,” he said, “Negroes could not talk ‘realistically about going it alone.’” The 
LCFO “just can’t work on a state level,” he argued, since African Americans only held the 
majority in a few counties.10 
These examples demonstrate how civil rights moderates expressed critiques of Black 
Power that, while rooted in a fundamental faith in the U.S. American system, were not solely in 
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defense of that system but instead, in defense of the predominant strategy of the civil rights 
movement. In this way, while white liberal and conservative narratives of Black Power often 
echoed the critiques launched by civil rights leaders, their relative disinterest in movement 
strategy made their emphases distinct. While they often had significant strategic and ideological 
differences with Black Power advocates, African American civil rights moderates, unlike white 
liberals in media and academia, ultimately shared with the Black Power advocates they opposed 
a more fundamental investment in achieving Black freedom. What distinguished them was how 
and what they imagined that freedom to be. 
White liberal commentators often built their responses to Black Power on analyses from 
civil rights moderates. They launched arguments in support of integration and critiqued Black 
Power for being self-destructive. However, even similar arguments were very different when 
deployed by whites. Claims that Black Power betrayed the spirit of the movement reflected 
paternalism more than a legitimate engagement with the strategies and ideologies of the Black 
freedom struggle.  
One of the most frequent dynamics to emerge in white liberal responses was to use the 
threat of “Black Power” as justification for increased support for integration. In this 
understanding, integration became a way to stave off the impending destruction that “Black 
Power” presented. Building on the initial responses from within the Black freedom struggle, 
some journalists framed Black Power in apocalyptic terms, like in the alarmist opening from 
Washington Post columnist Joseph Alsop: “What will it be like when many, perhaps most, of the 
great cities of America have become huge Negro ghettos, with no more than a dwindling 
minority of white residents who have not fled to the dormitory suburbs?” Signaling a line of 
argumentation that would become increasingly prevalent in white liberal responses, Alsop issued 
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a panicked call to ramp up integration efforts in order to halt the deleterious effects of Black 
Power. “‘Black power’ does not mean the election of Negroes,” Alsop wrote, “The kind of 
‘black power’ that can be foreseen in the ghetto-cities of the future will instead mean 
intensification of race feelings, perpetuation, even deterioration of the ghetto-situation, and 
hideously mounting tensions between America’s white majority and Negro minority. At all costs, 
then, the aim of integration…must be pursued with greater vigor and by more imaginative 
measures.” This type of response to Black Power, and increased support for integration, reflected 
a kind of fundamental paternalism on the part of white liberals who believed that white control of 
Black communities was essential and Black control was necessarily problematic.11 
Other responses reflected a different kind of paternalism. Betrayal of American liberalism 
was the primary marker of Black Power’s moral failure in these narratives. This perspective was 
a very explicit assertion of the liberal civil rights framework, in which white liberal allies, rather 
than Black people, become centered in the struggle for Black freedom. These critiques often try 
to re-assert white liberals as the appropriate arbiters of Black freedom. James Wechsler of the 
New York Post, for example,  “worried that [Black Power advocates] were ‘killing the dream.’ 
He continued, ‘the cause of Civil Rights was floundering’—‘the visions of the freedom 
movement are imperiled’…’some deeply dedicated…men are setting the stage for the 
destruction of the noblest cause of our time.’”12 According to Stokely Carmichael, Weschler’s 
response was typical for many white liberal “allies” of the movement, which reflected a “usual 
hand-wringing and pious condescension.” Framing their concerns about Black Power in a veiled 
language of altruism, white liberals were able to challenge Black Power while still maintaining 
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the appearance of alliance. Their “public distress,” Carmichael recalled, was framed as concern 
about a self-inflicted “irreparabl[e] damage” to the movement and to “our long-suffering 
people’s prospects of ‘acceptance.’” Once again, white liberals held Black Power advocates 
(rather than whites themselves) responsible for any potential backlash. According to Carmichael, 
such framing assumed that “had it not been for those two misaligned, ill-chosen words, 
American society would have transformed itself into a thoroughly integrated, multiracial, color-
blind utopia.”13 
 
We Hold This Shoe: White Narratives of Black Power 
The consolidation of Black Power into themes of violence, racism, and separatism also 
opened space for white liberals to center themselves in the Black freedom struggle by drawing 
links to longstanding northern narratives about southern backwardness. White southern violence, 
racism, and separatism were common themes of civil rights liberalism that morally justified the 
expansion of northern liberal power. By framing Black Power along these same lines, it became 
implicitly associated with the southern racists who they condemned. In effect, white liberals, 
rather than Black people, became the primary defenders of the Black freedom through the 
themes of nonviolence, anti-racism, and integration, and, by extension, of American patriotism. 
It facilitated the potential expansion of white liberal power, economically, socially, and 
politically, couched in the moral rhetoric of Black freedom. 
One explicit example of this link came a year after Carmichael’s Black Power speech, in 
June 1967 when NBC aired a News Special that offered viewers a seemingly needed analysis 
and explanation of Black Power. Entitled, “After Civil Rights…Black Power,” the special turned 
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to Eugene Patterson, white editor of the Atlanta Constitution and vice-chairman of the Civil 
Rights Commission, to provide the nation with expert analysis on Black Power and its 
significance. When asked to define Black Power, Patterson offered the following: “I think Black 
Power was pretty much what Dr. King was preaching five years ago,” he said, “which is political 
unity, get the vote, use the vote, to gain your rights, develop pride in self, develop a sense of 
history, develop a willingness to solve your own problems and stop leaning so much on the white 
man.” Two things are initially noteworthy in Patterson’s definition of Black Power: first, it was 
not negative and second, it did not rely on themes of violence, racism, or separatism. It actually 
echoed many of the themes of Black power offered by SNCC and CORE. However, he also 
framed Black Power as a list of directives (get the vote, develop pride, stop leaning on the white 
man…), which betrayed a pathologizing undercurrent. Further, as soon as he offered this more 
robust, albeit limited, definition, questions about the meaning of Black Power were swept aside 
in the NBC special for the main topics of discussion: condemning violence and celebrating 
American democracy. After rather oddly positioning the national symbol of nonviolence, Martin 
Luther King, as the original voice of Black Power, he then said, “But I think also, that you have 
to stay within certain bounds…”14 
Patterson was known as a champion of civil rights and, more recently, for having sent a 
message to “Negro Extremists” in his weekly columns, warning Black people not to turn to 
violence the same way that white southerners had. This warning was the central theme of the 
entire news special. “I’ve been a little worried about the manifestations of Black Power,” 
Patterson explained, “which indicate that staying within the democratic process is becoming less 
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attractive to the Negro.” He continued: “I experienced this in the white South where the 
difficulty of ending segregation, led many whites…outside the democratic process and into 
violence. I think this led to their self-defeat, I think it always will in this country.”15  
Reflecting a deeply ahistorical and racist liberal logic, Patterson suggested a fundamental 
equivalency between the experience of Black people in the United States and white southern 
racists. Both groups, he suggested, moved toward violence instead of using the democratic 
process, as if both groups had equal access to that democracy. In so doing he equated the Black 
struggle for freedom in the wake of centuries of slavery, widespread disenfranchisement, and 
systematic racialized violence, with Ku Klux Klan-style terror aimed at maintaining white 
supremacy in the South. Patterson continued this flawed logic, claiming that moving away from 
democracy had constituted the “self-defeat” of white southern racists, and would necessarily be 
the self-defeat of Black Power advocates as well. Perhaps drawing allusion to the post-Civil War 
national narrative, the most obvious fallacy here was the claim that white southern racists had 
somehow been defeated. But not surprisingly, Patterson’s logic also reflected the predominant 
liberal framework of the civil rights movement; he limited the legitimate pursuit of African 
American freedom to the same “democratic” processes and institutions that had been responsible 
for centuries of African American enslavement and exploitation.  
These themes deepened when Patterson then referenced the infamous bombing of the 
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, AL that killed four African American girls on 
September 15, 1963. Patterson had gained national attention when he wrote “A Flower for the 
Graves” in the Atlanta Constitution the day after the bombing, which was read aloud on the CBS 
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evening news with Walter Cronkite. The article began with a description of a weeping mother in 
the street in front the church, holding a shoe she had found in the debris that belonged to her 
murdered child. “We hold that shoe with her,” Patterson claimed. The article was a rather 
impassioned condemnation of white southern complacency in the face of systemic racialized 
discrimination and terror. “Every one of us in the white South” is to blame, he said. “We—who 
go on electing politicians who heat the kettles of hate…We—who stand aside in imagined 
rectitude… Let us…match it with the spectacle of shrilling children whose parents and teachers 
turned them free to spit epithets at small huddles of Negro school children for a week before this 
Sunday in Birmingham.” “May [this] hasten the day when the good South…will rise to this 
challenge of racial understanding and common humanity….”16  
Four years later, the NBC news special on Black Power described the central message of 
his famous editorial much differently. Rather than a challenge to the varied forms of white 
complicity in southern racism, the editorial’s primary message had now become that “all of us 
who don’t condemn violence” are responsible. Wielding the memory of the 1963 Birmingham 
bombing with disgusting hubris and paternalism, Patterson told viewers: “I would hope that the 
Negro in America would also remember those days.” He continued: “the democratic process, the 
institutions of this country I think have been sufficient to give a start toward a better break in life 
for the American Negro and I’m convinced will bring him full equality and justice, ultimately.” 
Here, in a callous reversal, Patterson felt empowered to use one of the most notorious moments 
of racialized terror against African Americans in recent history in order to instruct Black people 
to recognize how “sufficient” and promising U.S. institutions and democracy were for the yet 
unrealized achievement of their “full equality and justice.” In the same stroke, Patterson co-opted 
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the memory of the racist murder of the four little girls and used it to both shame Black people 
and also endorse U.S. democracy and its institutions. His final comments on the subject were: 
I recognize his reasons for being impatient. I’m not against impatience, I’m not against 
protest, I’m not against any group in America, certainly the Negro…who has so far to 
come, and I’m not against this man demanding his rights and working toward them, and 
bringing pressures to bear for them, but what I’m saying is, that when you carry any 
group of Americans across the boundary the separates the democratic process from the 
jungle, or when you threaten to burn a city, or shoot a man, when you threaten violence, 
either by implication or outright, then I think you are contributing to the defeat of 
whatever cause, whatever cause, moral or immoral, it is that you are attempting to 
champion.17 
 
Though initially Patterson’s interpretation of Black Power was not negative, the news 
special made it so by framing the discussion of Black Power around the question of violence. In 
effect, like Wilkins, Berry, and King, Patterson’s critique of Black Power became primarily 
strategic. However, this example demonstrates the ways that such strategic challenges functioned 
differently in the narratives developed by Black leaders and white liberals. Imbued almost 
entirely with paternalism and racism, Patterson’s concern about the potential use of violence in 
the Black struggle had nothing to do with effective strategies for liberation, instead it was 
primarily geared toward celebrating the promise of the American democratic process. Further, he 
used a narrative of violence to explicitly link white southern racism together with Black Power. 
The effect was to marginalize Black people from the Black freedom struggle and instead 
centralize white liberals and their institutions and democratic process as the legitimate avenue for 
Black freedom. In this way, by de-centering Black people from his analysis, Patterson’s 
treatment of Black Power reinforced the predominance of the civil rights liberal framework.   
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Media consolidation of Black Power into violence racism and separatism and SNCC into 
nihilistic radicalism fed the logics and strategies of repression that targeted Black Power activists 
and other perceived radicals in full force through state-sponsored terrorism programs such as the 
FBI’s “COINTELPRO.”18 In 1967 the Department of Defense including the Department of 
Army, US Army Intelligence Command, and the FBI developed a counter-intelligence study on 
SNCC. The study expressed the same reductionist logic and arbitrary associations that circulated 
in initial liberal and conservative media analyses. In this framing, SNCC had gone through a 
“transformation” that was “accelerated…when Stokely Carmichael became national 
chairman…[and] popularized his slogan, ‘Black Power,’ which to him meant ‘bringing this 
country to it knees’ and using ‘any force necessary’ to attain Negro goals.” “The switch,” the 
report contended, “changed SNCC from the traditional-type civil rights organization to a militant 
anti-white hate group.” Demonstrating an underlying racism and paternalism similar to 
Patterson, the Department of Defense explained SNCC’s “switch” in more detail:  “By 1965, 
SNCC had renounced its policy of non-violence and integration to advocate political and 
economic power for the Negro and to agitate against the United States involvement in Vietnam.” 
That “political and economic power for the Negro” was presented as a marker of SNCC’s new 
militancy without explanation, modification, or caveat demonstrates quite plainly that Black 
pursuit of political and economic power was inherently unacceptable to the state.19 
SNCC’s activities were also seen primarily in relation to their perceived position on 
violence. SNCC’s earlier voter registration work, for example, was necessarily linked to the 
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group’s status as a nonviolent civil rights organization, as if voter registration activism was only 
imaginable as an expression of nonviolence. The framing of a “switch” put policies of 
integration and nonviolence in relation to “political and economic power for the Negro” and 
opposition to “the United States involvement in Vietnam.” While neither of these themes had 
anything to do with SNCC’s strategic or tactical position on integration or nonviolence, the 
report nevertheless understood them in this way. Rather than justify this perceived connection, 
the Department of Defense presented them without explanation. Thus, SNCC’s investment in 
Black political and economic power, as well as opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, 
appeared to depend on them renouncing nonviolence and integration. With no actual connection 
to the question of violence, these positions were read, simply by association, as an expression of 
violence and of SNCC’s transformation from a “traditional-type civil rights organization to a 
militant anti-white hate group.”20 
 
SNCC and Black Power in Historical Narrative 
I highlight this initial consolidation of Black Power into themes of violence, racism, and 
separatism through media and mainstream commentators in order to emphasize the continuities 
between initial responses from white liberal allies and the historical narratives that our current 
scholarship engages and produces. Our current narratives are, just as these initial narratives were, 
part of a historical moment with real political, ideological, and personal consequences. Media 
narratives, like Patterson’s, had both implicit and explicit assumptions about which strategies and 
visions of Black freedom were legitimate. These were reflected in similar logics of legitimacy 
employed in the service of state repression during the sixties and seventies, as in Department of 
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Defense report on SNCC in 1967. They were also echoed in popular historical memory of Black 
Power as scholars matched the efforts of sixties era journalists and politicians to frame the civil 
rights movement and its “evil twin.” Historian Allen J. Matusow, for example, describes “black 
protest in the 1960s” as moving “from liberal hope to radical disillusionment.” 
Misrepresentations of Black Power emerged from a variety of neoconservative and liberal 
historical sources in the seventies, eighties, and onward, extending the paternalistic and racist 
undercurrents within mainstream media and liberal popular responses. As historian Cedric 
Johnson explains, “These texts merely inscribed in an academic language the fears and reactions 
to sixties counterculture, expressed decades earlier by the pioneers of the New Right.”21  
The failed Black Power/righteous civil rights dichotomy often emerged in scholarship 
that was identified in an early historiographical essay by historian Steven F. Lawson as the first 
wave in civil rights movement historiography.22 This first wave of scholarship solidified what is 
now the traditional periodization of the civil rights movement, beginning with the 1954 Brown 
vs. Board of Education decision or the Montgomery Bus Boycott the following year. Top-down, 
national narratives centered on the heroism of charismatic leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. 
and often framed the movement’s success in relationship to the efforts of white liberal allies in 
politics, media, and mainstream institutions.23  
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Most of the successive trends in movement scholarship that have emerged within the last 
three decades are a response to this first wave of scholarship. A second generation sought to 
remodel the top-down, national-focus in the historiography by turning their attention toward 
local communities, grassroots organizations, lesser-know leaders, and the experiences of rank-
and-file community activists. In this regard, historians Charles Payne and John Dittmer 
exemplify this locally rooted, community-oriented focus in their respective studies of civil rights 
organizing in Mississippi. In a similar fashion, historians Clayborne Carson and Wesley C. 
Hogan challenged prevailing trends by drawing their focus to the internal organizational 
dynamics within SNCC. Other scholars took a slightly different approach, which Lawson calls 
the interactive model. These scholars turned their attention to themes of struggle and dialectic 
within the movement, between local and national, social and political, external and internal, 
examining them in relationship to one another.24 
Out of this growth, a more forgiving set of narratives has emerged in the historical 
discussion of SNCC and Black Power. The detail with which these scholars examine civil rights 
organizing and SNCC in particular, provide important amendments to the dichotomous civil 
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rights/Black Power narratives that were established after 1966. They provide a more complicated 
response to those who take up the simple narrative that Wilkins’ assessment of the March 
Against Fear was the divisive moment of the movement. In these narratives, Sellers’ watershed 
moment at the Democratic National Convention in 1964, which was discussed in the previous 
chapter, becomes much more prominent. Scholarship that has turned inward to the local and 
organizational levels of analysis complicate our historical understanding of SNCC and its 
relationship to Black Power by emphasizing the period between these two moments of rupture in 
1964 and 1966 to explain what happened to SNCC and the movement.  
Locally- and internally-focused historical narratives of SNCC attend to questions of 
rupture, civil rights liberalism, and Black Power by focusing their attention on the period 
between 1964 and 1966. Disillusionment with liberal allies in the civil rights mainstream and 
federal government after 1964; internal struggles after Freedom Summer over the role of whites 
and middle-class northerners; questions of decision-making, authority, and organizational 
structure; burnout; fatigue; and dissension from the ranks all contribute to the understanding of 
SNCC’s changing relationship to the civil rights movement in these narratives. Rather than a 
racist, violent, and separatist takeover, Black Power emerges in with much more complexity and 
nuance. These narratives hold white liberal allies within SNCC and within the broader political 
sphere much more accountable for contributing to and even creating the complicated set of 
internal tensions, political disillusionment, and fatigue that developed in the organization. They 
point out the difficult political position that SNCC activists were in after 1964, and the 
immensity of the challenge they faced trying to overcome the changing internal and external 
political landscape. They also explain the emergence of Black Power as a product of SNCC’s 
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experience and political development in ways that challenge narratives of inexperienced, outside 
radical infiltrators. In general, these narratives are far more forgiving though rarely celebratory.  
However, though the closer level of focus within these narratives appears to provide an 
alternative to the Black Power “evil twin” trajectory, in effect, they tell the same story. While 
they demonstrate that the emergence of Black Power in SNCC was complicated, these narratives 
nonetheless frame SNCC’s, and the broader grassroots civil rights movement’s, organizational 
decline around it. They did this not just in spite of, but through their emphasis on internal 
transformation. As Carson explains, they were “weakened by internal dissension.” Payne 
elaborates: “Between the fall of 1964 and the spring of 1966, SNCC was[…] in an atmosphere of 
mutual distrust and recriminations, a deteriorating social climate that would ultimately lead to 
SNCC members threatening one another with weapons, to members calling the police to settle 
disputes among themselves, to the members of one faction ‘firing’ all the members of another 
faction and being ‘fired’ by them in turn.” As “speechifiers outshouted organizers,” Wesley C. 
Hogan contends, “The rhetorical style loosened within SNCC got in the way of patiently and 
persistently growing leaders at the grass roots.” While individuals would still organize, SNCC as 
a group was not focused on “working with people at the base.” The move from program to 
rhetoric, from locally-oriented community work to internal divisions and power grabs, from a 
beloved community to an angry dysfunctional family, from building community with local 
people to advancing their individualistic pursuits, these became the primary sites of analysis for 
SNCC’s decline. The shorthand was that they had changed, and in doing so they had abandoned 
their roots.25 
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Abandoning roots became the way that defamatory interpretations of radicalism, 
violence, racism and separatism became re-centered in the narrative. While the push toward 
becoming an all-Black organization is explained as a product of SNCC’s experiences, it is 
simultaneously a signal that SNCC had abandoned its earlier roots as an interracial organization. 
Though the turn away from philosophical and even strategic nonviolence was presented as a 
rational response to perpetual exposure to violence in combination with limited federal 
protection, it was nonetheless a sign of SNCC abandoning its early values. As Carson explained, 
“SNCC hastened its own decline by losing touch with its roots in the deep South.” Perhaps the 
theme in this scholarship that was most clearly a distinction from initial responses to Black 
Power was in how they presented liberal allies. These scholars presented the limits of the federal 
government and other white liberal allies very plainly, even justifying SNCC’s increasing 
unwillingness to work with them after Atlantic City. However, none of these narratives fully 
engaged the implications of this. Instead, the limits of their former liberal allies became the 
backdrop for analyzing the other ways in which SNCC had abandoned its roots internally.26 
In this way, abandoning their roots became the primary explanation for SNCC’s decline 
and while pieces of this narrative were presented as more complicated, the conclusion remained 
the same: interracialism to anti-white racism and separatism, nonviolence to violence, and 
working within liberalism to its radical rejection together populated the declensionist narrative of 
civil rights to Black Power in SNCC. “[T]he transition from the Beloved Community to Black 
Power,” Payne claimed, “was accompanied by a jettisoning of some of the moral and social 
anchors that had helped regulate relationships among activists when SNCC was in its 
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community-organizing phase.”27 Implicitly, they suggested that had the organization maintained 
its earlier values and programmatic emphases, the movement would not have declined. Though 
these histories of SNCC were complex and detailed, a far cry from the reductionist 
characterizations in media and neoconservative interpretations, the emphasis on programmatic 
decline kept these historians in conversation with movement repressors. Foreshadowing their 
declensionist narratives, the Department of Defense reported, “In May, 1967, Carmichael 
relinquished his National Chairman position in SNCC ostensibly to return to Negro problems as 
a field worker, however, he has remained in the lime-light and has not returned to field work in 
Washington, D.C., as he indicated at the time of his resignation.”28 
A primary limit of these narratives is their minimal engagement with SNCC after 1966. 
This oversight is fueled by their declensionist perspective and argument: SNCC was not relevant 
in the same way after their period of apparent decline, which would therefore not warrant 
scholarly attention. Further, if SNCC’s primary organizational value was their locally-oriented, 
community-organizing focus, then if these narratives perceived them to have abandoned that 
focus, this would become the end of the story. With the exception of Carson, most of these 
historians do not even attempt to engage SNCC in a substantive way after 1966. Wesley C. 
Hogan’s narrative is particularly striking in this regard. Her detailed analysis of SNCC’s “golden 
era” ends rather explicitly at the conference in Waveland in November 1964, with only a few 
concluding gestures to the rest of SNCC’s history. There were “many who tried to deflect 
quarrels in the name of preserving SNCC’s focus on the grass roots in the towns and hamlets of 
the South,” she explained. “After 1965, in every locale except SNCC’s cutting-edge outposts in 
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Lowndes County, Alabama, all of the [people] working at the base of southern society had found 
their actions effectively blunted….By the end of 1966 SNCC ceased, in any programmatic sense, 
to exist.”29 
As Hogan explicitly demonstrates, SNCC’s perceived declension in these narratives is 
often framed as a product of programmatic de-emphasis that developed after 1964, and 
positioned in relation to the emergence of Black Power. However, this narrative ignores the 
continual programmatic flux within SNCC, including periods where local projects were 
numerous and periods when they were less so, between 1961 and 1964. In this sense, there was 
actually a programmatic continuity within SNCC throughout its organizational life as SNCC 
continued to emphasize local community projects well into the 1970s. However, what these 
narratives miss in particular is that Black Power, rather than a signal of decline, was actually a 
marker of programmatic re-emphasis within the ebb and flow of SNCC’s organizing work. As 
historian Hasan Kwame Jeffries has demonstrated, Black Power was rooted in a new organizing 
program adopted by SNCC in May 1966 based on their work in Lowndes County, Alabama. 
Rather than turn away from the organizing tradition, Jeffries illustrates that Black Power was 
actually the most explicit assertion of a programmatic vision to emerge in three years. The 
absence of this analysis in declension narratives stems in part from their limited critical 
engagement with SNCC after 1964.30 
While SNCC scholars have both implicitly and explicitly critiqued Black Power,  they 
have been less likely to critically engage with SNCC’s relationships to liberalism and radicalism. 
Instead, locally- and internally-focused declensionist narratives have been more likely to 
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disengage from questions of political orientation, affiliation or ideology. Sometimes this has 
manifested in very little discussion of SNCC in terms of radicalism, revolution, liberalism, or 
militancy. But it could also manifest as the opposite. Carson’s In Struggle, for example, 
describes SNCC as a radical and militant organization throughout the entire narrative: “At first 
their radicalism took the form of an insistence that the federal government and its liberal leaders 
use their power to protect and assist SNCC workers and the southern blacks with whom they 
worked,” he claimed. Later, in a rather odd reversal of standard narratives of radicalism in 
SNCC, Carson describes that “SNCC staff scattered like seeds in the wind after their radicalism 
no longer found fertile ground in the southern struggle….Some have continued to affirm SNCC’s 
radical values; others have not.” Unlike Matusow or Wilkins, this group of historians does not 
have an explicit critique of radicalism. In the case of Carson, SNCC’s radicalism is celebrated. 
However, by uncomplicatedly celebrating the presence of radicalism during SNCC’s “golden 
era” within an otherwise critical declensionist narrative, they fail to effectively engage with the 
concept of radicalism.31 
In some ways it is not surprising that the histories most invested in the internal dynamics 
and voices from those within SNCC would take this approach to radicalism. This sense of 
radicalism was a narrative promoted by people in SNCC as well. As Carson explained about 
SNCC in 1961, “A measure of the new spirit of militancy among SNCC workers was their use of 
the term revolutionary as a self-description.”32 In a June 1964 staff meeting, SNCC workers 
discussed the political implications of the upcoming MFDP challenge, framing it as a “radical 
program.” Presaging a line of argumentation that would characterize the pursuit of Black 
electoral politics during and after the height of the Black Power era, their estimation was that by 
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“trying to gain…leverage within the structure,” they had the potential to “change the structure.”33 
SNCC workers were often deeply invested in their perception of themselves and the perception 
of them in the outside world as the most radical of the civil rights organizations. They believed 
they were breaking new ground and doing what no one else had done. Though it is not 
uncommon for organizations to imagine themselves as part of a radical vanguard, this 
perspective was more significant in understanding the story of SNCC than has been given 
attention. In part this was because SNCC’s self-perception limited their ability to see the multiple 
ways that they were deeply imbedded in the liberal civil rights framework. Even when they 
explicitly rejected liberalism in their rhetoric and through their organizational alliances, they 
failed to recognize the extent to which they were still enmeshed within liberalism. 
The relationship between liberalism and radicalism within SNCC was complicated and 
unclear, even (or perhaps especially) to those within the organization. However, SNCC’s 
longtime Executive Secretary James Forman recognized this. In explaining his desire for SNCC 
to become a more fully-realized revolutionary organization at the end of 1964 he said:  
This is not to negate the fact that the work SNCC had done was, in its time and place, 
revolutionary. We were not struggling for the vote as an end in itself, but to attain human 
dignity. And any struggle for dignity is revolutionary. SNCC was a pacesetter, a 
vanguard, in the early 1960s and would continue to be one. But it is possible to do 
revolutionary work in certain situations without being revolutionary. This was what 
SNCC as a whole had done until then, and we had reached the point where it was 
necessary to become a revolutionary organization in every sense. I thought SNCC would 
grow to see that need. But I failed to see clearly enough my own responsibility for 
sharing my dreams and infusing others with my spirit of organization. I also 
underestimated the danger of certain contradictions inherent in SNCC.34  
 
The effects of this absence of critical engagement with liberalism and radicalism within SNCC 
has gone under-acknowledged.  
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Narratives of Radicalism and Local Organizing in Black Power Scholarship 
Black Power scholarship that has emerged in the past two decades has often continued 
this trend in movement scholarship. While recognizing the contribution of earlier civil rights 
movement scholars like Carson, Dittmer, and Payne, much of this scholarship also sought to 
challenge the declensionist tendencies in earlier civil rights movement histories. In their attempt 
to vindicate Black Power, parts of this scholarship have tended toward uncritically celebratory 
narratives of the emergence of Black Power in and out of SNCC. As Cedric Johnson aptly notes, 
“Much of the writing on Black Power that emerged during the late nineties attempts to vindicate 
sixties radical politics against its various critics and misrepresentations.” But, he says, “The 
neoconservative ideological campaign to bury the memory of sixties black radicalism has had the 
effect of stalling the development of a critical orientation in the reparative literature on Black 
Power.”35 In an attempt to counter the massive maligning of Black Power in mainstream 
narratives, Black Power scholarship tended toward a rather uncritical and celebratory 
interpretation of Black Power understood in terms of radicalism. Though many Black Power 
groups did embrace a radical framework, Black Power scholars have fallen into the same trend as 
Carson of collapsing too much into the category. 
Claiming that “[t]he main thrust of Black Power politics was radical in orientation,” 
historian Peniel Joseph explains: 
This is to say that Black Power activists argued that American society needed to be 
fundamentally altered, rather than reformed. This radicalism was reflected in the politics 
of a broad range of historical actors and organizations that were black nationalists, 
Marxists, pan-Africanists, trade unionists, feminists, liberals, or a combination of all or 
some of these tendencies. Additionally, small strains of black conservatives also were 
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attracted to Black Power’s call for self-determination and promotion of black business, 
self-help, and entrepreneurship.36 
 
Besides defining the distinction of a radical orientation with two synonyms: “alter” and 
“reform,” Joseph’s list of acceptably radical tendencies includes categories that are just as likely 
to contain elements that are not radical (feminist, trade unionist, black nationalist, etc.). 
However, the most surprising part of the list is his inclusion of liberals. This betrays a common 
tendency that has emerged in Black Power literature in which Black Power comes to stand in for 
radical politics, regardless of what the politics within Black Power are. His addendum with Black 
conservatives in his definition demonstrates this.  
Scholars have aggressively pointed to the pursuit of Black electoral politics and 
institution building as a defense of Black Power politics against declension claims that Black 
Power, and SNCC as a particularly good example, failed because of their emphasis on rhetoric 
and ideology over program. However, in the process they have subsumed the pursuit of Black 
controlled politics (first outside of the two-party system but later within it) within a fuzzy frame 
of Black Power radicalism. In this way, similar to Carson’s description of SNCC as always 
radical, these narratives conflate Black Power and radicalism such that the pursuit of Black 
electoral politics and even certain expressions of Black capitalism can be understood as radical. 
The fact of Black-centeredness in these narratives has come to stand in for a radical ideology or 
political program.  
In the same vein, other versions of Black Power scholarship have simply removed a 
dialogue about radical politics from the discussion entirely. In these tendencies, celebrations of 
Black Power politics become celebrations of Black political participation in U.S. politics, 
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including Black political alliance with white liberals. In the context of SNCC’s history, this 
unearths a painful irony: the notion of Black Power emerged in direct relationship to a 
disinvestment with civil rights liberalism and liberal allies. However, some of the narratives that 
have emerged in Black Power scholarship have since elided this recognition in an effort to 
legitimate Black Power as a programmatic success.  
Cedric Johnson responds to this trend in Black Power politics since the 1960s, arguing 
that we need to move beyond either vindicating or demonizing black radical politics. Instead, he 
posits, “black ethnic politics has run its course as an effective means to confront inequality.” 
Johnson agrees with critiques from historians Robin D.G. Kelley and Peniel Joseph that 
movement histories have often overemphasized questions of “failure”. However, he says, “The 
social fluidity, disruptive politics, and idealism that characterized the civil rights and black 
radical political tendencies of the fifties and the sixties dissipated as movement energies were 
channeled toward conventional pluralist politics.” In this sense, he argues, there are both 
“scholarly and political ramifications” in addressing questions of decline and failure. In 
particular, he claims, “prospects for developing viable opposition hinge on how well intellectuals 
and activists understand the historical processes that created our current political conditions.”37 
Drawing on the experience of former SNCC members, including Ruby Doris Robinson, 
Phil Hutchings, and Gwendolyn Patton, Robinson argues that many Black activists have 
“spoke[n] out against prevailing orthodoxies within Black Power discourse” and “decried the 
retreats from purposive political action to ideological education, from participatory democratic 
formats to cults of personality, and from interracialism to ethnic politics.” Offering an alternative 
to what he calls “race-first politics,” Johnson claims that the contemporary political moment is 
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“inadequate as an antidote to hierarchy and exploitation” and instead argues for “the instigation 
of popular, democratic struggles that are shaped by the everyday concerns and interests of 
working people and seek to transcend the culture and institutions of neoliberal capital.”38  
In calling for a critical engagement with Black Power, however, Johnson has effectively 
reasserted the exact themes celebrated in the declension narratives that much of the Black Power 
scholarship sought to undo. His critical analysis of Black radical politics since the sixties helps 
frame some of the contours of a necessary discussion about the challenges that liberation 
struggles face. However, rather than actually calling for a more critical engagement with how 
interracial, participatory, action-oriented programs can function within a radical framework, 
Johnson simply reasserts them as the solution. In effect, the analytic message is not substantially 
different from that of Payne, Hogan, or Carson, who mobilized the same arguments to 
delegitimize Black Power.  
Matthew Countryman’s Up South also celebrates a return to participatory democracy and 
locally-led community projects, though he differs from Johnson on his view of Black politics. 
His detailed history of civil rights and Black Power struggles in Philadelphia examines the 
interactions of Black Power, postwar liberalism, and Black electoral politics. Countryman argues 
that in Philadelphia at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, a “new generation of activists turned 
to the principles of community-based leadership, participatory democracy, and racial self-
determination to replace liberalism’s faith in antidiscrimination laws, technocratic government, 
and the New Deal coalition.” “At its most fundamental,” he argues, “Black Power in 
Philadelphia challenged the decision-making structures that controlled public and private 
investment in the city.” While Countryman celebrates this development, the story in Philadelphia 
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is similar to the story in SNCC: “A decade after it began, the Black Power movement dissipated 
as African Americans experienced a series of clear lessons about the limitations of their ability to 
change public policy at the national and local level. Black Power suffered a number of strategic 
missteps. Most important, it never developed a feasible strategy, either political or revolutionary, 
for achieving control of political institutions in the black community. However, neither its 
strategic weaknesses nor the confrontational way it sought to renegotiate cross-racial relations 
were the primary cause of its failure. At root, Black Power advocates were never able to 
convince other elements of the New Deal coalition to bear the cost of its agenda for racial 
justice.”39  
Though Countryman’s story suggests fertile ground for interrogating the function of 
participatory democracy and community-based leadership, his conclusions instead return to an 
unproblematized engagement with the very strategies and practices he positions at the center of 
the struggle. In this way, Countryman and Johnson demonstrate a trend toward fetishizing 
participatory democracy and community-based leadership. Instead of fetishizing programs, as 
was the case in other instances of Black Power scholarship, they return to the fetish of local 
community action that existed in previous declensionist narratives.  
Rather than interrogating the fetishization and romanticization of local organizing, 
participatory democracy, and self-determined contours of struggle that undergird many of the 
movement’s declensionist narratives, Black Power scholarship seems to be moving in the 
opposite direction. Those who are doing the important work of challenging the function and 
efficacy of Black electoral politics as a programmatic strategy for liberation run the risk of 
uncritically re-valorizing local struggles and participatory democracy in the same way that 
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locally- and internally-oriented scholars did two decades ago. It seems that what is needed is a 
more critical, more precise analytic engagement with effective ideologies, strategies, goals, and 
tactics. To be clear, this is not an attempt to discard locally determined projects, community 
control, or participatory democracy as legitimate practices or values in our liberation struggles. 
In fact, the goal is the opposite. In order to make use of them as a way to move forward, we must 
explore them as fully as we can. Without critically engaging these concepts, we are doomed to 
repeat the mistakes of the past. SNCC’s experience within civil rights liberalism as it functioned 
organizationally, interpersonally, and internally, demonstrates the need to think critically and act 
differently in relation to how power functions within our liberation struggles.    
 
Conclusion 
Putting this discussion of Black Power scholarship more directly in conversation with the 
histories of SNCC, I propose that civil rights and Black Power historians have not effectively 
engaged a discussion of how liberalism and radicalism functioned within SNCC. Rather than a 
marker of radicalism, SNCC’s embrace of Black Power in 1966 represented a public break with 
the civil rights liberal alliance. The distinction is that this break was not initially accompanied by 
a developed radical program or framework. Further, because of the complex ways that liberalism 
functioned within SNCC as well as outside of it, this break was necessarily incomplete.  
One of the limits of declensionist narratives in SNCC and the movement more broadly is 
their tendency to focus on internal factors as an explanation for changes in the movement. 
Abandoning previous values and programmatic commitments explains the relative decline in 
activism in the later part of the seventies, which in effect minimizes critical engagement with the 
role of “COINTELPRO” and other kinds of state-sponsored repression. However, even if we 
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leave aside questions of state repression, internally focused narratives of declension still miss the 
mark.  
SNCC’s continued relationship to liberalism (rather than a decline in programs) better 
accounts for the eventual dissolution of SNCC. SNCC’s inability to get outside of the liberal 
civil rights framework, even after they publicly rejected this framework, stymied the 
organization’s effectiveness. Rather than a departure from SNCC’s organizational past, the same 
limits of liberalism that had existed within early SNCC continued into the Black Power era.  
SNCC’s initial Black Power program was not radical. Their public emphasis on themes 
of Black consciousness and self-determination coupled with their explicit assertion of Black-
centered struggle represented an important psychological break with the mores of civil rights 
liberalism. However, their pursuit of Black independent political, cultural, and economic 
institutions initially demonstrated a consistency with the liberal framework: a form of ethnic 
pluralism rather than a realized radical program. Though the emphasis on Black consciousness, 
pride, history, and culture has come under criticism for its role in de-politicizing and de-
radicalizing Black Power, I contend that this emphasis was an important and transformative 
development within SNCC because it facilitated the organizational transition out of civil rights 
liberalism. Black-centeredness was not inherently radical. Instead, publicly centering Black 
people in the Black freedom struggle was part of how SNCC articulated a desire to break with 
liberalism. 
Because Black Power was interpreted to be an expression of radicalism in mainstream 
responses, and because many in SNCC imagined it as an expansion of their already radical 
politics, SNCC’s break with civil rights liberalism came to be recognized as an expression of 
Black radicalism. This limited analysis has reverberated because of how significant SNCC’s 
 208	
organizational transformation from civil rights to Black Power has been in broader narratives of 
the movement. The initial scholarship on civil rights and Black Power reiterated the media’s 
conflation of Black Power into violence, racism, and separatism and used its association with 
Black radicalism as a way to vilify Black Power. Subsequent scholarship that sought to vindicate 
Black Power from claims of programmatic decline has also contributed to this misinterpretation 
by emphasizing Black Power era programs as a signal of SNCC’s radical programmatic focus. In 
this way, both celebratory and defamatory narratives of Black Power in SNCC have conflated its 
initial articulation with Black radicalism. In effect, these narratives have obscured both the 
significance of SNCC’s public break with liberalism and also the limits of not having a radical 
program. 
The period between Sellers’ turning point at Atlantic City in August 1964 and Wilkins’ 
turning point in Mississippi June 1966 represented a crucial time in which SNCC tried to make 
sense of its relationship to the civil rights liberal framework. In this period of transformation a 
potential radical framework could have emerged within SNCC but did not. In this sense, both 
Sellers and Wilkins are correct: SNCC recognized having been abandoned by its liberal allies 
and subsequently, SNCC’s Black Power slogan expressed a programmatic and ideological desire 
to reject civil rights liberalism in turn. Though Black Power was an explicit, public split with 
liberalism, it ultimately reflected a desire for a radical alternative more than its realization. In this 
way, SNCC’s long-term investment in the liberal framework has gone under-acknowledged. This 
point of analysis could help us tell the story of what happened to SNCC after 1966. It suggests 
we might be better served by framing SNCC’s organizational end not as a product of emerging 
radicalism but instead in relation to the continued presence of liberalism. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Though defamatory narratives of Black power as the “evil twin” of the civil rights 
movement have become increasingly outmoded, their specter remains in our popular narratives 
of the mid-century Black freedom struggle. More sympathetic accounts of the shift from civil 
rights to Black Power in SNCC often demonstrate the devastating impact of the MFDP betrayal 
at the Democratic National Convention in 1964 and the accompanying realization within the 
organization that liberal allies and the federal government had abandoned the struggle. Perhaps 
more accurately, they were never allied with the struggle in the first place.  
SNCC’s changing relationship to the federal government and white liberal allies after 
1964 impacted SNCC significantly, but this was not the source of its decline. These chapters 
start from the premise that taken individually, each of the dominant themes that are stressed in 
declensionist narratives of SNCC do not actually map onto the main narrative of decline that 
they purport. SNCC’s organizational relationship to white activists within the struggle became a 
source of contention within SNCC as early as 1962 and continued to be unresolved well after the 
infamous expulsion of whites in December 1966. Their growing awareness of the limits of 
mainstream civil rights organizations and liberal allies began even earlier, at least by 1961, and 
the implications of this were never resolved within SNCC. Debates and divisions over the 
strategic value of nonviolence and armed self-defense were present from SNCC’s organizational 
beginnings and while mainstream responses targeted this a primary site of organizational 
breakdown, internally, strategic questions around nonviolence did not take up nearly the kind of 
space they have been given in our historical narratives. The same set of ongoing internal 
challenges that SNCC faced before 1964 continued well after. After SNCC’s embrace of the 
Black Power slogan; after the organization’s decision to become all Black; after the election of 
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H. Rap Brown as Chairman: it was not new but old tensions that threatened the organization’s 
continuation. 
Initial declensionist narratives painted a rather simplistic picture of SNCC’s decline, but 
the more historically attentive versions (those that have spent time examining SNCC activists’ 
own perceptions) point to a shift from a programmatic to a rhetorical focus in SNCC’s 
organizational emphases as a signal of its deterioration. Among SNCC’s primary legacies is how 
they have come to influence activists’ and scholars’ valuation of local organizing both 
historically and in the present moment. SNCC in particular has become a main conduit in Black 
freedom histories to demonstrate the importance of local organizing. This comes from liberal and 
radical perspectives alike. As the last chapter suggested, the historiographical emphasis on local 
organizing as the solution for achieving Black freedom has remained under-theorized and under-
interrogated in our dominant histories of the Black freedom struggle. Instead, it is more often 
romanticized. As a result, rather than interrogating how local organizing functioned, what it 
looked like, felt like, what it’s challenges were, how it operated in different places, how it 
changed over time, and most significantly, what power dynamics were operating to limit the 
pursuit of freedom at the local level, our historical narratives more often point to local organizing 
as the uncomplicated solution to the problem of anti-Blackness and racism in the United States.  
SNCC’s relationship to effective local organizing programs was much more directly 
significant for the organization’s trajectory than questions of nonviolence, the role of whites, and 
the role of mainstream institutions. However, this relationship does not map onto the timeline 
most often promoted in declensionist narratives. This project argues that while SNCC has 
become a primary symbol of successful on-the-ground local organizing in the Black freedom 
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struggle, SNCC’s own history illustrates the dire need for deeper interrogation into how local 
organizing functions in a broader social movement context.  
As I demonstrated in Chapter 3, internal power dynamics within SNCC’s on-the-ground 
campaigns, and relationships between SNCC activists and local community members in the deep 
South had a significant impact on the success, sustainability, and political trajectory of the local 
campaigns and broader movement. SNCC activists were being radicalized through their on-the-
ground work both through the lessons they learned from rural, southern, and less formally 
educated local people and also through their perennially disappointing experiences with the 
federal government and white liberal allies in mainstream media and the broader culture. And 
yet, at the same moment, SNCC activists had to recognize that their changing politics were not 
necessarily reflected in the local communities in which they worked. As SNCC activists began 
turning away from the federal government and mainstream liberals as their allies, they did so in 
the name of solidarity with local people, who they saw being tokenized or cut out of the 
decision-making process. Yet “local people” were often less likely than SNCC activists to carry 
such a strong critique, and in fact, often saw gaining federal support and access to the 
mainstream political process as a primary goal.  
So what did it mean that the same “local people” who SNCC activists championed were 
much more open to working with the federal government, soliciting support from mainstream 
liberal allies, and trusting in their promises? What did it mean that some “local people” still 
wanted to work with the federal government when veteran activists in SNCC had had enough? 
Though SNCC activists labored over these questions among themselves, the always-changing 
political context of the movement forced them to also look ahead. Over time, SNCC began to 
work through these questions. Their best answer was Black Power. 
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Historical narratives have often framed the advent of Black Power in SNCC as 
abandoning local on-the-ground organizing for a more rhetorical approach that above all 
antagonized mainstream liberals and media. In these formulations, the shift in SNCC’s national 
leadership from John L. Lewis to Stokely Carmichael in 1966 coincided with the shift from civil 
rights to Black Power, and symbolized the shift from local grassroots organizing campaigns to 
national media spectacles. But within SNCC at the time, as historians such as Hasan Kwame 
Jeffries have pointed out, something entirely different was going on. For activists in SNCC, John 
L. Lewis had been primarily a national, mainstream civil rights figure who stood next to “Big 
six” leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr., Roy Wilkins, and A. Philip Randolph. More than 
anything, these leaders spoke for the movement: they gave speeches, framed media narratives, 
and made public appearances. Stokely Carmichael, on the other hand, reflected exactly where 
SNCC was in 1966, and where they wanted to be. He had cut his teeth leading one of SNCC’s 
most exciting on-the-ground organizing campaigns in Lowndes County, Alabama. While 
SNCC’s local campaigns had struggled with the contradictions inherent in mobilizing Black 
people to vote for national Democratic candidates, Carmichael was leading the formation of a 
Black-led alternative political party in Lowndes County. For many in SNCC, the election of 
Carmichael represented a new phase and a deepening of their commitment to local, on-the-
ground organizing, not its abandonment.1 
However, mainstream narratives typically look to the public media spectacle surrounding 
Black Power, and the ways that Carmichael in particular engaged and responded to it, to solidify 
a narrative that located Black Power outside of SNCC’s “golden era” of local organizing. 
Instead, they reinforce the notion that Black Power was the destructive foil to the promise of the 
                                                
1 Hasan Kwame Jeffries, “SNCC, Black Power, and Independent Political Party Organizing in 
Alabama, 1964-1966,” Journal of African American History 91:2 (Spring 2006). 
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civil rights movement.  Yet as the examination of the March Against Fear in Chapter 4 has 
illustrated, the birth of the Black Power slogan in the U.S. Black freedom movement occurred in 
a Black-led, Black-defined, Black-oriented local, on-the-ground organizing context. The march 
itself was a manifestation of what Black Power was to SNCC in 1966, and this was deeply local, 
grassroots, and oriented toward organizing. 
Rather than a simple transition from an organization that put primacy on local programs 
to one that prioritized media, image, and rhetoric, SNCC’s relationships to these elements were 
always interconnected and fraught. SNCC was no less committed to local programs in 1967 than 
they were in 1963. But the political context in each moment was distinct enough that SNCC’s 
implementation of their organizational goals and capacity to implement those goals looked very 
different.  
This dissertation contends that SNCC’s history of local, on-the-ground organizing 
throughout its entire organization life still requires deeper unpacking, interrogating, and re-
visioning, particularly with an eye for the lessons we can glean from it for today. Further, we 
must rescue SNCC’s history from the dominant narrative of the civil rights liberal framework. 
Thus far, historiographical celebrations of SNCC’s “heroic period” of grassroots organizing have 
by and large re-inscribed the logic of the civil rights liberal alliance. They perpetuate the same 
narrative of the Black freedom struggle that helped to consolidate and expand the power of 
liberal allies at the expense of power for Black people.  
In the post-Sixties world, the work of remembering and retelling the history of that 
particular period of the ongoing Black freedom struggle is imperative. But our historical 
narratives are not removed from the same kinds of politics that our subjects faced. When our 
histories of what Black actors did in the civil rights movement and Black Power eras are simple, 
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clean, and pretty, so that they celebrate respectability and morality, and condemn violence, for 
example; or when they romanticize SNCC for their local on-the-ground organizing but condemn 
them for their Black Power rhetoric, we perpetuate the same dynamics that maintain status quo 
hierarchies like white supremacy, capitalism, and patriarchy.  
The civil rights liberal alliance allowed for a nation-shaking social movement to emerge 
out of Black communities and become one of the central defining factors of the postwar era in 
the United States. But it also paved a new way for whites in power to maintain their power, and 
in fact expand it, while at the same time appearing to be more invested than ever before in the 
needs, interests, and humanity of Black people. We have not yet seen a significant structural 
transformation in the way that power functions in the United States. Thus, when our histories 
point toward a progressive narrative of change, culminating in the election of Barack Obama, for 
example, we are perpetuating the myth of the civil rights liberal alliance and continuing to de-
center Black humanity in our shared liberation struggle.2 
One approach has been to find as many instances of activism, resistance, and power in 
the Black community as possible as a way to combat the hegemony of civil rights liberalism. 
These inititatives are valuable. But a dominant trend now in Black freedom struggle scholarship 
has taken this approach to a troubling extreme in the form of the long civil rights movement. By 
erasing distinctions and specificity within the ongoing Black freedom struggle, even in the name 
of highlighting previously unseen or unacknowledged key sites of activism, we risk glossing 
over everything. Thus, struggle is struggle, and action is action, and power is power. But this 
                                                
2 While I use Obama’s presidential election as an example of a mythic narrative of American 
progress, I do not mean to diminish the historical importance of his election or presidency for 
African Americans or the United States as a whole. Obama’s election is certainly an important 
political milestone. Instead, I am challenging some of the dominant narratives that suggest his 
election symbolizes the achievement of a post-racist society and the end of the struggle for 
African American equality in the United States.  
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kind of simplicity is exactly the logic that allowed for the white supremacy of the civil rights 
liberal alliance, and has allowed it to continue in the present day. Historians of the 20th century 
Black freedom struggle risk becoming the primary agents to perpetuate these narratives. We have 
an obligation to demand specificity and precision in our histories in order to combat that 
possibility. 
 Some of the greatest confusions around SNCC have been in terms of its relationship to 
radicalism. Defamatory declensionist narratives have equated SNCC’s perceived decline in 
tandem with its perceived turn towards radicalism. Alternately, defenses of SNCC and Black 
power against these narratives have sought to celebrate the radicalism of Black Power as a 
symbol of SNCC’s deepening commitment to Black people and Black freedom. Both of these 
approaches reflect yet another instance in which SNCC’s trajectory has been misinterpreted. 
Though SNCC was in the process of transitioning from operating within the liberal framework of 
the civil rights movement and towards a radical framework connected to themes of Black Power, 
the initial call for Black Power in 1966 and the organizing program around which it was based 
were not part of a radical framework. Some scholars have called this a form of ethnic pluralism 
rather than Black radicalism. In line with this understanding, it is more accurate to locate the 
emergence of a radical programmatic framework in SNCC much later than the initial Black 
Power moment that has been so maligned and celebrated in our various historical narratives. By 
1969, both James Forman and H. Rap Brown had articulated very different visions of what Black 
Power meant in terms of Black liberation than the one articulated by Stokely Carmichael in 
1966-67. However, neither of these visions were given a chance to have a significant impact on 
SNCC organizationally. The shifting political terrain of the late-1960s Black freedom struggle 
included state repression of SNCC and difficulties due to the withholding of financial resources 
 216	
and other support by former liberal allies. These changes in combination with the longstanding 
internal struggles that SNCC was still navigating prevented later articulations of Black Power 
from fully taking root within the organization. Thus, SNCC’s political trajectory is more 
accurately the story of the rejection of the civil rights liberal alliance from within an organization 
whose work was formerly deeply rooted within the liberal civil rights framework rather than a 
story about Black Power radicalism eclipsing civil rights liberalism.  
This distinction is valuable in two ways: 1) for specificity and accuracy. Conflating Black 
Power with a realized radical political program ignores the ways in which Black Power was still 
entwined with liberalism and mainstream U.S. politics, in spite of its open rejection of them. 
This misidentification disserves our continued and much needed development of meaningful 
radical political programs and visions; 2) it is valuable for helping to explicitly disaggregate 
mainstream liberal visions of freedom from actual visions of freedom. Liberation depends on 
developing strategies and building relationships that have the potential to undermine the 
hierarchies of power that structure our lives. Liberalism by nature seeks to affirm existing 
hierarchies of power, while using strategies of gradualism, reform, and co-optation to romance 
its opponents into submission and invisibilize its own power.  
SNCC’s public break with liberalism was a significant turning point in the civil rights 
liberal alliance. Among its most important lessons was the demonstration that liberalism could 
not be a legitimate ally for liberation. Unfortunately, this lesson has never fully taken root in our 
continued struggle. SNCC’s inability to move past its relationship to liberalism illustrates the 
actual difficulty that such a paradigm shift entails. 
Distinguishing between Black Power as a marker of anti-liberalism rather than a realized 
radical program is critically important to ongoing struggles for liberation. It encourages those in 
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the present moment to recognize that challenging the liberal framework that continues to define 
and influence our visions of liberation is an important part of our struggles, but it is not the same 
as embracing radical programs of change. We do a disservice to our struggles for freedom by 
leaving such distinctions murky and by not seeking deeper precision in our strategies and visions 
of liberation. 
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